DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

MASTER OF ARTS-POLITICAL SCIENCES

SEMESTER -IV

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

SOFT CORE 402

BLOCK-1

FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavours.

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

BLOCK-1

BLOCK-2

BLOCK 1: POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Introduction to the Block

Unit 1 deals with the Social base of politics and in this unit we introduce you to basic concepts in sociology. These concepts include that of society itself.

Unit 2 deals with the scope of Political Sociology. Sociology, as compared to other social sciences, like economics and political science, is a young discipline.

Unit 3 deals with Social stratification and politics; caste class, Elites, Gender and politics. This unit is intended to acquaint you with the social structures on which political institutions base their actions.

Unit 4 deals with Power and politics: Durkheim, Much of Durkheim's work was concerned with how societies could maintain their integrity and coherence in modernity, an era in which traditional social and religious ties are no longer assumed, and in which new social institutions have come into being.

Unit 5 deals with Power and Politics: Marxism. This unit will explain the key notion of class as used by Karl Marx. We shall study in detail about the various criteria that are basic for calling any collectivity a class

Unit 6 deals with Power and Authority: Max Webber. In this unit, you will find some of Weber's important contributions in understanding power and authority.

Unit 7 deals with Cultural theory perspectives. Political culture is an established and seemingly inescapable concept, but it has a deeply problematic standing in political science.

UNIT 1: SOCIAL BASE OF POLITICS

STRUCTURE

1.0 OBJECTIVES

After you have read this unit we expect that you will be able-to:

- To explain the concept of society;
- To describe the nature of social groups;
- To discuss the concepts of status and role;
- To explain the relation between culture and human behaviour;
- To describe social change and social control; and
- To discuss sociological methods.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this unit we introduce you to basic concepts in sociology. These concepts include that of society itself. The social group is discussed, as it is basic to society. We then discuss status and role, which are crucial concepts. This unit also introduces the concepts of social institution and sociological method. Further, we explain various aspects of culture including folkways and norms. The unit rounds off with explanations of social change and social control. This is an important unit for grasping some of the basic concepts of political sociology.

Political sociology is the study of power and the relationship between societies, states, and political conflict. It is a broad subfield that straddles political science and sociology, with "macro" and "micro" components. The macrofocus has centered on questions about nation-states, political institutions and their development, and the sources of social and political change (especially those involving large-scale social movements and other forms of collective action). Here, researchers have asked "big" questions about how and why political institutions take the form that they do, and how and when they undergo significant change. The micro orientation, by contrast, examines how social identities and groups influence individual political behavior, such as voting, attitudes, and political participation. While both the macro- and micro-areas of political sociology overlap with political science, the distinctive focus of political sociologists is less on the internal workings or mechanics of the political system and more on the underlying social forces that shape the political system. Political sociology can trace its origins to the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber, among others, but it only emerged as a separate subfield within sociology after

World War II. Many of the landmark works of the 1950s and 1960s centered on microquestions about the impact of class, religion, race/ethnicity, or education on individual and group-based political behavior. Beginning in the 1970s, political sociologists increasingly turned toward macrotopics, such as understanding the sources and consequences of revolutions, the role of political institutions in shaping political outcomes, and large-scale comparative-historical studies of state development. Today both micro- and macroscholarship can be found in political sociology.

Political sociology is a border field between political science and sociology, and the term encompasses the overlap between these two neighboring disciplines. It denotes the analysis of the inter-relationship between the social and the political, social structures and political institutions, between the society and the state. There is no stable consensus of what counts as political sociology in contrast to sociology and political science proper. There have been great variations over time in the popularity of political sociology and in the tendencies to emphasize it as a genuine field of its own. Nevertheless a common element is that political sociology is related to the distinction between the social and the political.

Political sociology bridges the fields of sociology and political science by addressing issues of power and authority with a focus on state/civil society relations. Political sociology differs from political science in that it includes and often focuses on the civil society side of the equation rather than placing an emphasis on the state and/or political elites. Core areas of research include state formation and change, forms of political rule, major social policies, political institutions and challenges to them (including reform-oriented and revolutionary social movements), political parties and the social bases of political attitudes and behaviors, class/power relations, and the political consequences of globalization. The field includes distinct major approaches, yet theoretical combination and synthesis is common. Many early and contemporary studies utilize comparative historical analysis, especially with regard to critical junctures and historical processes and developments, whereas current work has become methodologically more eclectic. Contemporary

political issues and events, regimes in power, and cases relating to the United States and Europe tend to garner the most scholarly attention, though there is a steadily growing body of theory and empirical work beyond the core capitalist democracies.

A long line of work in political sociology and political science has focused on how meanings attributed to the nation affect people's self-understanding and how such conceptions relate to a given country's overarching political culture. Classic studies in this tradition were based on a functionalist understanding of culture as a coherent system of agreed-upon values that facilitates social cohesion; this logically implied that the task for nationalism scholars was to uncover each nation's essential and stable cultural characteristics. For instance, in Continental Divide, Lipset (1990) argues that the national identity of the United States consists of the central tenets of the American Creed: antistatism, individualism, populism, and egalitarianism. In contrast, Canada – Lipset's comparison case – prioritizes a distinct set of principles, including deference to authority, collectivism, elitism, and group-based particularism. Such large-scale cultural generalizations were typical of post-War scholarship, as exemplified by the work of Myrdal (1944), Hartz (1964), and the broader enterprise of consensus history.

An influential legacy of the functionalist approach has been the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, initially made by Friedrich Meinecke ([1907]1970) and subsequently elaborated by Hans Kohn (1944). This binary opposition assumes a stable character to national identity, but differentiates between two alternatives: the first based on ascriptive criteria such as race, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, or language and the second on elective criteria, such as commitment to the country's core ideology, subjective identification with a national community, and respect for the nation's laws and traditions. This dichotomy has been used to classify the central ideologies of specific nations – with Germany as the prototype of ethnic nationalism and France of civic nationalism – and occasionally entire world regions.

The view of national culture as stable and homogenous has been challenged by more recent research. Rogers Smith's (1997) work on citizenship law in the United States, for instance, reveals a layered and

often contradictory patchwork of legislation and court decisions informed by three distinct ideological perspectives (i.e., liberalism, republicanism, and 'ascriptive Americanism'), which have competed for dominance over the course of American history. Others have critiqued the ethnic–civic distinction on theoretical and empirical grounds for attributing essential properties to entire countries and regions and glossing over considerable within-country heterogeneity (Kaufmann, 2000; Shulman, 2002; Brubaker, 2004; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2008).

Despite its limitations, functionalist research on national identity has generated a number of valuable insights. Perhaps most importantly, it has helped scholars recognize that even though nationalism has become a hegemonic ideology in modern society, the content of nationalist beliefs can be highly variable. This work has also highlighted the inherent tendency of nationalism toward social exclusion: given that nationalism is predicated on a fundamental belief in the unique characteristics of each nation, it inevitably draws sharp symbolic and social boundaries around national communities based on a range of arbitrary criteria. Of course, the need for distinguishing between members and nonmembers is necessary for every state's ability to fulfill its core functions, such as generating tax revenue, managing economic development, providing social programs, and ensuring national security, but how such distinctions are made and maintained is an important object of study.

While the functionalist approach attempted to identify the shared attributes of a given political culture, more recent work in cultural sociology has focused on national narratives, which serve as focal points for collective identification. This tradition is inspired by the classic Durkheimian insight that in order to maintain social solidarity, collectivities must engage in ritualistic practices that imbue shared symbols with moral meaning. Thus, studies have paid particular attention to ritualistic events such as parades, concerts, festivals, and sporting events (Waldstreicher, 1997) as well as commemorative practices, such as the construction of national memorials and monuments (Collins, 2012). These empirical sites often reveal not only widely shared narratives, but also processes of contestation over the dominant interpretation of a nation's past, its core values, and its future aspirations.

Once such symbolic conflicts subside, the symbols produced in the process come to serve as tacit reminders of the primacy of the nation-state in everyday life. This is as true of memorials and holidays, as it is of more banal manifestations of the nation-state, such as currency, commemorative street names, or flags waving over private homes and businesses (Billig, 1995). These ritual practices are not merely by-products of collective identification, but are essential for the reproduction of the national community.

1.2   KEY SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS

Let us first see what is meant by concepts. A concept is a word or phrase, which is abstract from actual experience and which, more or less, means the same thing to all those familiar with it. A concept represents a class of phenomena. Thus, car is a concept, which signifies a vehicle of a particular kind. Once we are familiar with the concept of car, we do not always have to see it physically in order to know, what someone means by it. Similarly, a house or a table lamp is also concepts. Concepts are necessary in every science since accuracy is achieved through them. Every scientific discipline is continuously developing a refined set of concepts, which, to those familiar with that discipline, will mean the same thing at all times. Sociology, too, has a large number of concepts, which are similarly understood by all sociologists. Here, we shall introduce you to some important sociological concepts. Many of these concepts, it will be noticed, are expressed in words or terms, which are of daily use. It is necessary to be careful with their sociological usage, because in sociology, these very terms are used in some special sense:

1.2.1 The Concept of Society

Society is viewed by sociologists as s chain of social relationships. A relationship is social, when it is determined by mutual awareness, that is, the behaviour of one individual influences the behaviour of another. For example, when a teacher enters the classroom, students stop making noise and stand up as a mark of respect for their teacher. This behaviour signifies the social relationship between the teacher and the taught. Thus, social relationships exist only when individuals behave towards one

another in ways determined by their recognition of each other. This is why society is called a relational concept. In other words, society is not a substantial concept. It does not denote a concrete reality; rather it refers to social relationships, which become institutionalised, when people relate to each other in well-established and familiar ways.

1.2.2 Types of Society

The predominant types of social relationships form the basis of classifying human society in various types. Most sociologists contrast the industrial society in which they live with all other types. Some sociologists like Spencer and Durkheim, classified societies on the basis of their size or scale and other features, such as, the extent and degree of the division of labour, political organisation and social stratification, etc. Some scholars, like Karl Marx, distinguish them on the basis of their economic institutions. Thus, there are clearly many ways of classifying societies. Without going into complicated arguments at this stage of your introduction to sociology, it is necessary to realise that there is no ideal classification and no 'pure' example of various types of society. In broad terms, taking the wider interests of sociology into consideration, we can divide societies into two types, namely; simple and complex. All primitive or tribal social organisations are included among simple societies. The industrial societies with overlapping sets of social relationships are called complex societies.

Activity 1

Reflect about the type of society you live in and write a short note of one page about your understanding of your society.

Compare your answer with those of other students at your study centre and discuss with your Academic Counsellor.

1.3 SOCIAL GROUPS

The concept of group is central to sociology. While in normal discourse, we regard any collection of two or more individuals to be a group, sociologically, individuals constituting a group must be conscious of a common belongingness, of sharing some common understanding,

common interests and goals as well as accepting certain rights and obligations. In this sense, a family or a class can be called a group. A society or community can also be called a group.

1.3.1 Primary Groups

First coined by the sociologist, Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929), a primary group is relatively small (though not all small groups are primary). Its members generally have face-to-face contact, and thus, have intimate and co-operative relationships, as well as strong loyalty. The relationships between the members are ends in themselves. There is a basic human need for face to face, intimate co-operative interaction with others. That is, members derive pleasure and enjoyment merely by associating with one another. They have no other particular ends or goals in view. The primary group comes to an end, when one or more members leave it; they cannot be substituted by others. The best example of a primary group is the family or the friendship, or 'peer' group, as sociologists call it.

1.3.2 Secondary Groups

Secondary groups, in several respects, are the opposite of primary groups. These are generally large size groups, though not always so. Members of the secondary group maintain relatively limited, formal and impersonal relationship with one another. Unlike primary groups, secondary groups are specific or specialised interest groups. Generally, a well-defined, division of labour characterises these groups. Member can be substituted and replaced, hence, a secondary group may continue irrespective of whether its original members continue to be its members or not. A cricket team, a music club, an army or a factory, and so on, is examples of secondary groups. It is possible that within secondary groups, some members may come close to one another and develop primary relations and form a group of peers. Several sociological studies have shown that the presence of primary groups in armies, factories, and other secondary groups, have contributed to high level of morale, and more effective functioning

1.4 STATUS AND ROLE

The variety of social relations in any society is obviously countless. Parenthood, marriage, friendships, neighbor liness, and similar examples, illustrate the enormous range of social relations, which sociologists examine and on the basis of which they try to understand society. Each social relation is conceived, for purposes of analysis and understanding, in terms of two components, namely, status and role.

Status, also referred to as social position by some writers, is the 'socially defined location or place', which an individual occupies in a system of interaction or society. Thus, in any interaction, none of the participants is without status. Indeed, no individual can interact with another, if his/her status, as well as that of the person or persons, is not clear in a given situation. Thus, interaction in the family poses no problems because each members knows well the status he/she and others are occupying. This knowledge allows for a smooth flow and predictable interaction. But, when we encounter a stranger, we first of all want to know his or her status. Until this is known, we are not clear, how we should behave: towards him or her. Thus, it is status and knowledge of status that facilitates patterned interaction.

1.4.1 Types of Status

Sociologists make a distinction between 'ascribed' and 'achieved' statuses. Positions, which one is born into or one acquires without one's own effort, are known as ascribed status. Mostly, kinship statuses come in this category. Achieved statuses are, in contrast, based on and defined by what people do or acquire through their own effort. Usually, people's occupational positions come in this category. Only in some cases, it is possible to have both ascribed and achieved aspects in the same status, a hereditary priest in an Indian village, for example, may be rejected if he fails to learn the required scriptures.

1.4.2 Multiple Statuses

It should also be clear that every individual occupies multiple statuses. Even a young infant is a son, a grandson, a brother, a nephew, and so on.

As we grow up, we may get into even more status positions. Public figures and other important men, women simultaneously occupy several statuses. There is, however, one key status in terms of which the individual is ultimately identified and evaluated. In modern societies, one's occupation indicates one's key status.

1.4.3 The Concept of Role

We turn now to the concept of role. Role is the behavioural aspect of status; there can be no statuses without a corresponding role attached to it Role is, thus, the dynamic aspect of status and consists of rights and duties attached to it. Thus, an individual occupying the status of a father, simultaneously, has some rights over his children, as well as, some responsibilities towards them. Statuses and roles are, thus, two sides of the same coin. Role refers both to the actual behaviour of an individual occupying a particular status, as well as to a set of expectations regarding behaviour, shared by those involved in particular social relations. Thus, in the teacher-student relations, the teacher has an expectation as to how the student interacting with him will or should behave. The students, too, in turn, have their own set of expectations. Should either of them fail to act according to other's expectations, their relations are adversely affected. Since individuals, by and large, fulfil role expectation, society gains uniformity of behaviour. This discussion indicates the significance of the concept of role. Indeed, it is one of the basic units of analysis of social order in human societies and later, more will be discussed about this concept.

1.5   SOCIAL INSTITUTION

Social institution can be defined as a 'broad goal-oriented behaviour, which is firmly established'. It becomes possible to understand and predict the behaviour of people because of this established pattern of behaviour found in a society. The study of social institutions, therefore, includes groups, roles, norms, beliefs and practices in a particular area of social life. Social institution provides the framework within which people in different societies and cultures live. It provides the very structure of society. People are born in a family, which is an institution. They are

nurtured and socialised in this institution, which is governed by the values, norms and mores of that society. How the family and its members earn their living depends upon the economic institutions of their society. How they maintain order and administration depends on the political institutions of that society. How information and skills are passed from one generation to another, depends upon the educational institution of that society. Finally, how people explain their existence in society, from where they have come before birth and where they will go after death, i.e. the 'religious experience' is established by the religious institutions. . Thus, all social institutions in a given society are inter-related. Family as an institution forms the pivot around which all other social institutions move as it provides the individual members to the society. Therefore, as Perry and Peny (1973 : pp. 300) mention, "its important to remember that institutions are simply abstract concepts of organised habits and standardised ways of doing things. We cannot see institutions, what we can see are families, schools, banks and so on." Culture is an essential aspect of all societies. You will learn more about it in the next section.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

ii) Compare your answers with those given at the end of this unit.

1) Define the concept of society, in eight lines.

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2) Show the difference between primary and secondary groups. Use about six lines

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3) Distinguish between status and role. Write about five lines for your answer.

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1.6   CULTURE

Besides society, role, status and institution, culture is another important theme that engages the attention of sociologists. Ordinarily, even those, who are not at all familiar with sociology, are familiar with the word 'culture'. In our daily life, we may describe some people as very 'cultured'. We give such a label ifpersons concerned are refined and polished in their behaviour and manner. But sociologists do not use the term 'culture' in this sense. They have their own, special understanding of it. In sociological terms, culture can be defined as the total sum of human activities, which are learnt. It is passed on from generation to generation through membership of a particular society. As various learning processes in human societies involve systems of tools, communications and symbols, we can also say that the concept of culture refers to a system of tools, communications and symbols. People in order to learn new activities require tools, language and symbols. Cultures in human societies differ from one another and also, change over time. One of the gains of studying sociology is that besides giving an idea of various cultures, it also helps to develop an understanding of other cultures than one's own.

1.6.1 Culture and Human Behaviour

A little reflection will show that in similar situations, people of different cultures reveal differences in the way they meet these situations. For example, while greeting friends and relatives, at home or on the street, men in our society may shake hands with other men but as a rule, not with women. Similarly, notwithstanding great hunger, a vegetarian refuses non-vegetarian food. This is because culture influences our behaviour in given situations. Stated in sociological terms, culture is normative, that is, it provides standards of proper conduct, and also therefore, tells us, what is right or wrong. Concretely, these standards are provided to us by what are called cultural norms. Thus, while many college students smoke these days, they do not normally do so in the presence of their elders or teachers. In our culture, such an act is considered to be wrong, that is, contrary to our cultural norms. The

content of the non-material culture of every society consists of a large number of norms. These norms are learnt and enforced by folkways and mores.

1.6.2 Folkways

There are behaviour patterns that govern most of our daily life and contacts with other people. Thus, rising up from seats, when teachers enter into classrooms, allowing women to purchase tickets without queuing, distribution of sweets after getting a job or a promotion, and so on, are examples of folkways. A number of folkways are simply acts of politeness. In order that folkways may not be taken lightly, mechanisms such as praise, approval and acceptance exist to make individuals conform to them. Conversely, a word of' criticism, frown, or sarcastic remark or laughter are modes of expressing disapproval of incorrect behaviour. Since most people desire that they should not look funny or be considered rude and uncouth by their group, they fall in line with what the group expects and desires. Therefore, most people conform to the folkways without even being aware that they are conforming, or that there are alternative ways of behaving.

1.6.3 Mores

These are norms that are considered to be more important by group, and even vital for its welfare. Violation of the mores evokes an emotional response and instead of the mere raising of eyebrow or ridicule, a strong group action follows. Thus, prohibition of the consumption of beef and alcoholic drinks are part of the mores of Hindu and Muslim societies, respectively. Any violation ofthese will not be tolerated. Mores are linked to cultural values. It should now be clear that mores are norms of a higher order than folkways. There is an element of compulsion in them and they are linked to the dominant values of the culture. Mores clearly and definitely reflect the concepts of what is moral and immoral. This is seen from the fact that mores are generally expressed in terms of 'must behaviour' (for example, all married men and women must rerpain faithful to their spouses and must observe sexual fidelity) or, negatively,

in terms of 'must-not' behaviour, for example, women should not expose their bodies.

1.6.4 Values

Values, the ultimate essence and spirit of cultures, are the underlying principles and ideas on the basis of which societies and individuals choose their goals. Values are also the criteria on which social and individual ends and means are judged and evaluated. Apart from goals, all conduct and behaviour whether for achieving these goals, or otherwise, are judged and evaluated in the framework of accepted values. Any action that is contrary to the cherished values of the group or society is condemned and punished. For example, in Indian society there is a value regarding junior persons' behaviour towards senior persons. Any deviance from accepted behaviour is always a subject of criticism. Unlike norms, which are quite specific, values tend to be generalised ideals and somewhat abstract; nevertheless, they attract the total commitment of the society.

1.6.5 Sub-cultures

Another important point to bear in mind is, that in the case of complex and heterogeneous societies, like India, which are characterised by many religious, linguistic and other diversities, it is usual to have a number of sub-cultures within the framework of the larger overall cultures. Thus, in India, religious communities like Muslims, Christians or Sikhs or linguistic groups like Tamilians, Maharashtrians or Punjabis and so on, have their own sub-cultural characteristics that distinguish them from other communities or groups. But simultaneously, we also share certain core values like secularism, democracy and equality of all citizens, irrespective of our diversities, and these integrate us. But heterogeneous societies have constantly to keep emphasising and nurturing their more universal and cultural values so that they are not forsaken in favour of the sub-cultural values.

1.7 SOCIAL CHANGE

In tracing the origins of sociology, as well as in pointing out the concerns of early Sociologists, it had been indicated that the changes brought by the industrial revolution had a major role to play in the birth of modem sociology. Due to this, sociology and sociologists have never lost sight of the study of social change, and this interest has been major concern of the discipline throughout its entire history of about two hundred years. Although, sociologists have been studyingthe process of social change for a long time, it is difficult to give a brief and precise definition. Social change refers to the process by which alterations occur in society or social relations. Social change is a continuous process. Social change can be caused by many factors. Increased population can bring about changes. Innovations-i.e., new ideas or an object can bring about new relationships. It is also possible that one society can borrow ideas or objects from other societies, which may cause variation in social relations. Later on, you would be studying various theories of social change (evolution, cyclical, conflict, modernisation and development). The leading sociologists, who have been referred to in Unit 2, have their own ideas about how change occurs, which will be discussed later.

1.7.1 Agents of Change

An important question is the identity of agents of change. As mentioned earlier, any sub-units or institutions are instruments through which social change can be effected. Some of the institutions are more important than others-the economic, political and educational institutions are more central in effecting change. Religion can act as an agent of change as well as resistance to change. Although, the society continuously undergoes change, it must be pointed out that there is usually resistance to change. New ideas and new behaviour patterns are not easily accepted. Even material innovations also take time to be accepted and diffused in any society (trains were considered in England as the work of the devils. Resistance is greater, when traditional values and beliefs are involved.

1.7.2 Rate of Change

Another question is with regard to the rate of change. In societies, which are industrialised and use sophisticated technology (which itself has

brought about changes), the rate of change is more rapid than in pre-industrial societies. Another important fact to be kept in mind is that a great deal of change today is caused by planning. This is referred to as guided change, which is being undertaken in many developing countries. This would be discussed further in the unit on social development.

Activity 2

Within your family, ask your grandparents or their cousins about the kind of changes that they observe today in our society which were not present when they were children. Make a note of one page and discuss it with other students at your study centre.

1.8 SOCIAL CONTROL

Social control is a process to regulate behaviour within society. In a sense, social control is to discourage people from deviating from the established values and norms. Because of social control, people live up to what is expected of them. Social control is an aspect of all social institutions and thus, it is pervasive to social life on the whole. Behaviour of people is controlled both by positive and negative sanctions. The aim of both these types of sanction is to encourage people to conform to the norms. Positive sanction can include praise, gifts and promotion whereas negative sanction can be punishment, demotion ridicule or boycott. Social control is not necessarily always successful. There are different approaches to the study of social control, these will be discussed in later units.

1.9 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS

Sociologists have used many methods in studying society. In Unit 1, we have already discussed the scientific method and its characteristics. Although, sociologists may use different methods, the scientific approach is basic to all ofthem. The historical method involves the study of origins, development and transformation of social institutions. In this method, a sociologist uses information pertaining to one or more societies over a long period of time. The main approach is to try to get

some insights from the past experiences with regard to social behaviour In comparative method, data from different countries, different regions or different religions are gathered. An effort is made to see whether there are any common factors, which can explain patterns of behaviour. The empirkal method refers to collection of data from the field. The facts of social life P are studied and described as they exist. The techniques used in this method are I , observation, survey, experimental, case studies. These methods are not necessarily exclusive. There can be a combination of them. The purpose of all these methods, in a way, is to try to answer the questions: 'Why do people behave the way they do? The sociological theories and concepts have emerged as a result of these studies.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

ii) Compare your answers with those given at the end of this unit.

1) Write a note in ten lines on social division in tribal societies.

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2) What is social control? Explain in about five lines.

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1.10 LET US SUM UP

This unit has explained clearly some important concepts in sociology. They are in fact concepts which keep appearing in the following units. We hope you have grasped these concepts, such as, those of society, social group, status and role, socialinaitutions. This unit is understood well by the student kor then it would help them better to understand the following units.

Political sociology is concerned with the sociological analysis of political phenomena ranging from the State and civil society to the family,

investigating topics such as citizenship, social movements, and the sources of social power. The lineage of this discipline is typically traced from such thinkers as Montesquieu, Smith and Ferguson through the founding fathers of sociology – Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber – to such contemporary theorists as Gellner, Giddens, Habermas and Mann. Where a typical research question in political sociology might have been, "Why do so few American or European citizens choose to vote?" or even, "What difference does it make if women get elected?", political sociologists also now ask, "How is the body a site of power?", "How are emotions relevant to global poverty?", and, "What difference does knowledge make to democracy?

Traditionally, there were four main areas of research.

The sociopolitical formation of the modern state

How social inequality between groups (class, race, gender) influences politics. How public opinion, ideologies, personalities, social movements, and trends outside of the formal institutions of political power affect formal politics Power relationships within and between social groups (e.g. families, workplaces, bureaucracy, media)

In other words, political sociology was traditionally concerned with how social trends, dynamics, and structures of domination affect formal political processes, as well as exploring how various social forces work together to change political policies. From this perspective, we can identify three major theoretical frameworks: pluralism, elite or managerial theory, and class analysis, which overlaps with Marxist analysis. Pluralism sees politics primarily as a contest among competing interest groups. Elite or managerial theory is sometimes called a state-centered approach. It explains what the state does by looking at constraints from organizational structure, semi-autonomous state managers, and interests that arise from the state as a unique, power-concentrating organization. A leading representative is Theda Skocpol. Social class theory analysis emphasizes the political power of capitalist elites.[It can be split into two parts: one is the "power structure" or "instrumentalist" approach, whereas another is the structuralist approach. The power structure approach focuses on the question of who rules and

its most well-known representative is G. William Domhoff. The structuralist approach emphasizes the way a capitalist economy operates; only allowing and encouraging the state to do some things but not others (Nicos Poulantzas, Bob Jessop).

Contemporary political sociology takes these questions seriously, but it is concerned with the play of power and politics across societies, which includes, but is not restricted to, relations between the state and society. In part, this is a product of the growing complexity of social relations, the impact of social movement organizing, and the relative weakening of the state as a result of globalization. To a significant part, however, it is due to the radical rethinking of social theory. This is as much focused now on micro questions (such as the formation of identity through social interaction, the politics of knowledge, and the effects of the contestation of meaning on structures), as it is on macro questions (such as how to capture and use state power). Chief influences here include cultural studies (Stuart Hall), post-structuralism (Michel Foucault, Judith Butler), pragmatism (Luc Boltanski), structuration theory (Anthony Giddens), and cultural sociology (Jeffrey C. Alexander).

Political sociology attempts to explore the dynamics between the two institutional systems introduced by the advent of Western capitalist system that are the democratic constitutional liberal state and the capitalist economy. While democracy promises impartiality and legal equality before all citizens, the capitalist system results in unequal economic power and thus possible political inequality as well.

For pluralists, the distribution of political power is not determined by economic interests but by multiple social divisions and political agendas. The diverse political interests and beliefs of different factions work together through collective organizations to create a flexible and fair representation that in turn influences political parties which make the decisions. The distribution of power is then achieved through the interplay of contending interest groups. The government in this model functions just as a mediating broker and is free from control by any economic power. This pluralistic democracy however requires the existence of an underlying framework that would offer mechanisms for citizenship and expression and the opportunity to organize

representations through social and industrial organizations, such as trade unions. Ultimately, decisions are reached through the complex process of bargaining and compromise between various groups pushing for their interests. Many factors, pluralists believe, have ended the domination of the political sphere by an economic elite. The power of organized labour and the increasingly interventionist state have placed restrictions on the power of capital to manipulate and control the state. Additionally, capital is no longer owned by a dominant class, but by an expanding managerial sector and diversified shareholders, none of whom can exert their will upon another.

The pluralist emphasis on fair representation however overshadows the constraints imposed on the extent of choice offered. Bachrauch and Baratz (1963) examined the deliberate withdrawal of certain policies from the political arena. For example, organized movements that express what might seem as radical change in a society can often by portrayed as illegitimate.

1.11 KEY WORDS

Culture : The system of behaviour, customs, regulations that are learnt and socially acquired.

Folkways : Behaviour patterns that govern daily life and interactions, e.g. ways of addressing one another.

Mores : Ways of behaviour that are crucial for the welfare of a society, e.g. non-violence, fidelity, non-thieving and so on.

Role : In social life man and woman undertakes many responsibilities, e.g. husband, mother, son, etc. They are various roles.

Status : Consists of rights and duties of a person in any position. Each status has a role or set of actions attached to it, e.g. the teacher must teach.

1.12 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1) Define the concept of society, in eight lines.
2) Show the difference between primary and secondary groups. Use about six lines

3) Distinguish between status and role. Write about five lines for your answer.

4) Write a note in ten lines on social division in tribal societies.

5) What is social control? Explain in about five lines.

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1.14 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1) Society is a relational concept. It does not refer to a concrete reality. It is viewed as a chain or a network of social relationships. A relationship becomes social only when individuals interact in ways determined by well-established and familiar recognition of each other. So, we can say that the concept of society refers to social relationships, which become institutionalised.

2) Primary groups of a characterised by personalised relationships among their members. They are typically small and profoundly influence the members' behaviour. Secondary groups, on the other hand, are relatively larger and more impersonal. These groups are, generally, formed with a specific goal.

3) Within a set of social relationships among people, a place or a position is referred to by the term 'status'. Each status carries with it a generally expected behaviour. This behaviour is termed as 'role'. Role is, thus, the dynamic aspect of status.

Check Your Progress 2

1) Social change is a continuous process, which refers to changes occurring in society or social relations. Multiple factors, such as, increased population, innovations, natural disasters, political conflicts, etc., cause changes in society. Subunits or institutions in society are instruments through which social change is effected. In pre-industrial societies, the rate of change is slower as compared to fast speed of change in industrial societies.

2) Social control refers to a regulatory process, which encourages people to confarming to established values and norms. Non-conformity is considered to be a deviant behaviour. Social control is exercised through the mechanism of positive and negative sanctions.

UNIT 2: THE SCOPE OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

STRUCTURE

2.0 OBJECTIVES

After you have studied this unit, you should be able to:

- To give a definition of sociology;

- To describe social groups and their different classifications;
- To explain the major concerns of sociology;
- To describe the relation between sociology and science;
- To explain the relation between sociology and other social sciences; and
- To give in brief the ideas about the founding fathers of sociology such as, Comte,
- Durkheim, Weber, Marx, and Spencer

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Sociology, as compared to other social sciences, like economics and political science, is a young discipline. One could say, it is about a hundred-and-fifty years old but there has been a more rapid development of the subject in the last fifty to sixty years. This is partly due to desire, particularly, after the Second World War, to understand more about the behaviour of people in social situations. All social science subjects are concerned with the behaviour of people but each of them studies defferent aspects. Sociology, however, is concerned with social relations in general, and with social groups and institutions in particular.

Two distinct but converging intellectual traditions are to be found in the theoretical and empirical writings of political sociology. Broadly conceived, political sociology is concerned with the social basis of power in all institutional sectors of society. In this tradition, political sociology deals with patterns of social stratification and their consequences in organized politics. It is one particular approach to the study of social organization and societal change. By contrast, in narrower terms, political sociology focuses on the organizational analysis of political groups and political leadership. In this perspective, the core of political sociology involves the study of both formal and informal party organization, with its linkages to the governmental bureaucracy, the legal system, interest groups, and the electorate at large. This approach is an expression of an institutional or organizational point of view.

As societies strive to become modernized and as the role of formally organized political parties becomes more and more dominant, it appears difficult to make a sharp distinction between the social stratification and

the institutional approaches to political sociology. Nevertheless, these perspectives assume persistently different conceptions about the political process and are reflections of the basic writings of Karl Marx and Max Weber, respectively, both of whom have deeply influenced the emergence of a sociology of politics.

Conceptions of the political process. From the formulations of Karl Marx has come the pervasive view that class conflict and social stratification derive from economic factors or from the social relations generated by the mode of production. But Marx's fundamental contribution is not limited to or even dependent upon the orientation that political behavior is an expression of economic interests. To the contrary, his essential contribution was that he made the study of political sociology equivalent to the study of societal structure, or macrosociology, as it has come to be called. Marx's view that the political system derives from the pattern of social stratification, rather than his specific emphasis on the primacy of economic factors in fashioning social relations, has been a dominant theme in the development of an empirical analysis of politics.

Nevertheless, such an orientation has been criticized, both by political scientists and by sociologists, because it reduces political events to a social by-product and fails to consider the consequences of differing types of political institutions on societal change. The social stratification view of politics has been described as a form of sociological reductionism that has inherent limitations because of the institutional and cultural factors which are excluded. The economic determinist view of social stratification is also seen as a barrier to comparative analysis because, by implication, it assumes the universality of a historical pattern of industrialism which holds, at the most, for western Europe and does not apply to the United States. Moreover, it is inappropriate to an understanding of the developing nations, where new forms of political organization are crucial in conditioning economic growth.

It is from the writings of Weber that political sociologists received an intellectual impetus for a more autonomous and more institutional view of politics. As a sociologist, Weber adopted a mode of reasoning which converged with that of Marx, in that he held a comprehensive view of social structure as a basis for analyzing politics. However, he saw social

stratification as encompassing both economic relations and social status—prestige and honor. Furthermore, in his essay "Class, Status, Party" (1921), Weber postulated that the emergence of modern society implied a historical process of separation of political institutions from economic and social structure. Political institutions thereby emerge as worthy of direct sociological inquiry because they are an independent source of societal change.

These classic formulations of a social stratification view and an institutional view of politics have persisted despite their reformulation in the light of historical events and intellectual criticism. As the division of labor has become more complex, social stratification theories have been reformulated as "interest group" theories. Politics is still seen as derived from the struggle and conflicts of social strata, but these are viewed as more differentiated and as expressing the demands of specific interest groups—economic, professional, organizational, and even ethnic–religious. Social stratification theories of politics have been broadened to include the view that the governmental bureaucracy and the political party itself have emerged as new strata and thereby as elements in the theory of interest groups.

The institutional approach has come to be reformulated as a theory of "societal strain." Political parties are seen as mechanisms for accommodating the strains that exist in modern society. Thus, the identification of elements that condition the effectiveness of political organization in performing this mediating function becomes a central topic of sociological inquiry. Because the political party penetrates all sectors of society and because quasipolitical institutions develop to assist the party in this mediating function, the strain theory of political sociology must extend widely beyond the internal structure of party organization. The political sociologist addresses himself to a range of overlapping empirical problems, whether he begins with a concern for underlying social stratification or with a direct investigation of political party organization.

Often differences between these theoretical positions involve differences of social values and conceptions of political philosophy. It is much too crude to label social stratification theories as radical and institutional

theories as moderate in their orientations to political change. The most that can be stated is that some theorists who emphasize social stratification in their view of political sociology are also committed to comprehensive and ideological positions of political change. By contrast, the exponents of institutional thinking often tend to be concerned with pragmatic and incrementalist strategies of political change.

Social Context Of Political Power

At the empirical level, the bulk of research in political sociology has been directed toward the investigation of the social basis of political cleavage and consensus. These studies are mainly derived from a social stratification theory of politics and have been characterized by a progressive refinement of categories of analysis, from broad concern with class and occupation to much more refined measures of social status. Through analysis of voting statistics and sample surveys, political party affiliation and voting behavior of the mass electorate have been charted in a voluminous literature. In almost every nation with multiple-party election systems, sample surveys have been introduced. As a result, it is possible to describe voting behavior in considerable detail, in terms of such variables as occupation, income, education, status, ethnicity, and religion. Some surveys have come to include such data as membership in voluntary associations, exposure to the mass media, and contact with political party organization. Experimental work has been done on the relevance of personality and social-psychological variables for understanding voting patterns. These empirical researches have focused mainly on the correlates of national election decisions; they have not probed ongoing mass contact and involvement with administrative agencies of government, even though these contacts are very powerful factors in molding popular perspectives toward the political process. [SeeVoting.]

While this body of research is an extremely valuable source of descriptive and historical documentation, the findings permit only a limited contribution to the theoretical aspects of political sociology. In part, the difficulties are technical. National surveys based on a limited number of cases produce valid results for the society as a whole, but this

approach does not produce sufficient data to isolate the political behavior of specific social and economic subgroups on the basis of a trend analysis. Moreover, comparisons between nations are difficult, if not impossible, to make with precision and clarity, because of the difficulty of developing appropriate standardized indexes.

The basic difficulty in empirical studies of consensus and cleavage is the failure to articulate sample surveys with theoretical issues. Most of these findings have been interpreted as supporting the view that advanced industrialism produces a "middle-majority" politics. "Middle-majority politics" implies the decline of class conflict between the working and middle classes and the emergence of a wider area of consensus among less differentiated social groupings. The gap between elements in the working class and the middle class is described as declining, and the political process is seen as transformed into a process of pragmatic bargaining over specific issues (see Lipset 1960). Middle-majority theories are primarily concerned with changes in occupational structure and do not focus on new sources of social tension and political conflict, such as those based on race, ethnicity, and religion. These stratification theories also underemphasize the impact of foreign affairs on the political orientations of the electorate.

While research studies document these trends in the transformation of social cleavage for some industrialized countries, especially the AngloAmerican countries and Scandinavia, the middlemajority theories have been criticized for failing to address themselves to the persistence of workingclass political behavior, especially in the Catholic countries of western Europe. It is also the case that the proliferation of middle-income occupations undoubtedly is transforming political orientations in the one-party systems of industrialized communist societies, such as that of the Soviet Union and those of eastern Europe. However, even in the absence of adequate empirical studies, it is clear that these political changes cannot be understood in terms of changes in social stratification alone. The development of middle-class occupations has very different implications in the developing nations, in that it contributes to discontinuities in the social hierarchy and thereby increases the potentialities for political instability.

Public opinion and ideology

Aggregate analysis of the social correlates of political participation and voting has been augmented by extensive research on mass public opinion and political ideology. While these research efforts also rely heavily on the use of the sample survey, they represent a refinement in the intellectual concerns of the social stratification approach, since they seek to explore the extent to which political attitudes not only reflect social structure but are influenced by party organization and the mass media. With the growth of representative institutions and the spread of both literacy and mass media of communication, the processes of government, in varying degree, become responsive to mass opinion. In turn, political parties and the administrative agencies of industrialized societies find it necessary to mobilize public opinion in order to achieve mass participation in social and economic institutions.

Systematic research into political opinion has produced a body of data which has considerable theoretical sophistication and which gives deeper meaning to studies of voting behavior and political participation. The techniques of opinion measurement enable the description of attitude structures toward specific political issues, political candidates, and political institutions. These studies focus on the detailed identification of those parts of the social structure which are characterized either by an absence of political orientations or by political orientations which are extremely weak or, at best, limited to very specific interests and issues. Political apathy has been found to be concentrated in lower-income groups and is a persistent aspect of highly industrialized societies, even with increasing levels of educational attainment. In one sense, the major findings drive home, to those political sociologists who have held an overpoliticalized view of man, a more realistic image that has long been recognized as valid by most political leaders. [SeePolitical participation.]

The concept of alienation has come to figure prominently in empirical research into public opinion. While this concept is fundamentally diffuse, it focuses on understanding the social and psychological processes which produce a withdrawal or disengagement from political interest and political participation. Political apathy appears to be a broader category, which includes both alienation and socially inherited disinterest in

politics. Available research does not permit any trend statement about an increase or decrease in political alienation but instead highlights the social groups particularly vulnerable to alienation, such as youth, minorities, and intellectuals. These researches are most relevant when they focus on the process by which a person becomes alienated. They imply that alienation is not a "steady state" but an orientation which can gradually or suddenly be reversed and produce direct intervention, outside the normal channels of political action.

The study of mass opinion converges with the analysis of popular ideologies. A sharp distinction must be made beween the developing and the industrialized societies. In the developing nations the concept of ideology is probably not applicable among traditional and peasant groups, if by "ideology" is meant a comprehensive, rigidly held, and explicit political belief system or "world view" (this is not to overlook the obvious and pervasive religious "world views" held by the mass of the population). But the intellectuals in these nations who have been trained in Europe or have had prolonged contact with Western political thought are deeply involved in ideological controversy. Moreover, with the rapid expansion of literacy, the mass media, and urbanization, middle-class groups in these nations develop explicit political preferences. In turn, ideological alternatives enter mass political debates.

By contrast, in Western industrialized nations this process of ideological diffusion has passed, and there has been a growth of consensus about many domestic, economic, and welfare issues which reflect the changing character of social stratification. At the level of elite or mass opinion, it would be exaggerated to speak of an "end of ideology" (Bell 1960), and more appropriate to refer to a constriction or transformation of ideology. An ideological outlook is still found among elements of the most politically active and involved. However, the bulk of the population, including better-educated groups, do not hold such ideological orientations but, rather, hold generalized party preferences which express, at best, partial ideologies or pragmatic responses to changing political and social circumstances. Specific ideological components also emerge and persist with respect to religious, ethnic, and racial issues and conceptions of foreign affairs, and these can be held with great intensity

by small segments of the population. Paradoxically, people whose orientation to politics is limited to specific issues—often issues which seem peripheral to the central questions of political decision making—tend to display ideological orientations. As a result, middlemajority politics in industrialized societies is compatible with the emergence of minority ideological orientations.

The formation of public opinion and ideological attitudes involves an interplay between a person's social and psychological background and his participation in organizations and associations, as well as his exposure to the mass media. The term "political socialization" refers specifically to the whole process of internalization of political values, including the impact of the family and educational institutions. Under conditions of rapid social change, the relevance of initial socialization variables in explaining mass political perspectives must be amplified by an understanding of the impact of education and involvement in secondary associations. In fact, the continuing task of systematic empirical research, especially the sample survey, is to help clarify the complex processes involved in the dynamics of public and political opinion. [SeeSocialization.]

Empirical studies of election campaigns reveal the limited extent to which shifts in political attitudes and in actual voting behavior take place in a given campaign, although the amount of change is clearly crucial in determining the outcome. It is undoubtedly true and obvious, as the research literature implies, that long-term political socialization has greater impact than the consequences of exposure to mass media in a given political campaign. Nevertheless, the effects of the mass media — both long-term and short-term—and the impact of party organization are key variables in both maintaining and molding political opinions. This is particularly the case for persons who do not hold firm political beliefs or whose style of life is not rooted in memberships in voluntary associations. The influence of the mass media operates either through local activists and opinion leaders or by direct exposure. The notion of "the politics of mass society" (Kornhauser 1959) specifically refers to those processes which weaken community and associational affiliations and expose individuals to the pressures of party organization and the

mass media. Paradoxically enough, there is every reason to believe that the impact of the mass media is greater in multiparty, democratic systems than in one-party systems, where distrust of the media is great and where it is recognized that the political regime relies more on organizational controls than on persuasion.

Elite Analysis

Political sociologists who have come to consider politics as more than a reflection of social stratification and mass ideology have increased their concern with the analysis of those institutions and social systems through which the political process operates. The intellectual heritage of those political sociologists who seek to synthesize the stratification and the institutional approaches to political power is diverse. In particular, they have been strongly influenced by the "elite" theorists, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by the variety of writers who can be called macrosociologists because they have taken total societies as the object of their analysis.

Gaetano Mosca (1896) and Robert Michels (1911) served as central figures in stimulating empirical studies of elites and the sociology of political organization. Their initial formulations were concerned with the bureaucratic features of party organization and had strong ideological evertones. Particularly in the case of Michels, the "iron law of oligarchy" was more a definition than it was an empirical generalization offered as a fundamental barrier to representative institutions.

As a result of the subsequent development of a more objective and detailed theory of organizations, political parties and their auxiliary institutions have been subject to various forms of empirical analysis. Typologies of party organization have been created, using such categories as "patronage," "ideological," "programmatic," and the like, but these typologies were at best transitional to a more detailed study of the specific functions that political organizations and political elites perform. The writings of the University of Chicago empirical school of political research, which included Charles Merriam, Harold Lasswell, and Harold Gosnell and which in turn came to be called political behavior research, were crucial in transforming the study of party

organizations (see, for example, Gosnell 1927; Lasswell 1936). The effect of this tradition has been to add to elite analysis an interest in the effectiveness of differing types of party organization on the performance of such activities as the recruitment of new leaders, the posing of political alternatives, the maintenance of linkages between the electorate and the government bureaucracy, the mobilization of mass political participation, and the formulation of consent. The literature consists mainly of detailed case studies of political parties and covers a wide range of political systems. Comparative analysis mainly takes the form of paired comparisons (as between, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union) or of more-generalized models for describing the dilemmas facing similar groups of nations, such as the developing nations.

The analysis of political party organization obviously involves not only its internal structure but also its relation to the sociopolitical balance of society. First, there is the focal issue concerning the capacity of the economic and industrial sector to influence and control political decisions. There seems to be widespread agreement between political sociologists with differing value assumptions that, with the growth of a complex division of labor, industrial and economic organizations are constricted in their capacity for direct management of the political process. The complexity of economic organization is such, it is argued, that economic leaders do not have the skills or programmatic approach to maintain complete dominance over the political party system, be it a single-party or a multiparty structure. The separation of ownership from property control contributes to this process. Furthermore, the development of trade union organizations often serves as a countervailing force to the political power of economic organization in those societies where labor unions are autonomous organizations. Institutional analysis also implies a modification of economic theories of political power by calling attention to the growth of professional associations, with their ability to exercise political power in the name of both science and public welfare, and to the political power that adheres to large governmental bureaucracies.

Paralleling the politics of economic institutions is the basic balance between the political party and the military. The military have considerable actual and potential power because of the vast resources they command and because of the fundamental importance of national security. Nevertheless, personal military dictatorships are generally absent, since they are incompatible with the political requirements of contemporary social structure. Political sociologists have sought to describe and account for the various forms of political balance which operate between modern political parties and the military. There is hardly a society in which the military do not have some political power. The influence of the military varies from that of a pressure group to that of an active coalition partner in the domestic political structure. In some of the developing states the military may serve as the nucleus of a modernizing oligarchy, although it may be a transitional oligarchy. It is striking to note that one-party states, such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, have succeeded in reducing or eliminating the military as a major independent power base in domestic affairs.

There has been a growth of professional and voluntary associations that tend to accumulate political power, and these organizations have been studied, on a selective case study basis, as examples of pressure groups. The social structure of an industrial society or one in the process of modernization produces a variety of groups, such as old-age, youth, and ethnic, cultural, and religious associations, which generate political demands through their associational representatives. In a multiparty system these pressure groups seek direct access to the parliamentarians and administrative leaders and tend to weaken the party. Even in one-party systems, where the base for independent action by voluntary associations is limited or carefully controlled, the official mass party seeks to make use of such organizations as devices for communication and political support.

The analysis of elites supplies a conceptual device for understanding the patterns of integration of institutional power. One important convergence in the field of political sociology is in the progressive increase of research emphasis on elite structures. A paradigm has come to pervade the perspectives of political sociologists: the study of social stratification

is augmented by concepts of public opinion and ideology; institutional analysis is elaborated by the study of elite structures.

Elite analysis has shifted from an exclusive concern with social background as a determinant of elite behavior to a broader concern with the processes of recruitment, career development, and patterns of interaction. Modern elites tend increasingly to be selected by criteria of achievement rather than on the basis of inherited social background, and as a result they tend to be recruited from broader and broader social strata. Furthermore, as Karl Mannheim has pointed out (1935), the sheer increase in the size and complexity of elite structures brings about a growth of heterogeneity, a crisis in defining standards of behavior, and the necessity of developing new devices for achieving agreement and consensus among competing elites.

The literature of national power structures tends to focus on the analysis of specific elite groups. In particular, there are available a series of national studies in depth which deal with the recruitment and socialization of the parliamentary elites. In addition, attention has been paid on a comparative basis to the differing patterns of pressure groups, especially economic pressure groups, in influencing the political process. However, systematic research on the differentiation and integration of different elite groups, even for countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union, is far from comprehensive and adequate.

The persistence of substantive differences between interest group and social strain theories of political sociology is reflected in differing models of elite behavior. In the analysis of the United States, the residues of economic determinism are to be found in C. Wright Mills's "power elite" concept (1956), in which the societal leadership is seen as an integrated ruling group of a capitalist economic system transformed, in part, by the pressures of international relations and exercising power on an arbitrary basis. The leadership elements are based in the industrial and military sectors operating in conjunction with the professional political elite. The economic elites are dominant and fuse with the military, while the political elites have secondary and circumscribed roles.

By contrast, a variety of writers, including Robert Dahl, Talcott Parsons, Daniel Bell, and Morris Janowitz, identify a bargaining model in the

United States, characterized by a more pluralistic pattern of political power. The elites are seen as much more differentiated and subject to a system of countervailing checks and balances. In this approach the political elites are crucial to the extent that they perform the mediating and adjusting role between the various institutional sectors of society. On the basis of this model, the basic political issue is not so much the arbitrary exercise of power by a small, integrated elite as it is the necessity of creating conditions under which a differentiated elite can make effective decisions. In the United States, according to the analysis of Shils (1956) and others, elite integration presents special problems because the creative role of the politician is not adequately understood and the respect accorded him by the other elite sectors and by the electorate at large is relatively low and unstable.

Empirical research into elite structures has distinguished between local—community, metropolitan, and regional—elites and national elite systems. Interestingly enough, for the United States both the power elite concept and the bargaining model highlight the separation of economic power and political elites at the local level. A rich body of historical and analytical material describes the process of "bifurcation" of local elites in the United States. According to the power elite model, this is the result of a shift of political interest to the national arena; for the bargaining model, it is the outgrowth of the process of "democratization," which brings representatives of ethnic, religious, and lower-status groups into political power.

Macrosociology And Political Change

The elite perspective in political sociology has been paralleled and broadened by those few but influential sociologists who specialize in the study of total societies and political change at the societal level. These men were stimulated by the holistic approach of social anthropologists and, in return, have had a profound impact on political scientists who deal with comparative politics. In the slow and almost discontinuous development of macrosociology the central issue has been the analysis of the impact of modernization on representative institutions. In turn, studies of the spread of industrial institutions have served to highlight the

significance of differing political institutions in accounting for various patterns of national development and the persistence of national cultures. Tocqueville's analysis of prerevolutionary and posRevolutionary France, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, published in 1856, and Thorstein Veblen's Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution, which appeared in 1914, stand as landmarks of early contributions to the study of the interplay of political institutions and social and economic development. Both men forecast intellectual trends, in that they did not produce national case studies. Instead they were seeking to explain, by implicit comparative analysis, particular sequences of societal change which were reflected, in the first case, in the outbreak of the French Revolution in contrast to the absence of such violence in England and, in the second case, in the late and authoritarian character of industrialization in Germany.

Explicit concern with the theoretical aspects of macrosociology is rooted in the diverse approaches to the common problems of societal integration offered by Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Ferdinand Tonnies, whose works, among others, supplied the basis for the subsequent reformulations of Talcott Parsons, in The Structure of Social Action, published in 1937. At the theoretical-empirical level, the intellectual pioneer was W. I. Thomas, in The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, published in 1918–1920. This monumental work set forth the empirical requirements for comparative analysis. His standpoint was both intensive, in that he sought to describe and understand the cultural values of Polish society, and comprehensive, in that he sought to analyze the full range of social institutions, from family and kinship groups to political organization. By juxtaposing the development of a relatively integrated Polish society in Europe with the social disorganization of the Polish immigrants in the United States, he highlighted the differential role of values and of political institutions in the process of modernization and urbanization.

The intellectual vitality of macrosociological perspectives, however, derives less from formal theoretical considerations and more from the dramatic impact of contemporary history—particularly, first, the rise and transformation of totalitarianism and, second, the rapid process of

decolonization after World War ii. Joseph Schumpeter, in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942), developed a comprehensive and generic analysis of the social and political institutions on which capitalism was based. His ideas about the transformation of entrepreneurial activities into a large-scale organization format, the negative role of intellectuals in the politics of capitalism, and the decline of representative institutions have been seminal formulations. Franz Neumann's Behemoth (1942), an analysis of the social organization of the Nazi party and its transformation of German economic and social structure, and Barrington Moore's Terror and Progress (1954), a similarly comprehensive volume for Russia, are most noteworthy studies in depth. Comparison of the different elements of totalitarianism and their consequences is dealt with by C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski in Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956).

While it is not easy to categorize the so-called new nations, they display patterns of similarity which contribute to the comparative analysis. There are those nations, such as Japan and Turkey, which were never under Western colonial rule and which embarked early on the process of modernization. However, an overriding distinction, based mainly on the impact of colonial experience, has become operative. It is possible to differentiate the colonial experience of South America, with its wars of liberation in the nineteenth century, from that of the so-called new nations of Africa and Asia, which, with notable specific exceptions, achieved independence quickly and without extensive violence, after World War ii. In turn, these new nations can be categorized by the type of metropolitan rule they experienced—British, French, Dutch, etc. — which could be direct or indirect and which was imposed on differing indigenous cultural–religious systems.

The central issue in the study of new nations after independence hinges on the limitations and actual breakdown of multiparty systems in supplying the political leadership necessary for economic and social development. Scholarly writing in this area has passed from a focus on individual case studies to a variety of types of comparative analysis. One approach is that found in Edward Shils's Political Development in the New States (1959–1960), where he presents a series of generalized

governmental types, such as traditional oligarchies and modernizing oligarchies, and analyzes their political dilemmas. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, in The Politics of the Developing Areas (1960), follow a similar approach, but they make use of statistical indicators to explain these types of political regimes. Alternatively, comparative analysis has been pursued by exploring specific hypotheses related to a particular institution, such as the governmental bureaucracy or economic enterprise. An example of this approach is Morris Janowitz' The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (1964), in which the limitations on the capacity of the military to supply political leadership are in part accounted for in terms of internal organizational and professional factors.

A fully comprehensive approach to comparative political sociology must encompass the distinction between industrialized and nonindustrialized nations. Such work has been stimulated partly by the desire to make use of the data that are available and to produce quantitative comparisons and findings even though the problems of the validity of international statistical sources and the comparability of survey findings have not been solved. Karl Deutsch and his associates are representative of the efforts to uncover patterns of political behavior through refined statistical analysis of the standard census-type data for all the political divisions of the world. By contrast, more selectively and intensively, Almond and Verba (1963) have employed survey research techniques in countries of Europe and in Mexico to probe both political participation and socialization of fundamental political values.

Regardless of subject matter, political sociology has developed a common perspective in its focus on political conflict and political consensus. It is not possible to contend that sociologists have neglected the study of political conflict for an undue emphasis on the study of political consensus. The case is that in crisis situations which result in conflict or produce compromise, it is difficult to gain access to relevant data; thus, the development of the "behavioral persuasion" in the study of politics does in fact encourage a focus on routine and ongoing processes, rather than on crises and decision-making points. Nevertheless, there is a body of monographic literature which describes in "natural history"

terms the outbreak of political conflict—when the pursuit of group interest leads to action outside the institutionalized forms of political change. This type of phenomenological research has come to encompass the full range of politics, from community conflict to relations between nations. Social-psychological approaches derived from the study of collective behavior or collective problem solving have been employed to handle these empirical materials. The sources of political conflict and the means by which consensus is created are therefore the central issues for political sociologists, even though the practical difficulties of studying these phenomena are considerable.

Political Sociology And Political Theory

In the nineteenth century the development of representative institutions meant the extension of suffrage and an increase in the importance of parliament as a device for sharing political power and resolving political conflict. In the twentieth century the complexities of social structure and of the governmental process have produced a rise in the influence of executive leadership and a decline in the impact of the parliamentary process. Theorists of the democratic process have therefore had to face the task of making an intellectual contribution to "institution building," both to strengthen parliament and to make possible representation at new points in the political process.

At this juncture, political sociology faces political theory. Political sociologists have been men of strong opinions, and they have been concerned with the value implications of their work. But it is only since the end of World War ii, particularly under the influence of the newer types of economic analysis, that some political sociologists have become interested in theoretical formulations which explore explicitly the conditions under which political democracy would be maximized. If economic analysis is designed to maximize the use of economic resources, then political sociology has the goal of formulating social, psychological, and economic conditions under which political democracy would be maximized. Some theorists, as represented by Schumpeter, hold that elections are the hallmark of democratic society and that, therefore, the clarification of the election process is a key task of social

research. Others, such as Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, are concerned with the formulation of criteria which encompass the practices of administrative and community agencies. Definitions of political democracy have been drawn by some theorists so as to encompass one-party systems as well. Regardless of the particular definitions, political sociology has come to be linked to the analysis of the economic, social, and psychological preconditions for political democracy.

2.2 WHAT IS SOCIOLOGY?

Sociology can be defined as a study of society or social life, of group interaction and of Social behavior

2.2.1 Concept of Society and Culture

Society has been defined as a relatively self-sufficient, usually large group of peoplle who maintain direct or indirect contact with each other through a culture. Culture isgenerally understood as the shared language, beliefs, goals, artefacts and experiences that combine together to form a unique pattern. In other words, culture is a society's way of life (Stebbins, Robert A. 1987; p- 172)

2.2.2 Emergence of Sociology

During the 19th century sociology emerged as separate social science in Europe and its objective was the study of society. Auguste Comte, Spencer and Emile Durkheim besides several other social thinkers sought to establish the idea of society as a matter of study, unique in itself. They examined society as a whole - which is more than the sum of its parts. Society is more than the actions, thoughts, values, belief and wishes of its individual members. It is a complex and abstract reality; yet all human beings live in a society. A sociologist is interested in the general study of social behaviour as it occurs in groups, large or small, and lays special stress on understanding social life in the contemporary world. The word 'general' has been used as other social science disciplines deal with more specific areas. For example, a political scientist studies governmental functions and activities and an economist studies production and

distribution of goods. It is, however, difficult to draw an exact line of difference. Social psychology, social anthropology, political science and economics, all in a sense, have human social life as their general subject. As sociology is a relatively young discipline compared with the discipline of philosophy, economics and political science, sometimes, people confuse it with social work. Sociology is used in the discipline of social work to analyse and understand social problems. Social work is concerned with the uplift of those socially deprived, physically handicapped, etc. Sociology is not concerned with the reformation of society as such nor is it directly involved in social planning or directed change. The sociological understanding and research can help in better planning and in finding ways and means of acceptance of improved practices, in the formulation of development policies and programmes. It is generally accepted that sociologists do not interfere with social process. They are supposed to be value-neutral, i.e., they are not supposed to have any bias or prejudice in the analysis of the social behaviour. There are, however, at prese:nt, some, who question this and feel that sociologists must take an active role in the development process. We have defined sociology as the study of social life and group interaction and social behaviour. In order to understand social life, sociology is interested in the study of the organisation and the functioning of societies or social groups.

2.2.3 Social Groups

Just as every human being is born in a society, everywhere, social life is lived in groups, whether large or small. The term 'group' is used in different ways. There might be a group, which is watching a game in progress, there might be a group of people crossing a street. In sociology, the group is viewed in a different way. It has already been inentioned that the basic interest of sociology is human social behaviour. This leads to a study of how people relate to each other or interact with each other. Tlie social group, therefore, would have to have the following:

i)   a group of persons (two or more);

ii)   a patterned interaction (i.e., there is a regularity in the social relations, based on shared beliefs, values and norms); and

iii)   the interaction is sustained over a period of time. The groups are formed in order to satisfy some human needs. A basic need is survival and a family, which is an example of a group, enables us to meet this need. As individuals, it is not possible to fulfil all the needs. It is through the groups that the needs are met. We derive many satisfactions from living in groups and therefore, being a part of the group becomes important. The solidarity of a group is dependent upon the frequency of interaction and the emotional attachment.

Box 1.1: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936), a noted German sociologist, while examining different kinds of societies found that there were two kinds of social groups, similar to the concepts of primary and secondary groups found in all societies. He found that in small homogeneous societies members interacted with one another on face to face, informal basis. In these groups tradition dictated social behaviour. Tonnies called this kind of society a Gemeinschaft, which. when translated means broadly "a communal, or traditional society". In comparison, societies that are large and heterogeneous, such as the modern industrial societies, relationships among members are impersonal, formal, functional and specialised. According to Tonnies these societies have often contractual relationships which are on the basis of clear cut, legal contracts rather than being governed by traditions. Tennies calls these societies Gesellschaft, or "associational societies".

2.2.4 Kinds of Social Groups

The classification of social groups in two majortypes is based on the extent ofattachment the individual would have to a group. The major classifications are (i) primary and (ii) secondary groups. i) A primary group has been defined as one in which the members have very close or intimate relations and there is an emotional involvement. It has also been defined as primary because it is this group, which is chiefly responsible for nurture of social ideas of the individual. From the description above, we can go on to a mQre precise definition. Personality of an individual is involved in a primary group. The best example of the primary group is the family. As one tries to analyse one's behaviour within the family and

the functions, the family performs for each individual member, one can understand the importance of a primary group in shaping the ideas, be1iefs and norms ofthe members. The primary groups (family, play groups, a'community, etc.) also acts as a link between the individual and the larger society.

ii) In contrast to the primary group, there are secondary groups. In the secondary group, members interact with one another in a very specific range of activities. The relationships in the secondary group are more casual, impersonal and for specific purposes. A student body of a large college is a secondary group as they interact as students. People working in a factory are also an example of a secondary group as they relate to each other as workers. You can see yourself how the relationships between the family and in a work place differ. From that, you will be able to understand the difference between primary and the secondary groups. The understanding of the nature of the groups and their functions is very important for understanding social behaviour.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

ii) Compare your answers with those given at the end of this unit.

1) Give a definition of sociology. Write about five lines.

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2) What is social group? Use about five lines for your answer.

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3) Given below are some social situations, which amongst them can be called primary group. Tick the correct answer:

    a) Meeting of political leaders during a summit.

    b) Children playing "Kho Kho" in a field.

    c) A feminist leader addressing women labourers.

d) School Principal addressing students in an assembly.

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2.3   MAJOR CONCERNS OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociology seeks to study the society and to analyse it in terms of the social relations that have a pattern. Sociology addresses itself to three basic questions:

i)   how and why societies emerge?

ii)   how and why societies persist? and

iii)   how and why societies change? Sociology has been concerned with the evolution of society.

It has tried to analyse the factors and forces underlying the historical transformations of society. For example, societies have evolved from primitive tribal state to rural communities. How villages have become important centres of commercial activity or of art and culture and grown into towns and cities. Sociology has also been concerned with the units of social life. The attempt has bean to look at various types of groups, communities, associations and society. The effort has been to study the pattern of social relationships in these units. An important area which sociology deals with is social institutions. The institutions provide a structure for the society and perform functions, which enable the society to meet its needs. In any society, there are five basic social institutions; family, political institutions, economic institutions, religious institutions and educational institutions. However, in more complex societies, there may be many other institutions such as bureaucracy, military organisations, welfare and recreational organisations, etc. Caste is also an institution, which is more or less peculiar to India. Another area of study and analysis by sociologists is social processes. In one sense, the social institutions provide the stability and order whereas social processes are the dynamic aspects of social relations. Among the various processes that

will be dealt with in the latter units are socialisation, social control, co-operation, conflict, social deviation and social change.

2.3.1 Concept of Culture

'Culture' is another very important concept. As mentioned earlier, we are immersed in culture from birth onwards, we take culture for granted. It is difficult to imagine what life would be like without culture. Culture provides summing up ofthe past experiences, which are the necessary foundation for living in the present. Culture is learned and shared among members of the grolip. Culture in a sense, can seem to be the chief means of survival and adaptation. On each of the topics mentioned, which are concerns of sociology, there will be units which will deal in much greater detail. The society is dynamic and is changing; consequently, the areas of interest of sociologists are increasing. Today, there is sociology of knowledge, sociology of science and art, sociology of health, sociology of development, etc. This indicates the expanding nature of sociology.

2.3.2 Sociology and Science

At times, sodaogy has been defined as the science of society. This raises the question as to what skience is. Some have thought of science as an approach whereas others have thought about it in terms of the subject matter. Simply stated, we might say that the scientific approach consists of certain assumption that the phenomena studied have a regularity and hence, a pattern. The method emphasises observation and verification of social phenomena. This involves a systematic approach to the study of phenomena. The systematic approach consists of:

i)   defining a problem for study;

ii)   collecting data on the problem defined;

iii)   analysing and organising the data; which would help in formulation of hypothesis; and

iv)   further testing of the hypothesis and on the basis of this, develop new concepts and theories. Sociology has been using a systematic approach in the study of social life.

On the basis of the knowledge gathered through the systematic approach, it has tried to build a body of reliable knowledge. From this knowledge, it has tried to establish the patterns of relationships from which effort can be made at understanding social behaviour. If we look at sociology from the point of view of its approach to the study of society, then sociology can be considered to be a science.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

ii) Compare your answers with those given at the end of this unit.

1) Write a note, in eight lines, on the basic concerns of sociology.

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2) Explain the relationship between sociology and science. Write about five lines.

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2.4 SOME FOUNDING FATHERS

Later on, in various units of this course you will come across the names of inally early sociologists. A brief introduction is given of early sociologists, whose contribution to sociology is lasting. All of them wrote on the nature of human behaviour. In a way, they tried to understand profound changes taking place in society.

2.4.1 August Comte

Comte is regarded as the founder of modern sociology. I3e is the first one to have used the ward 'Sociology'. He tried to create anew science of society. which could not only explain the past of mankind but also, predict its future course. He felt that society moves through definite and fixed stages and that, it progresses towards ever-increasing perfection. The three stages, according to him, in which the society moves, were:

i) the theological or the religious to

ii) the metaphysical or the philosophical to

iii) the positive or the scientific stage. In the first stage. people thought, all phenomena were caused by supernatural forces. Abstract forces of either a religious or secular type were considered to be the source of knowledge in the second stage. In the last stage, scientific laws were supposed to detarmine both the natural and the social worlds. He also talked about two broad areas -'social statistics', which deals with the orderly and, stable aspects of social life and patterns of behaviour (family, occupational, polity. etc.). The second area called 'social dynamics' emphasises the study of changes in a social system. According to him, sociology was to be the queen of all sciences. Illustration

2.4.2 Emile Durkheim

Durkheim was also interested in sociology being a scientific discipline. He wrote a (1858 - 1917) book in 1895 entitled: Rules of Sociological Method. To him, social solidarity was one of the main principles of human life. He distinguished between two kinds of solidarity: 'mechanical solidarity' based on common assumptions, beliefs, sentiments like those found in traditional societies and 'organic solidarity' based on the divisioil of labour and inter-related interests as found in industrial societies. When solidarity is broken, there would be social disorganisatio~~ and confusion in society. He considered sociology as having wide iuterests, which includes sociology of religion, sociology of knowledge, sociology of law. sociology of crime, economic sociology, and sociology of education, art and aesthetics An important concept given by Durkheiln was social facts, which, according to him, are external to the individual but they exert pressure on the individual in the behaviour pattern. Customs, traditions, folkways and mores are social facts. He felt that sociology should be involved in the reformation of society. For him society was a reality in itself, tliat is, it is more than its parts.

2.4.3 Max Weber

Weber used the concept of social action rather than social relations. A comprehensive Max Weber study of social action, to him, meant understanding the meanings human beings give to (1864 - 1920) their behavioural pattern. The social behaviour was not merely a mechanical learning of norms but how people interpreted the social values. Sociology studies all kinds of social action without making any value judgements. Weber was concerned with understanding of inter-relations between parts of society and also, with comparative studies of different societies. He studied religion in different societies. His work 011 Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism is one of the well known works in sociology. Through both these approaches, he tried to develop propositions having general validity. For example, he classified authority into three types - charismatic, traditional and rational. These concepts are still used in the study of leadership authority and power.

2.4.4 Karl Marx

Marx has helped through his ideas in understanding the nature of society, particularly, Karl Marx how conflicts occur. . Marx writes in 1848 that all history is a history of classes and (1818 - 1883) class struggles. The society gets divided between the oppressors and the oppressed masters and slaves, lords and serfs and in the modern times, capitalists and workers. To analyse the structure of society, it was necessary to understand the forces of production and relations of production. The contradiction between the forces and the relations of production leads to class struggle. According to him, each society dies in time because of internal conflicts and contradictions and is replaced by a higher one. In time, capitalism would be destroyed and there would emerge a classless society characterised by absence of conflict, exploitation and alienation from this world.

2.4.5 Herbert Spencer

Spencer also empllasised a total view of society. According to him, the study of sociology Herbert Spencer covers the fields of family, politics,

religion and social control, division of labour and (1820 - 1903) social stratification. He emphasised the study of whole more than the study of parts. The individual institutions have significant relations. It is through a study of these inter-relations that one can hope to understand society. He indicated that the inter dependence of the various parts was functional, i.e., each of the part performs different functions, wliich is necessary for the total well being of society. A large number of sociologists, who are "functionalists", use Spencer's idea of the functional inter dependence as a basis for their approach to the study of society. Above description is of the contributions of founding fathers of sociology are sketchy. The main purpose is to introduce their names and to give you some idea of their concerns in sociology. the later units on Sociological Thought we will be studying their approaches, theories and contributions in greater details.

2.5   SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES

As lnentioned earlier, sociology has a broad perspective. It is concerned with those aspects of social life, which are present in all forms. It embraces every social setting. Most related social sciences have restricted range of specialisations. It must be pointed out that human behaviour cannot be divided neatly into different compartments and each assigned to a specific social science. Hence, the boundaries between the disciplines are often overlapping. Almost all the social sciences get outside their 'own' and into 'somebody else's' domain with great frequency.

2.5.1 Social Psychology and Sociology

Social psychology is the study of social and cultural influences on the individual. It focuses on the behaviour of a single person and hence, differs from sociology, which is more concerned with relations among groups. However, there are areas of common interest such as socialisation, norms and values. Moreover, the influences of the group on the individual and of the individual on the group are also of interest to both social psychology and sociology.

2 .5.2 Sociology and Anthropology

There are many fields in anthropology, namely; archaeology, linguistics, physical anthropology and social anthropology. Although, anthropology has been regarded as the study of early (primitive) cultures, and sociology ofthe more contemporary society. This distinction is no longer valid. Many of the early village studies in India have been done by social anthropologists. The tribal communities in India have, by and large, been studied by anthropologists, in both their physical and social aspects. There is, hence, some overlap between the areas of study of sociology and anthropology, particularly, social anthropology. Culture and social organisations are concepts studied in both these disciplines.

2.5.3 Sociology and Economics

Sociology and economics both study industry but do so differently. Economics would study economic factors of industry, productivity, labour, industrial policy, marketing, etc., whereas a sociologist would study the impact of industrialisation on society. Economists study economic institutions such as factories, banks, trade and transportation but are not concerned with religion, family or politics. Sociology is interested in interaction between the economic institutions and other institutions in society, namely, political and religious. Social life, in modern times, is very complex and no discipline by itself can study all of it in depth. While each social discipline focuses on a particular aspect of the society, there is needed to keep in mind the inter-relations of institutions of society. Only some social sciences have been discussed so as to give a feel of relationships among social sciences. Similar analysis of the relation of sociology can be made to philosophy, history, public administration, etc.

2.5.4 Basic and Applied Sociology

Sociologists are interested in conducting research studies in the area of social life and developing theories with regard to human social behaviour. The purpose is to build a body ofreliable knowledge through which various aspects of social life can be understood artd explained.

While this is important, it is necessary to make use of this knowledge in various aspects of human affairs. There are many factors, which have an impact on social relations. Increased use of technology is one such area. Sociologist's could1 anticipate as to how people will receive and react to new technology and changes it might bring about in social relations. There are many programmes of development that are launched. Sociologist can indicate what care needs to be taken in introducing; changes without affecting their way of life so that suggested programmes can be accepted. The reactions towards the innovations - acceptance, resistance or non- acceptance should be noted, when studies could also provide further insight into social values and social behaviour. Sociology thus provides an understanding about the social order in which we live and about the forces that shape and would it. It also suggests paths of action to ensure the emergence of new social patterns. Imaginatively pursued the study of sociology enables LIS to understand the condition and the predicament of human beings. It can, also help in finding solutions for the present problems and dilemmas of society.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

ii) Compare your answers with those given at the end of this unit.

1) What is the difference between basic and applied sociology? Write about ten lines for your answer.

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2.6   LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have given you a definition of sociology. We also explained the idea of social groups. We have explained basic areas of concern for sociology. These include the mention of the concept of culture. It also includes the relationship of sociology with science as whole. This unit also provides thumbnail sketches of five founding fathers of sociology. The theories of these thinkers continue to influence

present day sociology and other social sciences as well. Finally we looked at sociology in its relation to psychology, economics, and so on. We have therefore provided a good idea about the nature and scope of sociology.

Politics is a struggle for power—power over access to and the distribution of resources, over personal and collective status, and over the ability to define legitimate categories of thought. While politics can be found in all domains of social life, the ultimate site of political contestation is the state, which holds the legitimate monopoly on physical and symbolic violence. Hence, much political sociology is concerned with the relationship between the state and society: how the modern state came to exist, how it came to be viewed as legitimate, what factors shaped processes of democratization, how cleavages based on class, race, and gender affect democratic representation, how liberal democracies structure their welfare state policies, how states create and manage markets, and how social movements strive to effect political change by making claims on state actors. This course will offer an overview of these varied substantive topics, while exposing students to the analytical power of a sociological approach to politics.

Aron belongs to the French School of political sociology and follows the works and methods of Montesquieu and Tocqueville. He analyses together liberal democracy and its enemies, totalitarian regimes (Aron, 1965). Modern societies, he argues, tend by their very nature to equality, a lesson taught by both Montesquieu and Alexis de Tocqueville. In this longing for even more equality, two perspectives are open for modern societies: either relative equality through democratic reforms, which would lead to a pluralist constitutional regime, or absolute equality through revolution, and the imposition of a monopolistic party regime. Aron insists on the conflictual and pluralist character of liberal democracies, as he opposes two types of regime: a constitutional-pluralist one and another of a monopolistic party. This opposition actually recovers a series of oppositions: political and economical concurrence or monopole, constitution or revolution, social pluralism or absolutism, party State or partisan State (Audier, 2004). Respect of legalism and the sense for compromise (Aron, 1965) is the principle of

the constitutional-pluralist regime, argues Aron. It is what is denied in the monopolistic party regime. Such a regime would come to extinction if it were corrupted by the democratic sense of compromise. Instead, absolutism is its strength, and its principle is the sentiment of fear and faith. Militants' faith and non-militant's fear is the force and capacity for action for totalitarian regimes as dialogue and open-minded conflict is for liberal pluralist ones. Of course, Aron argues, there are many variations of one or multiple party regimes and even mixed forms, like monopolistic regimes introducing a Constitution and respecting individual rights or pluralistic regimes presenting an oligarchic character. And then again, liberal regimes are also open to corruption.

It was the special historical circumstances of the academic year 1957–58, when Aron offered the seminars on Democracy and Totalitarianism (Aron, 1965) that pushed his reflection on the corruption of constitutional-pluralist regimes. As Aron states in his introduction, "a legal savior inherited a corrupted Republic." The passage from the 4th to the 5th French Republic, and the end of the Algerian War, which ended with the independence of Algeria, gave Aron a critical insight into the liberal pluralistic regimes. There are three major types of corruption that can endanger liberal constitutional regimes claims Aron. The first appears when the party system does not any more correspond to the various groups of interests or when no stable authority can come out of the rivalry between parties. The second is the corruption of the public spirit, or the corruption of the principle, as Montesquieu would have called it. Either the partisan spirit of the parties' militants is too strong and erases any notion of common good, or the spirit of compromise is too strong and there can be no decision making. Last, corruption could come of the failure of the social infrastructure, if class conflicts are too intense and the political system of the parties is incapable of withholding them within limits. Excessive oligarchy or excessive demagogy can lead to social dissolution and political decay. Aron notes that corruption of liberal regimes is either due to not much time in power, which means that the political system is fresh and does not have yet deep roots into society, or too much time in power, and a long period of decomposition. A corrupted regime, concludes Aron, can continue existing for a long

period of time, as revolution is not necessarily what follows. But it can also, under specific conditions, like the Republic of Weimar in Germany in 1933, crumble into totalitarianism.

Aron defines the totalitarian regimes as a mixture of ideological frenzy and police terror. In addition, totalitarian regimes center on a controlled economy based on State planning. In the case of the Soviet regime, Aron makes some interesting remarks. First, that there have been free elections after the takeover in 1917. This first Parliament was of course dissolved, as it did not serve the Bolsheviks. Second, that there have been many Constitutions over the years. And third, that there was a separation between the State and the party, even if only for diplomatic reasons. As the party proclaims liberation by revolution, and the State has to negotiate and develop diplomatic relations with Western capitalistic forces, it would be difficult for the State to bear openly the party's ideology. This shows according to Aron that if Hitler and the fascist regimes show open hostility to democratic principles, the communist regime embraces them, even if it does not apply them. One of the forces of the communist totalitarianism is that it proclaims his faith in the principles it fights against. This is a 'passionate problem,' notes Aron. The answer to this apparent contradiction lies in the distance between the ideological 'truth' and the social and economical reality. The very organization of the party and the State are by ideological definition transient, suspended on the destruction of class society and the arrival of a class free society. Democratic principles can be restored only in this latter phase of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Just like Stalin said that the State must be reinforced until it could be abandoned, democratic principles must be suspended before they can be reinstated in a truly democratic society free of class conflicts and exploitation. This is the ideological structure that was used by left wing intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution in the West.

In 1955, Aron publishes one of his most famous books: The Opium of the Intellectuals (Aron, 1955). Adopting a critical perspective, Aron denounces the myths on which intellectuals base their argumentation. "Aron's 'skeptical' assault on the myths of the left, the proletariat and the revolution, and his philosophical dissection of the 'idolatry of history,'

are at the service of restoring political judgment to its rightful place as the guardian of the human world," writes Dan Mahoney (Aron, 2001). The book is an attack on French left wing intellectuals like Sartre, and their tentative to fusion existentialism with Nietzsche's philosophy in the service of a Marxist interpretation of political action, explains Harvey Mansfield (Aron, 2001, 1969b). Aron interprets the intellectual mobilization in search of an earthly paradise as a new religion. Intellectuals were in need of a new religion, one that would promise salvation and the certitude of future restoration of a just and equalitarian society. Intellectuals were therefore the modern society preachers appealing to the faith in historical necessity that would transform pessimism regarding social reality into optimism of a future liberation and emancipation of the exploited.

Aron's understanding of the conflictual nature of human societies made it impossible for him to believe in the quest of the "best regime." Oppositions such as liberty and efficacy, consensus and political direction point out to the value of civil and political diversity (Mahoney, 1992).

2.7 KEY WORDS

Classification : A way of putting data or information into different categories and groups.

Culture: This embodies the customs, rites and beliefs of a group of people. It includes both material culture, such as, houses, pots, coins etc. as well as non-material culture, such as, values, beliefs, norms etc.

Group : Comprises two or more people who have a meaningful interaction with each other and common goals.

Primary group : A social group with close ties and shared interests, e.g. the family Secondary group : A large group with looser ties but common well defined goals, e.g. office employees, or members of a club or associations.

2.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

2.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Mc. Kee, James B., 1981. Sociology : The Stu& of Society. Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York. Nature and Scope of Sociology
- Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1972. A Handbook of Sociology. Eurasian Publishing House: New Delhi

2.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1) In broad terms, sociology can be defined as the study of social life, group interaction and social behaviour, while other social sciences study specialised areas of social behaviour, Sociology is interested in taking an overall view of social life.

2) A social group refers to a group of persons (two or more), who have a regular social interaction, based on shared beliefs, values and norms. The interaction takes place on a basis over a period oftime. The interacting persons view themselves as members of the group. Examples of a group are the nuclear family, a football team, etc.

3) b)

Check Your Progress 2

1) Sociology is basically concerned with the study of patterns in social relations. Once relations between people are familiar and well-established, they become institutionalised ways of social behaviour, then, it is sociology's concern to make comparative studies of social institutions, such as, the family, economy and polity. Sociology is also concerned with the study of social processes, which reflect the dynamic aspects of social relations.

2) Being the scientific study of society, sociology views science as an approach to study social phenomena. In science, patterns in natural phenomena are discovered by observation and verification; in sociology, social phenomena are observed to formulate and test hypotheses.

Check Your Progress 3

1) Sociology is engaged in giving explanations of human social behaviour. For making use ofthis knowledge of human affairs, sociological findings can be and are used in planning development programmes. This kind of use of sociology is given the name of applied sociology. It is obvious that basic sociology is confined to researches into human social behaviour. Applied sociology differs from basic; sociology in the sense that it only makes use of sociological findings in planning and implementing action-oriented programmes for development.

UNIT 3: SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND POLITICS; CASTE CLASS, ELITES, GENDER AND POLITICS

STRUCTURE

3.0   OBJECTIVES

This unit is intended to acquaint you with the social structures on which political institutions base their actions. However given the fact that there are different ways of looking at social structures the orientation of political action depends on the understanding of social structures. After going through this unit: we hope, you would:

- To Understand the relation between social structures and social practices;

- To Highlight the different approaches to the understanding of social structures;

- To Relate the political institutions to social structures; and

- To Outline the different perspectives on social stratification.

3.1   INTRODUCTION

In common language we often ascribe the successes or failures of political action to certain social realities such as class, nation, caste, religion, gender and so on. For instance, we might say that the continued prevalence of untouchability in India has effectively limited the benefits of affirmative action reaching out to dalits; or women's political participation has been thwarted by gender exploitation. We, often, say that such and such a political decision or outcome has been due to the presence or absence of certain social structures. Most of us are aware that the course of public decision-making is not merely based on rule of law or franchise in a formal sense. Such a course also depends on the operation of social forces. Social structures are not constant. They change and reconstitute themselves. They undergo transformation with the activity of their members. They are subject to changes through scores of ways but more specifically through political &on. In India, scholars have pointed out how the electoral process has led to the reformulation and reassertion of caste identities. Social agents or actors (members of a society) may understand their position and role in social structures differently.

Resources and powers, honours and rankings of social agents widely vary in any society. Members composing any society are assigned to roles with demarcated functions. A large number of roles that social actors are called upon to play art: not of their choosing but are assigned to them. "I did not decide the caste, religion and linguistic community that I was born into." Although the stratificaitons they beget undergo change, such a change is gradual and these stratifications tend to persist over time. Social structures and stratification are primary concepts in the

writings of several major thinkers such as Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Levi Strauss. Talcott Parsons made concepts of social structure and stratification central to his functional analysis. In India democratic politics functions within the context of these structures. We cannot understand the political ideas and actions of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, B.R. Arnbedkar and Rammanohar Lohia and scores of other modem Indian thinkers and political leaders without understanding their perspectives on social structures in general and regarding structures in India in particular. The orientation and working of political institutions greatly depend upon the way they work within these structures.

3.2 MEANING

'Social Structure' and 'Stratification' are core concepts in social theories. But social theories and their approaches widely differ and so do these concepts. There are major differences regarding the scope and deternlination of these concepts. Besides there are two major streams employing structural analysis and explanations: the Structuralists or the Structural-functionalists, or simply, Functionalists. Their use of terms, 'structure' and stratification' markedly vary. There is a second major stream of Marxists. Max Weber and Karl Marx, belonging to these two different streams use their concepts in their own ways. Further, there are the terminological problems: Temls such as 'social structure'. 'social system' and 'social classes'overlap in several respects and so do 'social stratification' and 'social formation'. Besides the origins of terms such as 'structure' and 'stratification' lie with the biological and geological fonllulations of 19th century. Our approach to social reality today may not be in tune with such formulations. i) Tentatively, we can say that social structures are ordered relations of parts of a whole forming an arrangement in which elements of social life are linked together. There is continuity in such relatioils or patterns of interaction over time. Therefore, social structures have the following two fold connotations: a) They are patterns of interactions between social actors or groups. b) They imply relative persistence, endurance and durability over time. ii) As in the case of social structures, so with respect to social stratification, there are wide differences between social theorists. From the structural-

functional perspective, Talcott Parsons says that social stratification is, "The diffevntial ranking of human individuals who conlpose a given social system and their treatment as superior and inferior relative to one another in certain socially significant respects." Even if one adopts this definition, the ranking of social agents might vary widely as there may not be agreement on the criteria of ranking. If one employs a class perspective the meaning of social stratification is markedly in opposition to the functional one. Here the emphasis would not be 'ranking' but on conflict. The Social Structures under Stratificutior conflict is on account of exploitation centered around the relations of production. Marx makes this clear in one of his formulations of class: "In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes and put them in hostile opposition to the latter they form a class". Stratification leads social action in certain direction within a social system. (It's the grid through which differential communication and deferences are routed). It upholds a system of order in terms of which life's opportunities are conferred on actors. Marxism suggests that under revolutionary conditions, the revolutionary masses make social stratification their primary target of attack and attempt to overhaul the relations embedded in it. But short of revolutionary conditions, systems of stratification may enable different levels and degrees of mobility to social agents. One of the important concepts coined by the late M.N. Srinivas, an eminent Indian sociologist to denote such social mobility in India is 'Sanskritisation' i.e., upward mobility of lower castes in the caste system by adopting the beliefs, practices and rituals of the upper castes.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) Check your answers with the model answers given at the end of this unit.

1) Give the meaning of social structures.

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2) Read the following and mark the correct answer.

Differential ranking is termed as: a) Social Stratification b) Social Structure c) Social System d) Social Class

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3.3 PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL STRUCTURES

The term 'structure' has been employed by many thinkers to understand the social world. We can identity certain distinct trends among them:

3.3.1 Structuralism

Structuralists emphasise sustaining structures - One of the major intellectual tendencies where structures conceived in a variety of ways was given absolute primacy and efficacy and the subject as an agency came to be disregarded was the tendency called structuralism. In this conception structures were removed from the objective worlds and were transposed to the domain of culture, beliefs and thought. It discounted the possibility of any direct encounter with the social reality as functionalism suggested. The operation of the structures resulted in social action and transformation or provided explanations for them.

One of the earliest manifestations of this tendency was in the study of language. Hitherto, it was understood that words and language are expressions of concepts and representations of objects. Linguistic structuralism made understanding internal to language. A linguistic sign is made of sound image and a concept. The sound image relates to the sounds and syllables of the sign; the concept is a mental construct. The sound image is the signifier and the concept is the signified. Linguistic structuralism pointed out that the relation between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary, a matter of convention. There is nothing in common between a tree and the word "tree". The crucial relation is not between the sign and the real world of objects. It is between the sign and the overall system of language. Meaning is arrived at by the relation of differences within sound images working together to produce a positive

meaning. It is the product of structure and form and not of substance, made of concepts or the signified. Language creates meaning rather than conveys it. In the work of Levi Strauss, the social anthropologist, structure denoted something entirely different from the empirical structures of Functionalism. The structure that persists is characteristic of human social organisation as such and not the structure of a particular society associated with a scientific culture. Scientific knowledge is not induced from sensory observations; those observations should be made intelligible. He saw widely varied social practices as expressions of a theoretically constituted structure. Existing practices do not sustain a structure but a variety of social practices can be explained with reference to a single structure. Through the concept of structure he attempted to provide universal explanations. For him structures were models. Structuralism of this kind had a deep impact on Marxism and it was developed by the French Philosopher Louis Althusser. He asserted the total separation between ideology and science and read it in the works of Marx calling it as epistemological break. Structuralism also left a deep impact in psychoanalysis particularly in the work of Jacques Lacan. The present times have been characterised by a major revolt against structuralism in all these forms. Philosophers have called into question the assumptions and strivings of structuralists to constitute a social science in the natural science model. Post-structuralists have highlighted the historical and framework-relative character of the categories employed in social sciences and their inability to be univqrsalised. Hermeneutics argues how communication is primarily bound to cultural ambiences and decoilstructioilists expose the assumptions underlying .a position and ask the possible outcomes if those assuinptions are reversed. There is a great return of the subject as the seat of consciousness and deliberate pursuit. Structures to the extent they are acknowledged at all art primarily seen as the bites of the constitution of the self rather than makers of the self.

3.3.2 Functionalism

Functionalists, sometimes called as structural-functionalists, underplay individual human initiatives and prefer social structures. The most

important representatives of this trend are Emile Durkheim, A.R. Radcliffe Brown and Talcott Parsons. They see social structures as external to individual actors. These structures vary from one society to the other and largely explain the similarity and differences between one society and another. The behaviour of individuals in social life is to be explained with them in view. They emphasize careful scqtiny of social facts and identifjing the patterns of interaction holding them together. They see in society a normative order that assigns duties and responsibilities, prevents deviant behaviour and ensures value consensus. This trend definitely underplays the role that actors plays in the functioning of the social structures and advancing alternatives. It marginalises or ignores the role that social agent~-~la~ in understanding the relations they are involved in and engages with them in markedly different ways. This trend does not adequately distinguish the working of the social structures and natural processes. Although it proclaims value-neutrality, it has strong bias t6wards maintenance of the existing social order and seeing social change as reorganisation existing social structures.

3.3.3 Marxian

Marxian : Importance to class-structure and economic relations as basic. Marxists have emphasised class-structure as the key to understanding societies. Classes are formed on the basis of the relation of social agents to the means of production and to social produce as a whole and the resultant solidarity or bonds that they produce. In Marxist understanding of class-structure there is an overt emphasis on economic relations. It is expressed in the metaphor of 'base' and 'superstructures'. While the economy constitutes the base, the political, cultural, ideological and legal spheres form the superstructure. The class structure of a society primarily rests on the relation between two basic classes and the role that other classes play is marked by these basic classes. In a capitalist society, for instance, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are the basic classes. There might be other classes such as the peasantry. craftsmen, professionals, landlords etc. but the role that these classes can play is demarcated by the basic classes. Marxists understand Classes as those that are formed

through class struggle. It is in and through political struggles that classes realise their allies and demarcate their enemies. Marxism does admit the autonomy of political, cultural and ideological structures in relation to the economic process. But they are not clear about the nature and scope of this autonomy. Marxists do admit the existence of autonomous social strata and factions but they are encapsulated within classes. They find it difficult to explain cross-class and trans-class phenomena such as identity and gender issues. While Marxists do recognise the autonomy of human agency, its relation to class-structure is highly debatable. Besides, Marxists have not adequately conceptualized the relation between class-structure. The moral domain and the persistence of social stability. In India the relation between class structure and caste structure has been a very complex one to be explained.

3.3.4 Weberian

Max Weber: Multi-dimensional and integrated approach Max Weber, emphasised a multi-dimentional approach to understand social structures. He attempted to integrate structure and agency, material and normative dimensions. He highlighted the $le of the knowing subject and did not see himher as passive receptacles of the operation of the social structures. He argued that meaning is not intrinsic to the social world waiting to be discovered through rational inquiry. Human actors interpret and construct the meaning of the social world around them. Different viewpoints embodying different values and interests may therefore mean different readings of the social structures. Weber argued that 'unintended consequences of action' beget social structures such as markets. liioney and language. The rise of capitalism, the suggested, was the outcome of the Protestant Ethic which developed along its adherent's self-discipline and moral accountability for their actions to God in view of personal salvation. Max Weber distinguished between Power and Authority. Authority is legitimate power. Legitimate authority involves an element of voluntary compliance. He identified three sources of authority: traditional, legal-rational and charismatic. Traditional authority is ascriptive and inherited; legal-rational authority is based on calculability, intellectualisation and impersonal logic of goal directed action; and

charismatic authority is extraordinary personal power identified in and with a particular individual. Weber preferred the State, and particularly the bureaucracy as the fountain of power. Power represents action likely to succeed even against opposition and resistance of those to whom it is applied. Bureaucracy embodies legal-ratianal authority which he saw as undermining other forms of authority such as traditional and charismatic. He thought that the process of rationalisation, understood as calculability, intellectualisation and impersonal and goaldirected action, are increasingly overtaking human activity. This affects all institutions. He uses the metaphor of iron-cage to denote a situation where concern for means and instruments drives nut the concern for human ends. Although Weber's conception of structure attempts to relate agency and subjectivity with external reality, it suggests little inter-subjective bond between social actors. In its absence rational-legal domain of the state alone becomes the normal sncial bond, suggesting the metaphor of 'iron-cage'. Weber accords little consideraticl.. 2r democracy and active citizenship to sustain social relations. His understanding of the social structure under the modern conditions conception constantly calls for charismatic spells of one kind or another to sustain people's engagement with the social order. But charisma cannot be anticipated, calculated and predictable. It's a double-edged sword. Therefore, rational-legal authority will always attempt to keep it at bay. Weber does not adequately engage with the inequality of wealth, power and status. There is little to suggest that he thought that it was the responsibility of the state to promote an equalitarian order. A shared moral domain cannot arise in a Weberian framework.

3.3.5 Weberian and Mamian-Integratioti-Habermasf

One of the important thinkers of our times, who have carried the Weberian conception further, while maintaining an interface with Marxism, is Jurgen Habermas. He recognises the role of social structures and the calculative and predictive orientation they suggest but he also takes into account the dimension of power and domination built into

them. At the same time he takes seriously the potentiality of arriving at meaning built into language communication.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) Check your answers with the model answers given at the end of this unit.

1) Outline the hnctionalist understanding of social structures.

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    2) Highlight three characteristics of social class as understood by Marxists.

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3) Choose the correct answer For Levi Strauss, structure is

      : a) empirical b) model c) rational d) particular

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4) What is the difference between Structuralism and Structural-Functionalism?

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3.4 SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

In the earlier section: we dealt with the issue of social stn~ctures and how tl~inkers of different streams like Structuralists: Functionalists, Weberians and Marxists interpreted them. We also noted differences among them. In this Section we will read about stratification or layers in a society. Stratification has a great deal to do with the prospects of any specific political system. Aristotle suggested that the viability of

constitutional government rests on a particular kind of stratification. Lenin argued for the prospect of socialist transformation of Tsarist Russia based on an understanding of its changing social stratification.

3.4.1 The Marxist Approach

Marx employs ownership and control over the means of production and relationship of social agents to the process of production as the criteria for social stratification. Marx also uses the concepts of strata and factions to indicate the casting interests found in a class. Classes In a country like India, Marxists would identify the following classes: a) The bourgeoisie (to indicate initially the industrial bourgeoisie) who own and control the means of production and appropriate surplus; b) the landlords who own or enjoy title over land, play little role in the production process but obtain a share of the produce for themselves; c) the workers (to indicate generally the industrial proletariat) who do not own or control the means of production but depend on their labouring capacity for their livelihood; d) the peasantry, distinguishable into diverse strata and possessing different extent of land and other means of production but who at the same time directly participate in the process of production. (The rich peasant is problematic class/strata in this class/category.

In short respects he is akin to the industrial bourgeoisie but in other respects to the peasant). This stratum is also inclusive of the rural proletariat made of landless workers and marginal peasantry who generally live off by working for others; and the e) petit bourgeoisie made of professionals, the traders and the craftsmell who are not directly involved in the production process but play a variegated set of roles in terms of extending services and imparting skills

Class consciousness: In fact even if a group held a number of objective characteristics akin to a class but which does not possess consciousness, to that extent it could not be considered as a class. More distinguished different members of a class. First, members of a class who are least conscious of being members and whose practices, other than the economic, have little to do with their class position. Secondly, there is a class-in-itself. Here, a class collectively pursues measures to better its lot in existing class structure by promoting its particular demands such as

workers fighting for better wages. Thirdly; there is the classification-itself. A class pilrsucs its class interests without being intimidated by the prevailing class-structure. One of the most important contributions in the understanding of social stratification from the Marxist perspective has been the work of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist theoretician. He asked the question how dominant classes continue to dominate over societies based primarily on class stratification. One of the concepts: that he used to explain it was 'hegemony'. It denotes not merely domination out leadership wherein the consent of the dominated is elicited through several ways.

3.4.2 The Weberian Approach

While Marx based social stratification on class, Weber introduced a model of stratification based on CLASS, STATUS AND POWER. He understood class very differently. For him a class is composed of people who have life chances in ommon as determined by their power to dispose of goods and skills for the sake of income: 'The crucial aspect of class is its situation in the market. Class consciousness i not a requirement for the higherachy of a class. Status reRrs to the social ranking, honour and esteem that a group is held in. These are attributes attached to particular styles of life and groups are ranked as high or low accordingly. Ranking, styles and avocations in terms of status vary from one society to the other. Therefore, while class is universalistic, status tends to be more particularistic. For example in India the caste system is a specific mode of expression of status. Ritual ranking attached to caste becomes one of the major factors of stratification. Weber saw power as chance of a man or group to realise their will even against opposition of others. He thereby dispersed power across individual agents. This was very much unlike Marx who saw power primarily as a class-relation. At the same time Weber attributed the monopoly of coercive power to the state. In this ' concepts of there was little place for immediately institutions been the state and individual social agents. For Weber' all the three forms of stratification. Class. Status and Power may colliery in terms of soiled social agents or they need not. Further, sometimes anyone: of them could affect the other two or could be translated into the other. They however,

cannot be reduced to a single form. Weber also saw stratification in ter..ls of two models: a scripture and achievement. Inscriptive stratification: be it class, status or power is based on inherited characteristics. Achievement is the successful attain me it of the concerned individual or group.

3.4.3 The Functionalist Approach

The functionalist approach to stratification is associated with such thinkers as Emilie Durkheim, Kingsley Davis, Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton. Functionless look at modem society as a complex of highly differentiated system of robs. Different men and women have to be persuaded to assume these roles. Stratification is based on role allocation. Roles set different goals for individuals and groups. Functionalists see stratification as the mechanism through which society encourages men and women to seek to achieve the diverse positions necessary in a complex system. The positions require different skills and are endowed with different rewards. Through stratification motivation is provided to social agents to perform their roles. The status corresponding to the roles imparts recognition. Talcott Parsons has pointed out three sets of characteristics which are used as the basis of ranking:

a) Possessions: i.c. those attributes that people own

b) Qualities belonging to individuals including race, lineage or sex

c) Performances: i.e. evaluation of the way roles are fulfilled Different societies emphasise different characteristics: Feudal society stressed on ascribed qualities; a capitalist society values possessions and a conuilunist society on performance. Functionalists feel that industrial society with its division of labour encourage only one set of values those involving individual success. It results in anole or alienation. A stable society they feel is a prerequisite for integrated personality. Further as stratification based on role allocation involves inequality it calls for ideological justification that explains, justifies and propagates the system of inequality. Therefore functionalists accord a great deal of importance

on patterns of social solidarity embodying moral consensus and normative regulation. They see a major role for religion in this task.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) Check your answers with the model answers given at the end of this unit.

1) Read the following carefully and mark the correct answer. For Weber class is based on I a) Ownership and control of means of production b) Esteem and status c) Shared life-chances , d) Social role

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2) Why do structuralists stress on social solidarity based on moral consensus and norms'?

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3.5   SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND POLITICS

3.5.1 Caste class

Caste and Class jointly determine the position of an individual in social strain. Particularly in rural communities where caste system has maintained its rigidity. It forms the basic for economic and special life. In a single village there may be as many as 24 castes and of these are interdependent. Even in the urban society a constant tendency to make caste distinction is observed in the upper and middle classes. Thus the castes have maintained their importance in class system of social stratification.

According to Weber, Caste and class are both status groups. A status group is a collection of persons who share a distinctive style of life and a

certain consciousness of kind. While caste is perceived as a hereditary group with a fixed ritual status, a social class is a category of people who have a similar socio-economic status in relation to other segments of their community or society.

The individuals and families who compose a social class are relatively similar in educational, economic and prestige status. Those who are classified as part of the same social class have similar life chances. Some sociologists regard social classes as being primarily economic in nature whereas others tend to stress factors such as prestige, style of life, attitudes, etc.

Caste system is characterised by cumulative in-equality but class system is characterised by dispersed inequality. The members of a class have a similar socio-economic status in relation to other classes in the society, while the members of a caste have either a high or low ritual status in relation to other castes. Caste is a unique phenomenon found in India but class is a universal phenomenon found all over the world. Caste works as an active political force in a village but not the class. It is also true that castes depend on each other (jajmani system) but besides interdependence, castes also compete with each other for acquiring political and economic power and high ritual position.

Further, in the caste system, status of a caste is determined not by the economic and the political privileges but by the ritualistic legitimization of authority, i.e., in the caste system, ritual norms encompass the norms of power and wealth. For example, even though Brahmins have no economic and political power, yet they are placed at the top in the caste hierarchy. In the class system, ritual norms have no importance at all but power and wealth alone determine one's status.

Maclver says, "When status is wholly predetermined, so that men are born to their lot without any hope of changing it, then class takes the extreme form of caste. According to Sangeetha Rao, if castes are detached from religion, class may run parallel to castes.

Hindu society was composed of classes such as (1) Brahmin or the priestly class, (2) Kshatriya or the military class and (3) Vaishya or the merchant class and (4) Sudra or the artisan. This was considered as a class system .according to B.R. Ambedkar. Among the Hindus the

priestly class maintains social distance from others through a closed policy and becomes a caste by itself. The other classes undergo differentiation, some into large and some into very minute groups.

"Castes are the building blocks of the Hindu social structure. Caste is an important factor in the identification of other backward classes among the Hindu communities .Caste is also a class of citizens, as observed by Mandal Commission in its report.

Several Marxist writers have made castes synonymous with classes. Accordingly, castes are nothing but classes which in course of time have mingled into classes. The struggle of non-Brahmin classes for enhancement of their status began when Hindu society divided itself into various castes and classes. Marxists in India appear to have realised the significance of caste as a social reality. Marxist writers seem to realise that the members of lower classes also belong, by and large, to lower castes. Caste organisations are construed as class organisations which emerged when the rural poor went beyond symbolic reform to upgrade their caste status by raising economic issues. A peasant class is nothing more than a group of individuals belonging to various castes and possessing land to cultivate. Traditionally, the Zamindars were of the highest caste. The landless labourers were of the lower caste and in between were the members of the cultivating castes. The agrarian hierarchy has its root in the caste structure, in the traditional social system.

The relationship which is established between a Master and a Servant, land owner and tenant .creditor and debtor, all cut across the barriers. Nevertheless, looking at India's history over the millennia, one reaches the unavoidable conclusion that the most important consideration while determining the constituents of the classes is the caste Ramakrishna Mukherjee found the inter-mixture of caste and class in East Bengal.

Today, we want to find about how class is considered as open and caste as close or it is really like that. Caste has inhered in class and class is also inhered in caste for centuries in the Indian context, and Indian society continues to have this inseparable mix even today .Role of caste and class in elections is an evidence of this mix. However, caste operating as a 'marriage circle ' is a different way from the way it functions in other

arenas. Class has been an in-built mechanism within caste, and therefore, caste cannot be seen simply as a 'ritualistic 'system, and class cannot be seen as an open system as it has often been influenced by the institution of caste.

3.5.2 Elites

In political and sociological theory, the elite (French élite, from Latin eligere, to select or to sort out) are a small group of powerful people who hold a disproportionate amount of wealth, privilege, political power, or skill in a society. Defined by the Cambridge Dictionary, the "elite" are "those people or organizations that are considered the best or most powerful compared to others of a similar type."

Mills states that the power elite members recognize other members' mutual exalted position in society. "As a rule, 'they accept one another, understand one another, marry one another, tend to work, and to think, if not together at least alike'." "It is a well-regulated existence where education plays a critical role. Youthful upper-class members attend prominent preparatory schools, which not only open doors to such elite universities as Harvard, Columbia, Yale, and Princeton, but also to the universities' highly exclusive clubs. These memberships in turn pave the way to the prominent social clubs located in all major cities and serving as sites for important business contacts.

3.5.3 Gender and politics

Politics as a real-world phenomenon and political science as an academic discipline are gendered. This introduction and this volume aim to explain what this means and why it is important. People all over the world find that the basic conditions of their lives—their safety, health, education, work, as well as access to markets, public space, and free expression—are fundamentally shaped by their identification as belonging to particular sex or gender groups. Individual bodies may be typed as male or female, masculine or feminine, heterosexual or homosexual, transgendered or nongendered in a dizzying variety of ways across cultures and over time. However, these social practices of gender often appear natural and unproblematic, even biological and therefore

impossible to change, in the social contexts in which they occur. But a cursory review of the literature on the biological basis of sex, taking into account the wide variety of the number and content of gender categories across social contexts, reveals a world far more (p. 2) complex than this simplistic male–female dichotomy would suggest (Butler 1990; Dreger 1998; Fausto-Sterling 2000). Gender is never just about sex but varies by race, ethnicity, nation, class, and a variety of other dimensions of social life.

Indeed, the persistent, dichotomous sex-typing characteristic of many institutions of the modern world would be a matter of intellectual curiosity if the consequences of being identified with a particular sex were not so dire. Across the globe, gender determines who goes hungry and who gets adequate nutrition and water, who can vote, run for office, marry, or have rights to children, who commands authority and respect and who is denigrated and dismissed, and who is most vulnerable to violence and abuse in their own homes and intimate relationships (see, e.g., World Health Organization and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 2010; Htun 2003; Htun and Weldon 2011). These norms shape more than personal and family relationships or career paths, though they certainly shape those: they shape religious practice and the structure of markets and processes of governance (Charrad 2010; Brettell and Sargeant 2001; Lamphere 2001).

Let's examine a few concrete examples. If we look at some of the key issues that constitute the partisan divide between political parties in the United States—whether it is reproductive rights or same-sex marriage—we can see that many of the "culture wars" issues are fundamentally questions about which sexual and intimate behaviors of men and women should be accepted and supported by the society at large (Wolbrecht 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; but see also Sanbonmatsu 2002). In the Philippines, income from domestic worker care work is the number one export and the largest source of foreign currency, while Lim (1998) estimates that income from sex work comprises between 2 and 11 percent of the gross domestic product of Thailand. And, finally, since 2008 the global economic crisis has had a very differentiated impact in terms of the resulting spending cuts and austerity programs. It is clear

that some groups are affected far more adversely than others, and many women—who make up a large proportion of state and public sector employees and the majority of single parents and the poor—have been particularly hard hit and affected in different ways from men (Waylen 2012). Perhaps most profoundly, gender influences the very ways we organize and think about the world and our way of knowing about the world.

In such a context, it is hardly surprising that political science as a discipline is also gendered and fundamentally shaped by these social norms about sex and sexuality. The canonical definitions of politics that have delineated the boundaries of the discipline have been read to exclude many of the topics covered in this handbook. As we will see, the study of politics has now broadened beyond the narrow focus on those holding formal office and the politics of distribution. It now encompasses many new groups espousing "gender trouble" as well as new ideas about masculinity and femininity across a range of contexts, from house and home to the houses of Parliament. Yet, despite the vibrancy of the gender and politics scholarship shown in this handbook and a long history of gender activism, gender is still ignored in much academic political science.

(p. 3) In contrast to this omission, this handbook makes gender the point of departure for thinking about political science, taking it, in the words of bell hooks (1984), from margin to center. In doing so, it attempts a number of things. First, it challenges existing political science in terms of its concepts, subject matter, and even its methods. Second, it demonstrates the diversity of the gender and politics scholarship, embracing interdisciplinarity and a plurality of methods and approaches in ways that are unusual in political science. And finally, it shows that much of the gender and politics scholarship has close links with the practice of politics, and feminism in particular, which again is unusual within most political science. As a result, although the categories of analysis overlap with other handbooks to some degree (with chapters on institutions, social movements, interest groups, and multiculturalism), there are also categories such as sexual violence, reproductive rights, or sexuality and the body more generally not found (or less salient) in the

other handbooks,. More importantly, the organization of the chapters, and the priority given to these topics, is different from the handbooks that overlook gender.

In this introduction, we map some of the changes that form the backdrop to this handbook, and we locate the gender and politics scholarship by delineating its relationship to the discipline of political science as it is conventionally understood and to politics as a practice. We cannot do full justice to the complexity and sophistication of the wealth of gender and politics scholarship that now exists, as what we can present here is limited and inevitably involves some oversimplification. But we argue that gender is centrally important to politics and that inequalities are embedded in both the study and practice of politics. We also show that many scholars, influenced by feminism in its various different forms, see their work as challenging these inequalities and use standard methods and approaches as well as those that are more experimental or innovative.

As such, we do not discuss the different chapters but give you instead some context within which to locate them and an understanding of the development of the gender and politics subfield. We end by outlining some of the challenges that remain before giving a very brief outline of the handbook.

Feminism as a form of theory and practice has remained important to scholars and to the research carried out in the field of gender and politics. For many gender scholars, therefore, the "personal is political"—their academic interests have been inseparable from their political commitment. Their endeavor is therefore one of "critical scholarship" with an explicitly normative dimension. And from the late 1960s, women academics also began to organize inside the discipline. The women's caucus of the American Political Science Association was established in 1969, the International Political Science Association created a Study Group on Sex Roles and Politics in 1976, and in 1986 the Standing Group on Women and Politics was created within the European Consortium for Political Research. Debates about separate gender sections and panels on women and politics—seen by some as separatist—linked to broader questions about women's political

participation, such as whether women should organize within established structures (political parties, trade unions) or autonomously (Dahlerup 2010). Scholars pressing alternative sexualities pushed further, sometimes arguing for a destabilization of analytic as well as social categories (e.g., Butler 1990). The development of much academic work on gender and politics was shaped by this broader context of feminist and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) activism.

Thus, the burgeoning gender and politics scholarship has looked at a range of themes using a diversity of approaches. Much has focused on women—first on including women in the current categories and analyses of political science—thereby gendering the classic "units of analysis" such as citizens, voters, legislators, parties, legislatures, states, and nations. A second strand on women has examined political activities in arenas traditionally seen as outside political science. A third strand has looked at gender as a structure of social organization. Finally, mirroring struggles within the broader feminist movement, women of color (women of marginalized races and ethnicities), women in the developing world, postcolonial feminists, and LGBTQ scholars pressed for a place in the study of gender politics, sometimes finding a degree of accommodation and sometimes, frustrated with resistance, founding their own scholarly institutions and threads of research. We briefly describe these developments next.

3.6 LET US SUM UP

The unit we read explained first the meaning of social structures and how different thinkers conceived the idea. Social structures which form the basis for explaining social behaviour and policies, is simply a relation of constituting parts to the constituent whole. Elements of social life are linked together in a broad encompassing pattern. Social structure links individuals and lends a definite behaviour. Structuralisms, like Levi Strauss held out structures as universal models while Functionalists explained the behaviour of individual inners referring to the social structures in which they are present. Both discouraged individual initiatives. however giving primacy to the maintenance of structural whole: whereas Max Weber preferred a until dimensional approach,

distinguished between Power, Authority and legitimacy and gave importance to individuals to operate social structures. Karl Mam saw structure in terms of class layers which stresses economic considerations as the base over which are built legal, political and cultural systems. After we understood social structures through divergent approaches, we discussed how structures are divided. This is called stratification. The need for study of stratification is because it intakes constitution of democratic government viable, according to Aristotle, and establishment of Socialism possible: as Lenin thought. For Mam, social stratification provided the means to study relationship of the owners of the means of production and the entire processes of such a production. Mam divided the society according to different classes based on their economic activities and focus out possibilities of a class consciousiless or common belongingness to a certain class existing. Following in the footsteps of Man, Antonio Gramsci analysed the behaviour of dominant classes in society calling the relationship as 'hegemony'. Max Weber viewed stratification in terms of Class, Status and Power and denied the necessity of class consciousness to constitute a class. He distinguished between classes (generalistic). Status (particularistic) and Power (as a will or capacity of mien to realize a goal even midst opposition) but maintained that there is a possibility of convergence between the three social categories. Thinkers, such as Emile Durkheim, Davis, Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton who come under the group, Functionalists, saw great hopes in social stratification as it offered members opportunities to achieve positions, roles and goals necessary for advancement in a modern complex society. Roles depend on the individual's possessions, qualities due to birth, and perfonnances of services. They call for integrated personality and social solidarity. Agents that bring about such stability are moral consensus, religion. and rules and regulations.

3.7 KEY WORDS

Structuralism: In sociology, anthropology, and linguistics, structuralism is the methodology that implies elements of human culture must be understood by way of their relationship to a broader, overarching system

or structure. It works to uncover the structures that underlie all the things that humans do, think, perceive, and feel.

Social Stratification: Social stratification refers to society's categorization of its people into groups based on socioeconomic factors like wealth, income, race, education, gender, occupation, and social status, or derived power.

3.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1) What is the Meaning of Socio Politics?
2) Discuss the Perspectives on Social Structures.
3) Describe Social Stratification.
4) Discuss the Social stratification and politics.

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3.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1) Social structure is an arrangeiient where elenieiits of social life are linked together. They are durable and consistent.

Check Your Progress 2

1) In the views of Functionalists or structural-Functionalists, Social structures are more important than the role individual citizenslnienibers play. They also emphasise normative behaviour and rules of a social structure and are concerned about how a societal structure is held together. Social facts, according to them, should be scrutinized. Individuals' duties and responsibilities arc given great stress. Thus, maintaining the existing order is their concern.

2) For Marxists understanding social classes is based on: relationship of social agents to the means of production and to social produce (Economic relations are emphasised): Political, Cultural, legal and

ideological areas form a superstructure on the econoniic base; class struggle or political struggle as determinant of class formation.

3) Structuralism understood structures not as empirical structures as conceived by Functionalists but as characteristics of general human social organisation To the structuralist, structure does not relate to a particular Society and Culture. Social practices can be understood referring to the structure. Structures are models of universal Functionalists which explain behaviour of individuals in social life with reference to structures. For them a society assigns duties and responsibilities, prevents deviant behaviour of individual members and promotes value consensus. But both these approaches downplay individual initiatives.

Check Your Progress 3

1) Industrial society, laying stress on a single set of values and division of labour tends to alienate individuals. For the development of an integrated personality, a stable society is needed. Such a society is possible only if there is moral consensus and norms are followed and vice-versa.

UNIT 4: POWER AND POLITICS- DURKHEIM

STRUCTURE

4.0   OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know the Society Structure & Social Facts
- To describe Functionalism
- To discuss the Division of Labor
- To understand the Mechanical & Organic Solidarity

4.1   INTRODUCTION

David Émile Durkheim (French: [emil dyʁkɛm] or [dyʁkajm]; 15 April 1858 – 15 November 1917) was a French sociologist. He formally established the academic discipline of sociology and—with W. E. B. Du Bois, Karl Marx and Max Weber—is commonly cited as the principal architect of modern social science.

Much of Durkheim's work was concerned with how societies could maintain their integrity and coherence in modernity, an era in which traditional social and religious ties are no longer assumed, and in which new social institutions have come into being. His first major sociological work was The Division of Labour in Society (1893). In 1895, he

published The Rules of Sociological Method and set up the first European department of sociology, becoming France's first professor of sociology. In 1898, he established the journal L'Année Sociologique. Durkheim's seminal monograph, Suicide (1897), a study of suicide rates in Catholic and Protestant populations, pioneered modern social research and served to distinguish social science from psychology and political philosophy. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912) presented a theory of religion, comparing the social and cultural lives of aboriginal and modern societies.

Durkheim was also deeply preoccupied with the acceptance of sociology as a legitimate science. He refined the positivism originally set forth by Auguste Comte, promoting what could be considered as a form of epistemological realism, as well as the use of the hypothetico-deductive model in social science. For him, sociology was the science of institutions, if this term is understood in its broader meaning as "beliefs and modes of behaviour instituted by the collectivity" and its aim being to discover structural social facts. Durkheim was a major proponent of structural functionalism, a foundational perspective in both sociology and anthropology. In his view, social science should be purely holistic; that is, sociology should study phenomena attributed to society at large, rather than being limited to the specific actions of individuals.

He remained a dominant force in French intellectual life until his death in 1917, presenting numerous lectures and published works on a variety of topics, including the sociology of knowledge, morality, social stratification, religion, law, education, and deviance. Durkheimian terms such as "collective consciousness" have since entered the popular lexicon.

Durkheim's thought

Throughout his career, Durkheim was concerned primarily with three goals. First, to establish sociology as a new academic discipline. Second, to analyse how societies could maintain their integrity and coherence in the modern era, when things such as shared religious and ethnic background could no longer be assumed; to that end he wrote much about the effect of laws, religion, education and similar forces on society

and social integration. Lastly, Durkheim was concerned with the practical implications of scientific knowledge. The importance of social integration is expressed throughout Durkheim's work:

For if society lacks the unity that derives from the fact that the relationships between its parts are exactly regulated, that unity resulting from the harmonious articulation of its various functions assured by effective discipline and if, in addition, society lacks the unity based upon the commitment of men's wills to a common objective, then it is no more than a pile of sand that the least jolt or the slightest puff will suffice to scatter.

— Émile Durkheim

Inspirations

During his university studies at the École, Durkheim was influenced by two neo-Kantian scholars, Charles Bernard Renouvier and Émile Boutroux. The principles Durkheim absorbed from them included rationalism, scientific study of morality, anti-utilitarianism and secular education. His methodology was influenced by Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, a supporter of the scientific method.

A fundamental influence on Durkheim's thought was the sociological positivism of Auguste Comte, who effectively sought to extend and apply the scientific method found in the natural sciences to the social sciences. According to Comte, a true social science should stress for empirical facts, as well as induce general scientific laws from the relationship among these facts. There were many points on which Durkheim agreed with the positivist thesis. First, he accepted that the study of society was to be founded on an examination of facts. Second, like Comte, he acknowledged that the only valid guide to objective knowledge was the scientific method. Third, he agreed with Comte that the social sciences could become scientific only when they were stripped of their metaphysical abstractions and philosophical speculation. At the same time, Durkheim believed that Comte was still too philosophical in his outlook.

A second influence on Durkheim's view of society beyond Comte's positivism was the epistemological outlook called social realism.

Although he never explicitly exposed it, Durkheim adopted a realist perspective in order to demonstrate the existence of social realities outside the individual and to show that these realities existed in the form of the objective relations of society. As an epistemology of science, realism can be defined as a perspective that takes as its central point of departure the view that external social realities exist in the outer world and that these realities are independent of the individual's perception of them. This view opposes other predominant philosophical perspectives such as empiricism and positivism. Empiricists such as David Hume had argued that all realities in the outside world are products of human sense perception. According to empiricists, all realities are thus merely perceived: they do not exist independently of our perceptions, and have no causal power in themselves. Comte's positivism went a step further by claiming that scientific laws could be deduced from empirical observations. Going beyond this, Durkheim claimed that sociology would not only discover "apparent" laws, but would be able to discover the inherent nature of society.

Scholars also debate the exact influence of Jewish thought on Durkheim's work. The answer remains uncertain; some scholars have argued that Durkheim's thought is a form of secularized Jewish thought, while others argue that proving the existence of a direct influence of Jewish thought on Durkheim's achievements is difficult or impossible.

Establishing sociology

Durkheim authored some of the most programmatic statements on what sociology is and how it should be practiced. His concern was to establish sociology as a science. Arguing for a place for sociology among other sciences he wrote:

Sociology is, then, not an auxiliary of any other science; it is itself a distinct and autonomous science.

To give sociology a place in the academic world and to ensure that it is a legitimate science, it must have an object that is clear and distinct from philosophy or psychology, and its own methodology. He argued, "There is in every society a certain group of phenomena which may be differentiated from ....those studied by the other natural sciences."

A fundamental aim of sociology is to discover structural "social facts". Establishment of sociology as an independent, recognized academic discipline is amongst Durkheim's largest and most lasting legacies. Within sociology, his work has significantly influenced structuralism or structural functionalism. Scholars inspired by Durkheim include Marcel Mauss, Maurice Halbwachs, Célestin Bouglé, Gustave Belot, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, Talcott Parsons, Robert K. Merton, Jean Piaget, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Ferdinand de Saussure, Michel Foucault, Clifford Geertz, Peter Berger, Robert N. Bellah, social reformer Patrick Hunout and others.

Methodology

Cover of the French edition of The Rules of Sociological Method (1919)

In The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), Durkheim expressed his will to establish a method that would guarantee sociology's truly scientific character. One of the questions raised by the author concerns the objectivity of the sociologist: how may one study an object that, from the very beginning, conditions and relates to the observer? According to Durkheim, observation must be as impartial and impersonal as possible, even though a "perfectly objective observation" in this sense may never be attained. A social fact must always be studied according to its relation with other social facts, never according to the individual who studies it. Sociology should therefore privilege comparison rather than the study of singular independent facts.

Durkheim sought to create one of the first rigorous scientific approaches to social phenomena. Along with Herbert Spencer, he was one of the first people to explain the existence and quality of different parts of a society by reference to what function they served in maintaining the quotidian (i.e. by how they make society "work"). He also agreed with Spencer's organic analogy, comparing society to a living organism. Thus his work is sometimes seen as a precursor to functionalism. Durkheim also insisted that society was more than the sum of its parts.

Unlike his contemporaries Ferdinand Tönnies and Max Weber, he did not focus on what motivates the actions of individuals (an approach

associated with methodological individualism), but rather on the study of social facts.

Social facts

A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations.

— Émile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method

Durkheim's work revolved around the study of social facts, a term he coined to describe phenomena that have an existence in and of themselves, are not bound to the actions of individuals, but have a coercive influence upon them. Durkheim argued that social facts have, sui generis, an independent existence greater and more objective than the actions of the individuals that compose society. Only such social facts can explain the observed social phenomena. Being exterior to the individual person, social facts may thus also exercise coercive power on the various people composing society, as it can sometimes be observed in the case of formal laws and regulations, but also in situations implying the presence of informal rules, such as religious rituals or family norms. Unlike the facts studied in natural sciences, a "social" fact thus refers to a specific category of phenomena:

The determining cause of a social fact must be sought among the antecedent social facts and not among the states of the individual consciousness.

— Émile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method

Such social facts are endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they may control individual behaviors. According to Durkheim, these phenomena cannot be reduced to biological or psychological grounds. Social facts can be material (physical objects) or immaterial (meanings, sentiments, etc.). The latter cannot be seen or touched, but they are external and coercive, and as such, they become real, gain "facticity". Physical objects can represent both material and immaterial social facts; for example a flag is a physical social fact that often has

various immaterial social facts (the meaning and importance of the flag) attached to it.

Many social facts, however, have no material form. Even the most "individualistic" or "subjective" phenomena, such as love, freedom or suicide, would be regarded by Durkheim as objective social facts. Individuals composing society do not directly cause suicide: suicide, as a social fact, exists independently in society, and is caused by other social facts (such as rules governing behavior and group attachment), whether an individual likes it or not. Whether a person "leaves" a society does not alter the fact that this society will still contain suicides. Suicide, like other immaterial social facts, exists independently of the will of an individual, cannot be eliminated, and is as influential – coercive – as physical laws such as gravity. Sociology's task thus consists of discovering the qualities and characteristics of such social facts, which can be discovered through a quantitative or experimental approach (Durkheim extensively relied on statistics).

Society, collective consciousness and culture

Cover of the French edition of The Division of Labour in Society

Regarding the society itself, like social institutions in general, Durkheim saw it as a set of social facts. Even more than "what society is", Durkheim was interested in answering "how is a society created" and "what holds a society together". In The Division of Labour in Society, Durkheim attempted to answer the question of what holds the society together. He assumes that humans are inherently egoistic, but norms, beliefs and values (collective consciousness) form the moral basis of the society, resulting in social integration. Collective consciousness is of key importance to the society, its requisite function without which the society cannot survive. Collective consciousness produces the society and holds it together, and at the same time individuals produce collective consciousness through their interactions. Through collective consciousness human beings become aware of one another as social beings, not just animals.

The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own. It can be termed the collective or common consciousness.

— Emile Durkheim

In particular, the emotional part of the collective consciousness overrides our egoism: as we are emotionally bound to culture, we act socially because we recognize it is the responsible, moral way to act. A key to forming society is social interaction, and Durkheim believes that human beings, when in a group, will inevitably act in such a way that a society is formed.

The importance of another key social fact: the culture. Groups, when interacting, create their own culture and attach powerful emotions to it. He was one of the first scholars to consider the question of culture so intensely. Durkheim was interested in cultural diversity, and how the existence of diversity nonetheless fails to destroy a society. To that, Durkheim answered that any apparent cultural diversity is overridden by a larger, common, and more generalized cultural system, and the law.

In a socioevolutionary approach, Durkheim described the evolution of societies from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity (one rising from mutual need). As the societies become more complex, evolving from mechanical to organic solidarity, the division of labour is counteracting and replacing collective consciousness. In the simpler societies, people are connected to others due to personal ties and traditions; in the larger, modern society they are connected due to increased reliance on others with regard to them performing their specialized tasks needed for the modern, highly complex society to survive. In mechanical solidarity, people are self-sufficient, there is little integration and thus there is the need for use of force and repression to keep society together. Also, in such societies, people have much fewer options in life. In organic solidarity, people are much more integrated and interdependent and specialisation and cooperation is extensive. Progress from mechanical to organic solidarity is based first on population growth and increasing population density, second on increasing "morality density" (development of more complex social

interactions) and thirdly, on the increasing specialisation in workplace. One of the ways mechanical and organic societies differ is the function of law: in mechanical society the law is focused on its punitive aspect, and aims to reinforce the cohesion of the community, often by making the punishment public and extreme; whereas in the organic society the law focuses on repairing the damage done and is more focused on individuals than the community.

One of the main features of the modern, organic society is the importance, sacredness even, given to the concept – social fact – of the individual. The individual, rather than the collective, becomes the focus of rights and responsibilities, the center of public and private rituals holding the society together – a function once performed by the religion. To stress the importance of this concept, Durkheim talked of the "cult of the individual":

Thus very far from there being the antagonism between the individual and society which is often claimed, moral individualism, the cult of the individual, is in fact the product of society itself. It is society that instituted it and made of man the god whose servant it is.

— Émile Durkheim

Durkheim saw the population density and growth as key factors in the evolution of the societies and advent of modernity. As the number of people in a given area increase, so does the number of interactions, and the society becomes more complex. Growing competition between the more numerous people also leads to further division of labour. In time, the importance of the state, the law and the individual increases, while that of the religion and moral solidarity decreases.

In another example of evolution of culture, Durkheim pointed to fashion, although in this case he noted a more cyclical phenomenon. According to Durkheim, fashion serves to differentiate between lower classes and upper classes, but because lower classes want to look like the upper classes, they will eventually adapt the upper class fashion, depreciating it, and forcing the upper class to adopt a new fashion.

Social pathologies and crime

As the society, Durkheim noted there are several possible pathologies that could lead to a breakdown of social integration and disintegration of the society: the two most important ones are anomie and forced division of labour; lesser ones include the lack of coordination and suicide. By anomie Durkheim means a state when too rapid population growth reduces the amount of interaction between various groups, which in turn leads to a breakdown of understanding (norms, values, and so on). By forced division of labour Durkheim means a situation where power holders, driven by their desire for profit (greed), results in people doing the work they are unsuited for. Such people are unhappy, and their desire to change the system can destabilize the society.

Durkheim's views on crime were a departure from conventional notions. He believed that crime is "bound up with the fundamental conditions of all social life" and serves a social function. He stated that crime implies "not only that the way remains open to necessary changes but that in certain cases it directly prepares these changes". Examining the trial of Socrates, he argues that "his crime, namely, the independence of his thought, rendered a service not only to humanity but to his country" as "it served to prepare a new morality and faith that the Athenians needed". As such, his crime "was a useful prelude to reforms". In this sense, he saw crime as being able to release certain social tensions and so have a cleansing or purging effect in society. He further stated that "the authority which the moral conscience enjoys must not be excessive; otherwise, no-one would dare to criticize it, and it would too easily congeal into an immutable form. To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself...[even] the originality of the criminal... shall also be possible".

Suicide

In Suicide (1897), Durkheim explores the differing suicide rates among Protestants and Catholics, arguing that stronger social control among Catholics results in lower suicide rates. According to Durkheim, Catholic society has normal levels of integration while Protestant society has low levels. Overall, Durkheim treated suicide as a social fact, explaining variations in its rate on a macro level, considering society-scale

phenomena such as lack of connections between people (group attachment) and lack of regulations of behavior, rather than individuals' feelings and motivations.

Durkheim believed there was more to suicide than extremely personal individual life circumstances: for example, a loss of a job, divorce, or bankruptcy. Instead, he took suicide and explained it as a social fact instead of a result of one's circumstances. Durkheim believed that suicide was an instance of social deviance. Social deviance being any transgression of socially established norms. He created a normative theory of suicide focusing on the conditions of group life. The four different types of suicide that he proposed are egoistic, altruistic, anomic, and fatalistic. He began by plotting social regulation on the x-axis of his chart, and social integration on the y-axis. Egoistic suicide corresponds to a low level of social integration. When one is not well integrated into a social group it can lead to a feeling that they have not made a difference in anyone's lives. On the other hand, too much social integration would be altruistic suicide. This occurs when a group dominates the life of an individual to a degree where they feel meaningless to society. Anomic suicide occurs when one has an insufficient amount of social regulation. This stems from the sociological term anomie meaning a sense of aimlessness or despair that arises from the inability to reasonably expect life to be predictable. Lastly, there is fatalistic suicide, which results from too much social regulation. An example of this would be when one follows the same routine day after day. This leads to a belief that there is nothing good to look forward to. Durkheim suggested this was the most popular form of suicide for prisoners.

This study has been extensively discussed by later scholars and several major criticisms have emerged. First, Durkheim took most of his data from earlier researchers, notably Adolph Wagner and Henry Morselli, who were much more careful in generalizing from their own data. Second, later researchers found that the Protestant–Catholic differences in suicide seemed to be limited to German-speaking Europe and thus may have always been the spurious reflection of other factors. Durkheim's study of suicide has been criticized as an example of the logical error termed the ecological fallacy. However, diverging views

have contested whether Durkheim's work really contained an ecological fallacy. More recent authors such as Berk (2006) have also questioned the micro–macro relations underlying Durkheim's work. Some, such as Inkeles (1959), Johnson (1965) and Gibbs (1968), have claimed that Durkheim's only intent was to explain suicide sociologically within a holistic perspective, emphasizing that "he intended his theory to explain variation among social environments in the incidence of suicide, not the suicides of particular individuals".

Despite its limitations, Durkheim's work on suicide has influenced proponents of control theory, and is often mentioned as a classic sociological study. The book pioneered modern social research and served to distinguish social science from psychology and political philosophy.

Religion

In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim's first purpose was to identify the social origin and function of religion as he felt that religion was a source of camaraderie and solidarity. His second purpose was to identify links between certain religions in different cultures, finding a common denominator. He wanted to understand the empirical, social aspect of religion that is common to all religions and goes beyond the concepts of spirituality and God.

Durkheim defined religion as

A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, i.e., things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.

— Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Book 1, Ch. 1

In this definition, Durkheim avoids references to supernatural or God. Durkheim argued that the concept of supernatural is relatively new, tied to the development of science and separation of supernatural—that which cannot be rationally explained—from natural, that which can. Thus,

according to Durkheim, for early humans, everything was supernatural. Similarly, he points out that religions that give little importance to the concept of god exist, such as Buddhism, where the Four Noble Truths are much more important than any individual deity. With that, Durkheim argues, we are left with the following three concepts: the sacred (the ideas that cannot be properly explained, inspire awe and are considered worthy of spiritual respect or devotion), the beliefs and practices (which create highly emotional state—collective effervescence—and invest symbols with sacred importance), and the moral community (a group of people sharing a common moral philosophy). Out of those three concepts, Durkheim focused on the sacred, noting that it is at the very core of a religion. He defined sacred things as:

...simply collective ideals that have fixed themselves on material objects... they are only collective forces hypostasized, that is to say, moral forces; they are made up of the ideas and sentiments awakened in us by the spectacle of society, and not of sensations coming from the physical world.

— Émile Durkheim

Durkheim saw religion as the most fundamental social institution of humankind, and one that gave rise to other social forms. It was the religion that gave humanity the strongest sense of collective consciousness. Durkheim saw the religion as a force that emerged in the early hunter and gatherer societies, as the emotions collective effervescence run high in the growing groups, forcing them to act in a new ways, and giving them a sense of some hidden force driving them. Over time, as emotions became symbolized and interactions ritualized, religion became more organized, giving a rise to the division between the sacred and the profane. However, Durkheim also believed that religion was becoming less important, as it was being gradually superseded by science and the cult of an individual.

Thus there is something eternal in religion that is destined to outlive the succession of particular symbols in which religious thought has clothed itself.

— Émile Durkheim

However, even if the religion was losing its importance for Durkheim, it still laid the foundation of modern society and the interactions that governed it. And despite the advent of alternative forces, Durkheim argued that no replacement for the force of religion had yet been created. He expressed his doubt about modernity, seeing the modern times as "a period of transition and moral mediocrity".

Durkheim also argued that our primary categories for understanding the world have their origins in religion. It is religion, Durkheim writes, that gave rise to most if not all other social constructs, including the larger society. Durkheim argued that categories are produced by the society, and thus are collective creations. Thus as people create societies, they also create categories, but at the same time, they do so unconsciously, and the categories are prior to any individual's experience. In this way Durkheim attempted to bridge the divide between seeing categories as constructed out of human experience and as logically prior to that experience. Our understanding of the world is shaped by social facts; for example the notion of time is defined by being measured through a calendar, which in turn was created to allow us to keep track of our social gatherings and rituals; those in turn on their most basic level originated from religion. In the end, even the most logical and rational pursuit of science can trace its origins to religion. Durkheim states that, "Religion gave birth to all that is essential in the society.

In his work, Durkheim focused on totemism, the religion of the aboriginal Australians and Native Americans. Durkheim saw totemism as the most ancient religion, and focused on it as he believed its simplicity would ease the discussion of the essential elements of religion.

Now the totem is the flag of the clan. It is therefore natural that the impressions aroused by the clan in individual minds— impressions of dependence and of increased vitality—should fix themselves to the idea of the totem rather than that of the clan : for the clan is too complex a reality to be represented clearly in all its complex unity by such rudimentary intelligences.

— Émile Durkheim,

Durkheim's work on religion was criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds by specialists in the field. The most important critique came from Durkheim's contemporary, Arnold van Gennep, an expert on religion and ritual, and also on Australian belief systems. Van Gennep argued that Durkheim's views of primitive peoples and simple societies were "entirely erroneous". Van Gennep further argued that Durkheim demonstrated a lack of critical stance towards his sources, collected by traders and priests, naively accepting their veracity, and that Durkheim interpreted freely from dubious data. At the conceptual level, van Gennep pointed out Durkheim's tendency to press ethnography into a prefabricated theoretical scheme.

Despite such critiques, Durkheim's work on religion has been widely praised for its theoretical insight and whose arguments and propositions, according to Robert Alun Jones, "have stimulated the interest and excitement of several generations of sociologists irrespective of theoretical 'school' or field of specialization".

Sociology and philosophy

While Durkheim's work deals with a number of subjects, including suicide, the family, social structures, and social institutions, a large part of his work deals with the sociology of knowledge.

While publishing short articles on the subject earlier in his career (for example the essay De quelques formes primitives de classification written in 1902 with Marcel Mauss), Durkheim's definitive statement concerning the sociology of knowledge comes in his 1912 magnum opus The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. This book has as its goal not only the elucidation of the social origins and function of religion, but also the social origins and impact of society on language and logical thought. Durkheim worked largely out of a Kantian framework and sought to understand how the concepts and categories of logical thought could arise out of social life. He argued, for example, that the categories of space and time were not a priori. Rather, the category of space depends on a society's social grouping and geographical use of space, and a group's social rhythm that determines our understanding of time. In this Durkheim sought to combine elements of rationalism and empiricism,

arguing that certain aspects of logical thought common to all humans did exist, but that they were products of collective life (thus contradicting the tabla rasa empiricist understanding whereby categories are acquired by individual experience alone), and that they were not universal a priori's (as Kant argued) since the content of the categories differed from society to society.

Another key elements to Durkheim's theory of knowledge is his concept of représentations collectives (collective representations), which is outlined in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Représentations collectives are the symbols and images that come to represent the ideas, beliefs, and values elaborated by a collectivity and are not reducible to individual constituents. They can include words, slogans, ideas, or any number of material items that can serve as a symbol, such as a cross, a rock, a temple, a feather etc. As Durkheim elaborates, représentations collectives are created through intense social interaction and are products of collective activity. As such these representations have the particular, and somewhat contradictory, aspect that they exist externally to the individual (since they are created and controlled not by the individual but by society as a whole), and yet simultaneously within each individual of the society (by virtue of that individual's participation within society).

Arguably the most important "représentation collective" is language, which according to Durkheim is a product of collective action. And because language is a collective action, language contains within it a history of accumulated knowledge and experience that no individual would be capable of creating on their own. As Durkheim says, 'représentations collectives', and language in particular:

add to that which we can learn by our own personal experience all that wisdom and science which the group has accumulated in the course of centuries. Thinking by concepts, is not merely seeing reality on its most general side, but it is projecting a light upon the sensation which illuminates it, penetrates it and transforms it.

As such, language, as a social product, literally structures and shapes our experience of reality. This discursive approach to language and society would be developed by later French philosophers, such as Michel Foucault.

Morality

Durkheim defines morality as "a system of rules for conduct". His analysis of morality is strongly marked by Immanuel Kant and his notion of duty. While Durkheim was influenced by Kant, he was highly critical of aspects of the latter's moral theory and developed his own positions.

Durkheim agrees with Kant that within morality, there is an element of obligation, "a moral authority which, by manifesting itself in certain precepts particularly important to it, confers upon [moral rules] an obligatory character". Morality tells us how to act from a position of superiority. There exists a certain, pre-established moral norm to which we must conform. It is through this view that Durkheim makes a first critique of Kant in saying that moral duties originate in society, and are not to be found in some universal moral concept such as the categorical imperative. Durkheim also argues that morality is characterized not just by this obligation, but is also something that is desired by the individual. The individual believes that by adhering to morality, they are serving the common Good, and for this reason, the individual submits voluntarily to the moral commandment.

However, in order to accomplish its aims, morality must be legitimate in the eyes of those to whom it speaks. As Durkheim argues, this moral authority is primarily to be located in religion, which is why in any religion one finds a code of morality. For Durkheim, it is only society that has the resources, the respect, and the power to cultivate within an individual both the obligatory and the desirous aspects of morality.

Deviance

How many times, indeed, it [crime] is only an anticipation of future morality - a step toward what will be!

—Émile Durkheim, 'Division of Labour in Society',

Durkheim thought that deviance was an essential component of a functional society. He believed that deviance had three possible effects on society. First, Durkheim thought that deviance could challenge the perspective and thoughts of the general population, leading to social change by pointing out a flaw in society. Secondly, deviant acts could also support existing social norms and beliefs by evoking the population

to discipline the actors. Finally, Durkheim believed that reactions to deviant activity could increase camaraderie and social support among the population affected by the activity. Durkheim's thoughts on deviance contributed to Robert Merton's Strain Theory

Influences and legacy

Durkheim had an important impact on the development of Anthropology and Sociology, influencing thinkers from his school of sociology, such as Marcel Mauss, but also later thinkers, such as Maurice Halbwachs, Talcott Parsons, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, and Claude Lévi-Strauss. More recently, Durkheim has influenced sociologists such as Steven Lukes, Robert N. Bellah, and Pierre Bourdieu. His description of collective consciousness also deeply influenced the Turkish nationalism of Ziya Gökalp, the founding father of Turkish sociology. Randall Collins has developed a theory of what he calls interaction ritual chains, which is a synthesis of Durkheim's work on religion with Erving Goffman's micro-sociology. Goffman himself was also deeply influenced by Durkheim in his development of the interaction order.

Outside of sociology, he influenced philosophers Henri Bergson and Emmanuel Levinas, and his ideas can be found latently in the work of certain structuralist thinkers of the 60s, such as Alain Badiou, Louis Althusser, and Michel Foucault.

Durkheim contra Searle

Much of Durkheim's work, however, remains unacknowledged in philosophy, despite its direct relevance. As proof one can look to John Searle, who wrote a book The Construction of Social Reality, in which he elaborates a theory of social facts and collective representations that he believed to be a landmark work that would bridge the gap between analytic and continental philosophy. Neil Gross however, demonstrates how Searle's views on society are more or less a reconstitution of Durkheim's theories of social facts, social institutions, collective representations and the like. Searle's ideas are thus open to the same criticisms as Durkheim's. Searle responded by saying that Durkheim's work was worse than he had originally believed, and, admitting that he

had not read much of Durkheim's work, said that, "Because Durkheim's account seemed so impoverished I did not read any further in his work." Stephen Lukes, however, responded to Searle's response to Gross and refutes point by point the allegations that Searle makes against Durkheim, essentially upholding the argument of Gross, that Searle's work bears great resemblance to that of Durkheim's. Lukes attributes Searle's miscomprehension of Durkheim's work to the fact that Searle, quite simply, never read Durkheim.

Gilbert pro Durkheim

A contemporary philosopher of social phenomena who has offered a sympathetic close reading of Durkheim's discussion of social facts in chapter 1 and the prefaces of The Rules of Sociological Method is Margaret Gilbert. In chapter 4, section 2, of her 1989 book On Social Facts (whose title may represent an homage to Durkheim, alluding to his "faits sociaux") Gilbert argues that some of his statements that may seem to be philosophically untenable are important and fruitful.

4.2 SOCIETY STRUCTURE & SOCIAL FACTS

Emile Durkheim was a well-known sociologist famous for his views on the structure of society. His work focused on how traditional and modern societies evolved and function. Durkheim's theories were founded on the concept of social facts, defined as the norms, values, and structures of society.

This perspective of society differed from other sociologists of his era as Durkheim's theories were founded on things external in nature, as opposed to those internal in nature, such as the motivations and desires of individuals. According to Durkheim, collective consciousness, values, and rules are critical to a functional society. In this lesson, we will focus on Durkheim's theories of functionalism, anomie, and division of labor.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

ii) Compare your answers with those given at the end of this unit.

    1) How do you know the Society Structure & Social Facts?

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    2) Kindly describe Functionalism.

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4.3   FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism emphasizes a societal equilibrium. If something happens to disrupt the order and the flow of the system, society must adjust to achieve a stable state. According to Durkheim, society should be analyzed and described in terms of functions. Society is a system of interrelated parts where no one part can function without the other. These parts make up the whole of society. If one part changes, it has an impact on society as a whole.

For example, the state provides public education for children. The family of the children pays taxes, which the state uses for public education. The children who learn from public education go on to become law-abiding and working citizens, who pay taxes to support the state.

Let's look at this example again. The state provides public education for children. But a disruption or disequilibrium in the system occurs - perhaps the education is subpar, and the children drop out and become criminals. The system adjusts to improve the education and attempts to rehabilitate (through jail or other means) the criminals for them to become law-abiding and taxpaying citizens.

Durkheim actually viewed crime and delinquent behavior as a normal and necessary occurrence in the social system. He proposed that crime led to reactions from society about the crime. These shared reactions were used to create common consensuses of what individuals felt were moral and ethical norms by which to abide. These commonly held norms and values led to boundaries and rules for the society.

Types

Machine-state functionalism

Artistic representation of a Turing machine.

The broad position of "functionalism" can be articulated in many different varieties. The first formulation of a functionalist theory of mind was put forth by Hilary Putnam in the 1960s. This formulation, which is now called **machine-state functionalism**, or just **machine functionalism**, was inspired by the analogies which Putnam and others noted between the mind and the theoretical "machines" or computers capable of computing any given algorithm which were developed by Alan Turing (called **Turing machines**). Putnam himself, by the mid-1970s, had begun questioning this position. The beginning of his opposition to machine-state functionalism can be read about in his Twin Earth thought experiment.

In non-technical terms, a Turing machine is not a physical object, but rather an abstract machine built upon a mathematical model. Typically, a Turing Machine has a horizontal tape divided into rectangular cells arranged from left to right. The tape itself is infinite in length, and each cell may contain a symbol. The symbols used for any given "machine" can vary. The machine has a *read-write head* that scans cells and moves in left and right directions. The action of the machine is determined by the symbol in the cell being scanned and a table of transition rules that serve as the machine's programming. Because of the infinite tape, a traditional Turing Machine has an infinite amount of time to compute any particular function or any number of functions. In the below example, each cell is either blank (*B*) or has a *1* written on it. These are the inputs to the machine. The possible outputs are:

- Halt: Do nothing.

- *R*: move one square to the right.
- *L*: move one square to the left.
- *B*: erase whatever is on the square.
- *1*: erase whatever is on the square and print a '1.

An extremely simple example of a Turing machine which writes out the sequence '111' after scanning three blank squares and then stops as specified by the following machine table:

	State One	State Two	State Three
B	write 1; stay in state 1	write 1; stay in state 2	write 1; stay in state 3
1	go right; go to state 2	go right; go to state 3	[halt]

This table states that if the machine is in state one and scans a blank square (*B*), it will print a *1* and remain in state one. If it is in state one and reads a *1*, it will move one square to the right and also go into state two. If it is in state two and reads a *B*, it will print a *1* and stay in state two. If it is in state two and reads a *1*, it will move one square to the right and go into state three. If it is in state three and reads a *B*, it prints a *1* and remains in state three. Finally, if it is in state three and reads a *1*, then it will stay in state three.

The essential point to consider here is the *nature of the states* of the Turing machine. Each state can be defined exclusively in terms of its relations to the other states as well as inputs and outputs. State one, for example, is simply the state in which the machine, if it reads a *B*, writes a *1* and stays in that state, and in which, if it reads a *1*, it moves one square to the right and goes into a different state. This is the functional definition of state one; it is its causal role in the overall system. The details of how it accomplishes what it accomplishes and of its material constitution are completely irrelevant.

The above point is critical to an understanding of machine-state functionalism. Since Turing machines are not required to be physical systems, "anything capable of going through a succession of states in time can be a Turing machine".[7] Because biological organisms "go

through a succession of states in time", any such organisms could also be equivalent to Turing machines.

According to machine-state functionalism, the nature of a mental state is just like the nature of the Turing machine states described above. If one can show the rational functioning and computing skills of these machines to be comparable to the rational functioning and computing skills of human beings, it follows that Turing machine behavior closely resembles that of human beings. Therefore, it is not a particular physical-chemical composition responsible for the particular machine or mental state, it is the programming rules which produce the effects that are responsible. To put it another way, any rational preference is due to the rules being followed, not to the specific material composition of the agent.

Psycho-functionalism

A second form of functionalism is based on the rejection of behaviorist theories in psychology and their replacement with empirical cognitive models of the mind. This view is most closely associated with Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn and has been labeled **psycho-functionalism**.

The fundamental idea of psycho-functionalism is that psychology is an irreducibly complex science and that the terms that we use to describe the entities and properties of the mind in our best psychological theories cannot be redefined in terms of simple behavioral dispositions, and further, that such a redefinition would not be desirable or salient were it achievable. Psychofunctionalists view psychology as employing the same sorts of irreducibly teleological or purposive explanations as the biological sciences. Thus, for example, the function or role of the heart is to pump blood, that of the kidney is to filter it and to maintain certain chemical balances and so on—this is what accounts for the purposes of scientific explanation and taxonomy. There may be an infinite variety of physical realizations for all of the mechanisms, but what is important is only their role in the overall biological theory. In an analogous manner, the role of mental states, such as belief and desire, is determined by the functional or causal role that is designated for them within our best *scientific* psychological theory. If some mental state which is

postulated by folk psychology (e.g. hysteria) is determined not to have any fundamental role in cognitive psychological explanation, then that particular state may be considered not to exist . On the other hand, if it turns out that there are states which theoretical cognitive psychology posits as necessary for explanation of human behavior but which are not foreseen by ordinary folk psychological language, then these entities or states exist.

Analytic functionalism

A third form of functionalism is concerned with the meanings of theoretical terms in general. This view is most closely associated with David Lewis and is often referred to as **analytic functionalism** or **conceptual functionalism**. The basic idea of analytic functionalism is that theoretical terms are implicitly defined by the theories in whose formulation they occur and not by intrinsic properties of the phonemes they comprise. In the case of ordinary language terms, such as "belief", "desire", or "hunger", the idea is that such terms get their meanings from our common-sense "folk psychological" theories about them, but that such conceptualizations are not sufficient to withstand the rigor imposed by materialistic theories of reality and causality. Such terms are subject to conceptual analyses which take something like the following form:

Mental state M is the state that is preconceived by P and causes Q.

For example, the state of **pain** is *caused* by sitting on a tack and *causes* loud cries, and higher order mental states of anger and resentment directed at the careless person who left a tack lying around. These sorts of functional definitions in terms of causal roles are claimed to be *analytic* and *a priori* truths about the submental states and the (largely fictitious) propositional attitudes they describe. Hence, its proponents are known as *analytic* or *conceptual* functionalists. The essential difference between analytic and psychofunctionalism is that the latter emphasizes the importance of laboratory observation and experimentation in the determination of which mental state terms and concepts are genuine and which functional identifications may be considered to be genuinely contingent and a posteriori identities. The

former, on the other hand, claims that such identities are <u>necessary</u> and not subject to empirical scientific investigation.

Homuncular functionalism

Homuncular functionalism was developed largely by Daniel Dennett and has been advocated by William Lycan. It arose in response to the challenges that Ned Block's China Brain (a.k.a. Chinese nation) and John Searle's Chinese room thought experiments presented for the more traditional forms of functionalism (see below under "Criticism"). In attempting to overcome the conceptual difficulties that arose from the idea of a nation full of Chinese people wired together, each person working as a single neuron to produce in the wired-together whole the functional mental states of an individual mind, many functionalists simply bit the bullet, so to speak, and argued that such a Chinese nation would indeed possess all of the qualitative and intentional properties of a mind; i.e. it would become a sort of systemic or collective mind with propositional attitudes and other mental characteristics. Whatever the worth of this latter hypothesis, it was immediately objected that it entailed an unacceptable sort of mind-mind supervenience: the *systemic* mind which somehow emerged at the higher-level must necessarily supervene on the individual minds of each individual member of the Chinese nation, to stick to Block's formulation. But this would seem to put into serious doubt, if not directly contradict, the fundamental idea of the supervenience thesis: there can be no change in the mental realm without some change in the underlying physical substratum. This can be easily seen if we label the set of mental facts that occur at the higher-level *M1* and the set of mental facts that occur at the lower-level *M2*. Given the transitivity of supervenience, if *M1* supervenes on *M2*, and *M2* supervenes on *P* (physical base), then *M1* and *M2* both supervene on *P*, even though they are (allegedly) totally different sets of mental facts.

Since mind-mind supervenience seemed to have become acceptable in functionalist circles, it seemed to some that the only way to resolve the puzzle was to postulate the existence of an entire hierarchical series of mind levels (analogous to <u>homunculi</u>) which became less and less

sophisticated in terms of functional organization and physical composition all the way down to the level of the physico-mechanical neuron or group of neurons. The homunculi at each level, on this view, have authentic mental properties but become simpler and less intelligent as one works one's way down the hierarchy.

Mechanistic functionalism

Mechanistic functionalism, originally formulated and defended by Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Gillett independently, augments previous functionalist accounts of mental states by maintaining that any psychological explanation must be rendered in mechanistic terms. That is, instead of mental states receiving a purely functional explanation in terms of their relations to other mental states, like those listed above, functions are seen as playing only a part—the other part being played by structures— of the explanation of a given mental state.

A mechanistic explanation involves decomposing a given system, in this case a mental system, into its component physical parts, their activities or functions, and their combined organizational relations. On this account the mind remains a functional system, but one that is understood in mechanistic terms. This account remains a sort of functionalism because functional relations are still essential to mental states, but it is mechanistic because the functional relations are always manifestations of concrete structures—albeit structures understood at a certain level of abstraction. Functions are individuated and explained either in terms of the contributions they make to the given system or in teleological terms. If the functions are understood in teleological terms, then they may be characterized either etiologically or non-etiologically.

Mechanistic functionalism leads functionalism away from the traditional functionalist autonomy of psychology from neuroscience and towards integrating psychology and neuroscience. By providing an applicable framework for merging traditional psychological models with neurological data, mechanistic functionalism may be understood as reconciling the functionalist theory of mind with neurological accounts of how the brain actually works. This is due to the fact that mechanistic explanations of function attempt to provide an account of how functional

states (mental states) are physically realized through neurological mechanisms.

Physicalism

There is much confusion about the sort of relationship that is claimed to exist (or not exist) between the general thesis of functionalism and physicalism. It has often been claimed that functionalism somehow "disproves" or falsifies physicalism *tout court* (i.e. without further explanation or description). On the other hand, most philosophers of mind who are functionalists claim to be physicalists—indeed, some of them, such as David Lewis, have claimed to be strict reductionist-type physicalists.

Functionalism is fundamentally what Ned Block has called a broadly metaphysical thesis as opposed to a narrowly ontological one. That is, functionalism is not so much concerned with *what there is* than with what it is that characterizes a certain type of mental state, e.g. pain, as the type of state that it is. Previous attempts to answer the mind-body problem have all tried to resolve it by answering *both* questions: dualism says there are two substances and that mental states are characterized by their immateriality; behaviorism claimed that there was one substance and that mental states were behavioral disposition; physicalism asserted the existence of just one substance and characterized the mental states as physical states (as in "pain = C-fiber firings").

On this understanding, **type physicalism** can be seen as incompatible with functionalism, since it claims that what characterizes mental states (e.g. pain) is that they are physical in nature, while functionalism says that what characterizes pain is its functional/causal role and its relationship with yelling "ouch", etc. However, any weaker sort of physicalism which makes the simple ontological claim that everything that exists is made up of physical matter is perfectly compatible with functionalism. Moreover, most functionalists who are physicalists require that the properties that are quantified over in functional definitions be physical properties. Hence, they *are* physicalists, even though the general thesis of functionalism itself does not commit them to being so.

In the case of David Lewis, there is a distinction in the concepts of "having pain" (a rigid designator true of the same things in all possible worlds) and just "pain" (a non-rigid designator). Pain, for Lewis, stands for something like the definite description "the state with the causal role x". The referent of the description in humans is a type of brain state to be determined by science. The referent among silicon-based life forms is something else. The referent of the description among angels is some immaterial, non-physical state. For Lewis, therefore, *local* type-physical reductions are possible and compatible with conceptual functionalism. (See also Lewis's mad pain and Martian pain.) There seems to be some confusion between types and tokens that needs to be cleared up in the functionalist analysis.

Criticism

China brain

Ned Block argues against the functionalist proposal of multiple reliability, where hardware implementation is irrelevant because only the functional level is important. The "China brain" or "Chinese nation" thought experiment involves supposing that the entire nation of China systematically organizes itself to operate just like a brain, with each individual acting as a neuron. (The tremendous difference in speed of operation of each unit is not addressed.). According to functionalism, so long as the people are performing the proper functional roles, with the proper causal relations between inputs and outputs, the system will be a real mind, with mental states, consciousness, and so on. However, Block argues, this is patently absurd, so there must be something wrong with the thesis of functionalism since it would allow this to be a legitimate description of a mind.

Some functionalists believe China would have qualia but that due to the size it is impossible to imagine China being conscious. Indeed, it may be the case that we are constrained by our theory of mind and will never be able to understand what Chinese-nation consciousness is like. Therefore, if functionalism is true either qualia will exist across all hardware or will not exist at all but are illusory

4.4 DIVISION OF LABOR

Durkheim's concept of the division of labor focused on the shift in societies from a simple society to one that is more complex. He argued that traditional societies were made up of homogenous people that were more or less the same in terms of values, religious beliefs, and backgrounds. Modern societies, in contrast, are made up of a complex division of labor, beliefs, and backgrounds.

In traditional societies, the collective consciousness ruled, social norms were strong, and social behavior was well regulated. In modern societies, common consciousness was less obvious, and the regulation of social behavior was less punitive and more restitutive, aiming to restore normal activity to society.

4.5 MECHANICAL & ORGANIC SOLIDARITY

Mechanical solidarity occurs when individuals within structural units are alike and self-sufficient. For example, in traditional societies, people grew their own food, made their own clothes, and had little need for extensive social contact with others because they did not have to rely on others for daily needs.

Organic solidarity is when a large population is stratified into smaller structural units. There's a high level of interdependence among individuals and structures, but there's still a division of people along the lines of labor or type.

Durkheim recognized that things like increased communication, transportation, and interaction with others resulted in the social change from a mechanical solidarity to organic. If societies evolve too quickly from traditional to modern, a breakdown of norms and collective consciousness occurs. The concept of community and social constraints becomes weakened, and this leads to disorder, crisis, and anomie.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

ii) Compare your answers with those given at the end of this unit.

1) Discuss the Division of Labor.

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2) How do you understand the Mechanical & Organic Solidarity?

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4.6 LET US SUM UP

Functionalism is a viewpoint of the theory of the mind (not to be confused with the psychological notion of one's Theory of Mind). It states that mental states (beliefs, desires, being in pain, etc.) are constituted solely by their functional role, which means, their causal relations with other mental states, sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. Functionalism developed largely as an alternative to the identity theory of mind and behaviorism.

Functionalism is a theoretical level between the physical implementation and behavioral output. Therefore, it is different from its predecessors of Cartesian dualism (advocating independent mental and physical substances) and Skinnerian behaviorism and physicalism (declaring only physical substances) because it is only concerned with the effective functions of the brain, through its organization or its "software programs".

Since mental states are identified by a functional role, they are said to be realized on multiple levels; in other words, they are able to be manifested in various systems, even perhaps computers, so long as the system performs the appropriate functions. While computers are physical devices with electronic substrate that perform computations on inputs to give outputs, so brains are physical devices with neural substrate that perform computations on inputs which produce behaviors.

4.7 KEY WORDS

Social Fact: In sociology, social facts are values, cultural norms, and social structures that transcend the individual and can exercise social control. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim defined the term, and argued that the discipline of sociology should be understood as the empirical study of social facts.

Solidarity: Solidarity is an awareness of shared interests, objectives, standards, and sympathies creating a psychological sense of unity of groups or classes. It refers to the ties in a society that bind people together as one.

Functionalism: Functionalism is a viewpoint of the theory of the mind. It states that mental states are constituted solely by their functional role, which means, their causal relations with other mental states, sensory inputs and behavioral outputs.

4.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

a. How do you know the Society Structure & Social Facts?
b. Kindly describe Functionalism.
c. Discuss the Division of Labor.
d. How do you understand the Mechanical & Organic Solidarity?

4.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

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4.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 4.2
2. See Section 4.3

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 4.4
2. See Section 4.5

UNIT 5: POWER AND POLITICS-MARXISM

STRUCTURE

5.0   OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you should be able to

- To define the concept of class
- To describe the various criteria for class formation
- To identify the various stages involved in the history of society that change due to class conflict or change in mode of production
- To discuss what is social revolution and how it will be reached
- To understand Marx's concept of alienation.

5.1   INTRODUCTION

You have already studied two units on Karl Marx's ideas about human society and its historical development. This unit will explain the key notion of class as used by Karl Marx. We shall study in detail about the various criteria that are basic for calling any collectivity a class. Also we

shall discuss how and why classes come into conflict with each other. We will seek to understand the impact of these class conflicts on the history of development of society. Finally, the present unit will give you a brief overview of history including the future of human society on the basis of Marxian framework. The entire unit is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the class structure, including the classification of societies in history and class conflict. Within this section we go on to elaborate the intensification of class conflict under capitalism. The third section deals with class struggle and revolution, while the fourth section explains Marx's concept of alienation.

Karl Marx's reputation has changed significantly in the 35 years since the -centenary of his death in 1983. I wrote The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx to mark that anniversary against the background of the huge explosion of study of and debate about Marx that was driven by the great ideological and political radicalisation produced by the upturn of 1968-76.1 I was able to build on all that work (as well as the friendly goading of Tony Cliff and Peter Clarke) in writing my book. By then, however, we had entered a different period, one in which the ruling class was on the offensive and the workers' movement was in retreat. This shift was indelibly marked two years later by the defeat of the Great Miners' Strike of 1984-5. This journal continues to debate the causes of the subsequent collapse in strike activity (see Dave Lyddon's article elsewhere in this issue), but to my mind the memory of the miners' agony looms large among them, above all in the imagination of the trade union bureaucracy. Even before this great shift in the balance of class forces Marx's intellectual star was waning. By the mid-1970s Paris, which had been at the centre of intense debates about Marxism between figures such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre and Louis Althusser, was the cradle of what was subsequently marketed in the academy as poststructuralism. The key figure here was Michel Foucault, who developed an extremely sophisticated historical genealogy of modernity that, inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, gave primacy to different forms of "power-knowledge". For all his brilliance, Foucault's references to Marx are generally dismissive, sometimes hostile and frequently ignorant.2 His conception of society as a cluster of power relations irreducible to the

economy or the state (both of which he criticised Marx for privileging) provided a useful framework for those who had come out of the movements of the 1970s believing that Marxism was too economically reductive to accommodate the struggle for women's or black or gay liberation. Foucault's critique of Marxism was partly stimulated by what he regarded as its implication in the great disaster of Stalinism. Here at least he converged with mainstream liberalism, which was enormously strengthened ideologically by the crisis and then collapse of the Soviet Union.3 The resulting intellectual eclipse of Marx is most evident in Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, where he barely mentions Marx as he confidently announces the definitive triumph of liberal capitalism over all modern rivals and therefore the End of History as Hegel had understood it, as the struggle between antagonistic ideologies.4

In 1989 Fukuyama wrote:

Marx, speaking Hegel's language, asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental contradiction that could not be resolved within its context, that between capital and labour, and this contradiction has constituted the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely, the class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West. As [Alexandre] Kojève (among others) noted, the egalitarianism of modern America represents the essential achievement of the classless society envisioned by Marx.5

Where is Fukuyama today? In November 2016, trying to make sense of Donald Trump's election victory, he struck rather a different note:

Social class, defined today by one's level of education, appears to have become the single most important social fracture in countless industrialised and emerging-market countries. This, in turn, is driven directly by globalisation and the march of technology, which has been facilitated in turn by the liberal world order created largely by the US since 1945…the benefits of this system did not filter down to the whole population. The working classes in the developed world saw their jobs disappear as companies outsourced and squeezed efficiencies in response to a ruthlessly competitive global market.6

As Fukuyama goes on to acknowledge, the general impact of neoliberal globalisation has been greatly exacerbated by the 2007-8 financial crash and its aftermath—what Michael Roberts calls the Long Depression. This crisis was itself the culmination (to date) of a series of financial crashes—the bursting of the Japanese "bubble economy" in the early 1990s, the East Asian crisis and Russian bankruptcy of 1997-8, and the collapse of the Wall Street dot-com bubble in 2000—that increasingly homed in on the centre of the global economic system in the United States. As the gloss has gone off the neoliberal capitalism whose praises Fukuyama sang when the USSR collapsed, there has been a serious revival in intellectual interest in Marx and his critique of political economy. He was capitalism's greatest foe and critic so it is natural that when capitalism gets into trouble, people turn to him. This is reflected in mainstream media pieces announcing that "Marx is back", but much more seriously in renewed interest in Capital, including a wave of reading groups. David Harvey symbolises this entire process, thanks to his video lectures, which have led to two book spin-offs, as well as the numerous other books, articles and talks in which he tries to elucidate the sometimes tortuous logic of Capital and bring it to bear on the present. This has been accompanied by a renewal of scholarly Marxist study of Capital and its drafts, facilitated by the appearance of hitherto unpublished manuscripts in the MEGA2 (Marx-Engels Complete Works).7

This is an enormously positive development. It creates an environment in which, in at least some academic contexts (especially, somewhat bizarrely, in the English-speaking world), Marxism is treated as a serious interlocutor. Of course, the situation is different outside the academy, where (with some important exceptions) serious Marxist organisations have been struggling in recent years.8 Nevertheless the renewal of the Marxist critique of political economy is an important political fact, which can help, in the right circumstances, to create a broader audience for revolutionary socialist politics. My interest here, however, is the dominant view of Marx that this renewal creates—Marx the critic of capitalism and the author of Capital. I would be the last to deny the centrality of this achievement, but what tends to get lost here is Marx the

revolutionary and the political activist. The result is to reinforce an image of Marx as a scholastic figure, even an impractical dreamer, confined to the British Museum, far from the realities of working class life and struggle.

The state, "this supranaturalist abortion"

This situation is reinforced by the widespread impression that Marx was much weaker on politics than on economics. The leading Marxist state theorist Ralph Miliband even complains that "the available classical writings [of Marx, Engels and their immediate successors] are simply silent or extremely perfunctory over major issues of politics and political theory".9 Not everyone agrees. For example, Stathis Kouvelakis, author of an important study of the young Marx, argues: "Rather than an Achilles heel, or the sign of a troubling lacuna, politics is, in my opinion, Marx's strong point, the point where his work is at its most open and innovative".10

Certainly Marx himself from the start was preoccupied with politics as a space of struggle and transformation. Early on his long journey to Capital, in 1843-4, he confronted Hegel's political philosophy, which he saw, as Antonio Gramsci later would, in:

the context of the French Revolution and Napoleon with his wars…the vital and immediate experiences of a most intense period of historical struggles, -miseries, when the external world crushed individuals, bringing them to the ground, -flattening them against the ground, when all past philosophies were criticised by reality in such an absolute way.11

Confronting Hegel was therefore a way into politics. In the unfinished manuscript of A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Marx developed the argument that the modern political state produced by the English, American and French revolutions is the alienated expression of an atomised and competitive civil society.12 He concluded in the 1844 Introduction to this text that Germany, fragmented and dominated by absolutist regimes, required a "radical revolution…general human emancipation" rather than the "merely political revolution" that had taken place in France in 1789-94, and that this revolution could only be made by the proletariat (MECW 3: 184,

186).13 A "Draft Plan for a Work on the Modern State", apparently written in November 1844, finishes in the same vein: "Suffrage, the fight for the abolition of the state and of bourgeois society" (MECW 4: 666).

In the mid-1840s Marx was planning a two-volume Critique of Politics and Political Economy. The planned Critique of Political Economy that he mapped out in 1857-8 in response to a new global economic and financial crisis didn't really represent much of a narrowing down of this project, since the fourth of the six books he intended to write was to be on the state. It is interesting that when Marx mused in a letter to Ludwig Kugelmann of 28 December 1862 about focusing just on the first book, Capital, he reserved the state for special treatment: "the development of the sequel (with the exception, perhaps, of the relationship between the various forms of state and the various economic structures of society) could easily be pursued by others" (MECW 41:435). In the event, of course, Marx never even finished Capital, let alone wrote the Book on the State. But there's plenty about the state in Capital, volume 1, especially in Part VIII on the primitive accumulation of capital, where he highlights the role of state violence in creating the conditions for modern capitalism—on the one hand, the concentration of money in the hands of the capitalists, and on the other, the formation of a class of propertyless wage labourers. This culminates in the magnificent chapter 31, under the misleadingly technical title of "The Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist", summed up here:

The different moments of primitive accumulation can be assigned in particular to Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and England, in more or less chronological order. These different moments are systematically combined together at the end of the seventeenth century in England; the combination embraces the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system, and the system of protection. These methods depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized power of society [die Staatsmacht, die konzentrierte und organisierte Gewalt der Gesellschaft], to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition.

Force [Gewalt] is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.14

This chapter alone gives the lie to those interpretations (sometimes by Marxists who should know better) that portray Capital as a narrowly economic work that replicates the logic of bourgeois political economy. As Lucia Pradella puts it, in Part VIII more generally Marx "incorporates the state system into the analysis of capital's accumulation…he…analyses the state's fundamental role in generating the capitalist relation, both nationally and internationally, and in reproducing the social order as a whole. For Marx the logic of the state is internal to the logic of capital".15

Indeed the whole of volume 1 is structured by the class antagonism between capital and wage labour. This is constituted in the extraction of surplus value in the process of production whose fundamental structure is uncovered in parts I and II where Marx presents the theory of value and surplus value, but finds expression in the clash of opposed "collective wills" (as Gramsci would put it). We see this in another great chapter, chapter 10 "The Working Day", where "the establishment of a norm for the working day presents itself as a struggle between collective capital, ie the class of the capitalists, and collective labour" whose outcome the state registers in factory legislation that forces a restructuring of the production process.16 Politics for Marx thus starts from this antagonism, which reaches its apogee in what he calls in the Grundrisse the "concentration of bourgeois society in the form of the state".17

Capital is thus a profoundly political work. We'll return below to its relationship with Marx's political activity, but it's worth underlining the connection between how he conceives the state as the concentrated form of capitalist power and what he would write four years after the publication of Capital, volume 1, in solidarity with the Paris Commune of 1871. In The Civil War in France Marx praises the Commune for dismantling the centralised bureaucratic structures of the modern capitalist state and replacing them with forms of radical and, where possible, direct democracy. In a critique of his anarchist opponent Mikhail Bakunin in 1875 he even calls the Commune "a Revolution against the state itself, this supernaturalist abortion of society, a

resumption by the people for the people, of its own social life" (MECW 22: 486).18 That same year Marx reaffirmed this in the "Critique of the Gotha Programme", where he opposed the statist socialism of Ferdinand Lassalle. Thus socialist revolution would target the very state that had played such a central role in the construction of capitalism in the first place.

So Marx may not have provided the kind of "systematic theorisation" of politics that Miliband demanded.19 My aim in the rest of this article is not to fill this lacuna—after all, Chris Harman has written magisterially on the capitalist state in the pages of this journal, and I have discussed the subject elsewhere.20 Instead I shall try to show that Marx is not "simply silent or extremely perfunctory over major issues of politics", concentrating on two key episodes where he had a real political influence—the 1848 Revolution and the First International. These show him as a political leader who sought to shape struggles and learned from the experience.21

1848 and after: revolutionary self-education

Exploding in Paris in February 1848, revolution swept throughout Europe, shaking all the established regimes, which were mainly dynastic absolutisms restored after the final defeat of Napoleon in 1814-15. Marx, his communist and materialist outlook already formed, threw himself into the revolutionary struggle in his native Rhineland after a popular rising in Berlin in March 1848. He had two great advantages in this. First, through his editorship of the Rheinische Zeitung in 1842-3 he already had political experience and contacts in Cologne, the region's biggest city, where the liberal bourgeoisie chafed under quasi-colonial Prussian rule (the relatively economically advanced Rhineland had been under French rule under Napoleon when it experienced progressive reforms that made its annexation by Prussia in 1815 hard to bear). Secondly, along with his lifelong friend and comrade Friedrich Engels, he had won the leadership of a German international revolutionary artisans' society that, at his instigation, adopted the name the Communist League and commissioned him to write its programme, which turned out to be the Communist Manifesto.22

But the strategy that Marx and Engels pursued in 1848 involved substantial internal tensions. Essentially their immediate objective was not proletarian revolution, but a German version of the Great French Revolution of 1789-94, when the Jacobins led a plebeian coalition of the small producers of town and country violently to sweep away the old regime. In other words, they sought a -radical-democratic bourgeois revolution, though, as they put in the Manifesto, they expected "the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution" (CW 6: 519). In March 1848 Marx and Engels drafted "The Demands of the Communist Party in Germany". These called for Germany—a patchwork of petty kingdoms and pettier principalities—to be transformed into a "single and indivisible republic" based on universal suffrage, the destruction of feudal property and privileges and progressive social measures that remained within the limits of capitalism (MECW 7:3).

Marx and Engels expected this programme would be achieved through a revolutionary war against Tsarist Russia, the military guarantor of European reaction since 1814-15. In this they were influenced by the example of the revolutionary wars waged by the Jacobins and their successors that had turned Europe upside down in the 1790s and 1800s. Engels wrote in August 1848: "A war with Russia would have meant a complete, open and effective break with the whole of our disgraceful past, the real liberation and unification of Germany, and the establishment of democracy on the ruins of feudalism and on the wreckage of the short-lived bourgeois dream of power" (MECW 7: 352). And, as in the Great French Revolution, the bourgeoisie would find itself forced, at least temporarily, to mobilise the masses against the old regime. Marx wrote in July 1848: "The bourgeoisie cannot achieve domination without previously gaining the support of the people as a whole, and hence without acting more or less democratically" (MECW 7: 262).

But where did the Communist League fit into this strategy of a more radical rerun of 1789-94? Marx found himself in conflict with Andreas Gottschalk, leader of the Workers Association of Cologne (a substantial organisation of 7,000 members at its height), who opposed any

cooperation with the liberal bourgeoisie and successfully organised a boycott of elections to the German and Prussian parliaments. Marx was able to see off Gottschalk's challenge, but he was opposed to the left running candidates against bourgeois democrats and put the Communist League into cold storage. The revived Neue Rheinische Zeitung (NRZ) became the main axis of his intervention in the revolution as a campaigning democratic paper that agitated against Prussian domination in the Rhineland and criticised the timidity of liberal politicians in the national and Prussian parliaments in Frankfurt and Berlin respectively. Consequently Marx had increasingly to confront the conservatism of the bourgeoisie who shunned revolutionary methods. This was dramatised in Paris in June 1848, when the new French Republic bloodily suppressed a workers' rising. In Germany the vacillations of the bourgeoisie locally in Cologne, but more importantly in Berlin and Frankfurt, gave the initiative to Prussian absolutism, which intervened to suppress the revolution.

In November 1848, as counter-revolution rolled across Europe, Marx denounced both faces of the bourgeoisie—brutal in France, cowardly in Germany:

The bourgeoisie in France…headed the counter-revolution only after it had broken down all obstacles to the rule of its own class. The bourgeoisie in Germany meekly joins the retinue of the absolute monarchy and of feudalism before securing even the first conditions of existence necessary for its own civic freedom and its rule. In France it played the part of a tyrant and made its own counter-revolution. In Germany it acts like a slave and carries out the counter-revolution for its own tyrants. In France it won its victory in order to humble the people. In Germany it humbled itself to prevent the victory of the people. History presents no more shameful and pitiful spectacle than that of the German bourgeoisie (MECW 7: 504).

Marx initially shifted his position by arguing in December 1848 that "a purely bourgeois revolution and the establishment of bourgeois rule in the form of a constitutional monarchy is impossible in Germany…only a feudal absolutist counter-revolution or a social republican revolution is possible" (MECW 7: 178). The problem with this ambiguous

formulation was not that it implied some kind of coalition of classes against absolutism—this was inevitable in a country such as Germany where the majority were peasants and the "Demands of the Communist Party" included proposals directed at their interests. In 1856 Marx was to write to Engels: "The whole thing in Germany will depend on whether it is possible to back the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the [16th century] Peasants' war. In which case the affair should go swimmingly" (MECW 40: 41). The question in 1848-9, however, before he had reached this clarity, was which class would lead the "social republican revolution". Marx found himself unable to rely on his bourgeois allies, but lacked an organisation of his own that could drive the revolution forward despite them. As Jonathan Sperber puts it:

Either prong of Marx's strategy of a double recurrence of the French Revolution—a democratic revolution against Prussia, or a workers' revolution against the bourgeoisie—had its possibilities. Combining the two proved impossible. Attacking Prussian rule meant neglecting class antagonisms, cultivating the workers' hostility to the bourgeoisie meant ceasing work with other democrats in Cologne and Rhineland.23

In April 1849 Marx sought to break out of this dilemma by resigning from the district committee of the Democratic Associations of the Rhine Province on the grounds that, "in view of the heterogeneous elements in the Associations in question, there is little to be expected from them that would be advantageous for the interests of the working class or the great mass of the people" (MECW 9: 502). He and his allies tried instead to unite the Workers' Associations of the Rhine Province and Westphalia in a single organisation. Marx also published in the NRZ "Wage Labour and Capital", his first developed account of capitalist exploitation. In an introductory note he wrote: "From various quarters we have been reproached with not having presented the economic relations which constitute the material foundation of the present class struggles and national struggles" (MECW 9:197). In explaining why he thought the time was now right for such a presentation Marx drew the lessons from the chain of counter-revolutionary victories:

Europe, with the defeat of the revolutionary workers, had relapsed into its old Anglo-Russian slavery. The June struggle in Paris, the fall of

Vienna, the tragicomedy of Berlin's November, the desperate exertions of Poland, Italy and Hungary, the starving of Ireland into submission— these were the concentrated expressions of the European class struggle between bourgeoisie and working class, by means of which we proved that every revolutionary upheaval, however remote from the class struggle its goal may appear to be, must fail until the revolutionary working class is victorious, that every social reform remains a utopia until the proletarian revolution and the feudalistic counter-revolution measure swords in a world war (MECW 9: 197-8).24

Mario Tronti, one of the founders of Italian workerism, has stressed the theoretical importance of Marx's editorship of the NRZ:

The experience of editing the newspaper, straddling 1848 and 1849, was a fundamental transition in Marx's discourse on labour and on capital… In these political writings, rough, violent, sectarian, one-sided, factually unjustified, but limpid in that anticipation of future development that only hatred can give—in these writings we see the abstract concept of labour and the concrete reality of work overlap and conjoined for the first time. The synthesis is that of an idea of the proletariat that is now fully definite, and not merely intuited with the force of genius, as was the case in previous works.25

Any faith in the revolutionary role of the liberal bourgeoisie gone, Marx now sought to arm the workers ideologically and organisationally. But he was expelled from the Rhineland in May 1849 as part of the final counter-revolutionary clampdown (which Engels tried to resist by participating in armed struggle in the Palatinate). Driven into exile in London, in the autumn of 1849 they revived the Communist League and started a publication, the Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung: Politisch-ökonomische Revue. The Communist League Mark II is significant chiefly because it provided the framework for what amounted to a detailed self-criticism of the strategy Marx and Engels had pursued in 1848, the "Address of the Central Authority to the League" of March 1850. They concentrated their fire on the "democratic petty bourgeoisie", whose radical rhetoric allowed them to act as a bridge between the bourgeoisie, "which is united with absolutism", and the -working class:

While the democratic petty bourgeoisie wish to bring the revolution [against the old regime] to a conclusion as quickly as possible…it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of their positions of dominance, the proletariat has conquered state power, and the association of proletarians, not only in one country but in all the dominant countries of the world, has advanced so far that competition between proletarians in these countries has ceased and that at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians (MECW 10: 279, 281).

As Michael Löwy comments:

This striking passage contains three of the fundamental themes that Trotsky would later develop in the theory of permanent revolution: (1) the uninterrupted development of the revolution in a semi-feudal country, leading to the conquest of power by the working class; (2) the application by the proletariat in power of explicitly anticapitalist and socialist measures; (3) the necessarily international character of the revolutionary process and of the new socialist society, without classes or private property.26

So here Marx and Engels anticipated the theory of permanent revolution Leon Trotsky formulated after the Russian Revolution of 1905 and generalised in the course of his struggle against the developing Stalinist bureaucracy during the 1920s: in German conditions, bourgeois and proletarian revolutions would be part of a single process driven by a self-organised working class. The political conclusion Marx and Engels drew was that workers should not allow the democratic petty bourgeoisie to "entangle" them "in a party organisation in which general social-democratic phrases predominate", and thus "once more be reduced to an appendage of official bourgeois democracy" (MECW 6:281). Therefore:

the workers and above all the League must exert themselves to establish an independent secret and public organisation of the workers' party alongside the official democrats and make each community the central point and nucleus of workers' organisations in which the attitude and

interests of the proletariat will be discussed independent of bourgeois influence (MECW 6: 282).

In the event of a new revolution:

alongside the official governments, they [the workers] must establish their own revolutionary workers' governments, whether in the form of municipal committees and municipal councils or in the form of workers' clubs or workers' committees so that the bourgeois-democratic governments not only immediately lose the support of the workers but from the outset see themselves supervised and threatened by authorities backed up by the whole mass of the workers (MECW 6: 283).

Though this form of dual power should be backed up by the workers arming themselves and organising their own "proletarian guard", "the workers must put up their own candidates [in elections] in order to preserve their independence, to count their forces and to lay before the public their revolutionary attitude and party standpoint". They must reject the accusations that "by so doing they are splitting the democratic party"—exactly the reason Marx had opposed left electoral candidates in 1848-9 (MECW 6: 283, 284). The experience of revolution thus led him implicitly to re-evaluate his strategy, in the process sketching out elements that would figure in the much more developed approach to revolution forged by Lenin, Trotsky and the Bolsheviks in the white heat of 1905 and 1917.

The reason why Marx himself did not further elaborate what he began to argue in 1850 was that 1848 proved not to be a dress rehearsal for the real event, but the end, in western Europe at least, of the era that opened in 1789 when the bourgeoisie was willing to take to the streets. Fear of the masses, including now an increasingly organised and militant working class, pushed the bourgeoisie towards a modus vivendi with the old regime. In Britain, where Marx and Engels had taken refuge, 1848 marked the moment when the ruling oligarchy succeeded in breaking Chartism, the first great mass workers' movement, through a combination of systematic repression and the successful mobilisation of the middle class in defence of the status quo.27 Great bourgeois revolutions did take place in the mid-19th century, but they either took

the form of what Gramsci was to call "passive revolutions", in which Italy and Germany were unified from above through a combination of interstate wars, diplomatic manoeuvres and class compromises, or, in the case of the mightiest of all, the American Civil War that destroyed the Southern slave power, was tightly controlled from above by the Union government and its vast armies.28

Marx and Engels were confronted in the Communist League by opponents who refused to recognise the defeat of the revolution and sought to revive the struggle through insurrectionary conspiracies. In September 1850 they broke with the League. As Marx put it:

The materialist standpoint of the Manifesto has given way to idealism, the revolution is seen not as the product of realities of the situation but as a result of an effort of will. Whereas we say to the workers: You have 15, 20, 50 years of civil war to go through to alter the situation and to train yourselves for the exercise of power, it is said: We must take power at once, or else we must take to our beds (MECW 10: 626).

A few months later Marx and Engels sought to fill in a broader analytical framework for the rhythm of revolution and counter-revolution they had experienced. In the "Review May to October" that they drafted for the third issue of the Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung: Politisch-ökonomische Revue (which never appeared) they argued that, just as the spread of the economic crisis that broke out in Britain in 1847 to the Continent had helped to spark off the wave of risings in 1848, so the subsequent recovery—made possible by global imperial expansion fuelled by the discoveries of gold in Australia and California and Western penetration of China but once again moving across the Channel via Britain—set the seal on their defeat. A revival of the revolutionary struggle would depend on a future crisis:

While, therefore, the crises first produce revolutions on the Continent, the foundation for these is, nevertheless, always laid in England. Violent outbreaks must naturally occur rather in the extremities of the bourgeois body than in its heart, since the possibility of adjustment is greater here [ie London] than there. On the other hand, the degree to which Continental revolutions react on England is at the same time the barometer which indicates how far these revolutions really call in

question the bourgeois conditions of life, or how far they only hit their political formations.

With this general prosperity, in which the productive forces of bourgeois society develop as luxuriantly as is at all possible within bourgeois relationships, there can be no talk of a real revolution. Such a revolution is only possible in the periods when both these factors, the modern productive forces and the bourgeois forms of production, come in collision with each other… A new revolution is possible only in consequence of a new crisis. It is, however, just as certain as this crisis (MECW 10: 509-10).

The First International, the writing of Capital and the struggle against racism and imperialism

The break with the Communist League temporarily brought to an end Marx's organised political activity. He wrote to Engels (on 11 February 1851):

I am greatly pleased by the public, authentic isolation in which we two, you and I, now find ourselves. It is wholly in accord with our attitude and our principles. The system of mutual concessions, half-measures tolerated for decency's sake, and the obligation to bear one's share of public ridicule in the party along with all these jackasses, all this is now over (MECW 38: 285).

In his reply (13 February 1851) Engels agreed in even more emphatic terms:

How can people like us, who shun official appointments like the plague, fit into a "party"? And what have we, who spit on popularity, who don't know what to make of ourselves if we show signs of growing popular, to do with a "party", ie a herd of jackasses who swear by us because they think we're of the same kidney as they? (MECW 38: 290).

But what Marx and Engels were distancing themselves from was not so much the idea of a party as such but party organisation, particularly of the secret -conspiratorial kind that dominated the revolutionary left before 1848. Thus Marx wrote to the poet Ferdinand Freiligrath nearly a decade later (29 February 1860):

Since 1852, then, I have known nothing of "party" in the sense implied in your letter. Whereas you are a poet, I am a critic and for me the

experiences of 1849-52 were quite enough. The "League"…was simply an episode in the history of a party that is everywhere springing up naturally out of the soil of modern society… I have tried to dispel the misunderstanding arising out of the impression that by "party" I meant a "League" that expired eight years ago, or an editorial board that was disbanded twelve years ago. By party, I meant the party in the broad historical sense (MECW 41: 82, 87).

Monty Johnstone argues that "for Marx the party in this sense was the embodiment of his conception of the 'mission' of the working class, concentrating in itself 'the revolutionary interests of society', to accomplish 'the historical tasks which automatically arose' from its general conditions of existence".29 But Marx couldn't even abandon the "party" in the narrow sense of the Communist League: in 1852 he was busy campaigning against the Prussian government's show trial of his ex-comrades in Cologne. He complained to Adolph Cluss (7 December 1852): "The trial dragged me even deeper into the mire, since for 5 weeks, instead of working for my livelihood, I had to work for the party against the government's machinations" (MECW 39: 259). Moreover, as August Nimtz argues, Marx and Engels also "consciously operated as an informal party", with a network mainly of ex-League members and other veterans of 1848, one of whom, Wilhelm Liebknecht, would play an important role in founding the German Social Democratic Party (SPD).30

Marx's main priority was, however, his endlessly interrupted, never-ending Critique of Political Economy—in particular, the intensive studies recorded in the London Notebooks (1850-3), and the cycle of manuscripts, beginning with the Grundrisse (1857-8) and culminating in Capital, volume 1, a decade later.31 But of course this was itself a deeply political project, particularly given the analysis Marx and Engels had developed in 1850 that made a future revolutionary wave depend on the outbreak of another economic crisis. When the next crisis came in 1857, both were initially optimistic about its political impact. Marx suggested to Engels that they write "a pamphlet together about the affair as a reminder to the German public that we are still there as always" (MECW 40: 225). He went as far as assembling what he called the "Book of the

Crisis of 1857", in which he systematically ordered the mass of newspaper articles and statistics he had collected for this project.32 Even after their hopes of renewed revolution had been disappointed, Marx's recognition of the political importance of his Critique of Political Economy comes out in a letter to Lassalle of 12 November 1858 where, quite characteristically, he explains why he hasn't sent the manuscript off to the publisher: "In it an important view of social relations is scientifically expounded for the first time. Hence I owe it to the party that the thing shouldn't be disfigured by the kind of heavy, wooden style proper to a disordered liver" (MECW 40: 354).33

So Marx never lost sight of "the party in the broad historical sense". And his correspondence with Engels shows them closely following the political events of the day, accompanied by continuous acerbic commentary on both established political leaders and their revolutionary opponents. Occasionally they were dragged back into polemic, most notably in 1860 when Marx had to interrupt the Critique to respond in a book-length polemic to the zoologist Karl Vogt, one of the leaders of the Frankfurt Parliament—and an agent of the Emperor Napoleon III, who had accused Marx of being a police spy and gangster boss.34 Exile quarrels aside, Marx was confined to commentary, most effectively in the articles he wrote (sometimes they were ghosted by Engels) for the New York Daily Tribune. These provided a laboratory for Marx's developing political and economic analyses.

Everything changed in September 1864 when a meeting he helped to set up by British and French workers' organisations in support of the Polish struggle for national independence decided to launch the International Working Men's Association (IMWA)—the First International. Its formation reflected the revival of progressive politics and the workers' movement after the defeat of the revolutions of 1848. According to Gareth Stedman Jones:

in England, three developments were particularly important. Without them, the International Working Men's Association (IMWA) would never have come into existence, let alone have made the impact it did. The first was the popular response to republican transnationalism in the form of identification with the stirring and heroic national struggles in

Italy, Bourbon and Russian autocracies. The second and equally important development was the growth in popular support for the abolition of slavery and the cause of the North in the American Civil War… But none of these campaigns would have made such an impact without a third and fundamental development, the transformation in the capability and political presence of trade unions.35

The International had at its core 23 British trade unions with 25,000 members, "the real worker-kings of London", Marx called them (MECW 42: 44).36 They were based among skilled workers, particularly in the building trades and engineering, and were developing class-wide forms of organisation—notably the London Trades Council (1860) and the Trades Union Congress (1868). The British unions were flanked by Continental workers' societies, and radical political currents, notably the followers of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in France, and Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy. But Marx was the dominant figure in the General Council of this politically heterogeneous coalition. Its founding documents were written by him; he complained to Engels: "I was, however, obliged to insert two sentences about 'duty' and 'right', and ditto about 'truth, morality and justice' in the preamble to the rules, but these are so placed that they can do no harm" (MECW 42:18). The IMWA affirmed his fundamental conception of the self-emancipation of the working class—"the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes"—and insisted on the necessity of working class political action: "To conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working classes" (MECW 20: 14, 12). This latter principle would be strongly contested by the Proudhonists and Bakuninists.

It was exactly in the early years of the IMWA, 1864-7, that Marx wrote the manuscript of Capital, volume 3, and, under Engels's constant chivvying, completed volume 1 for publication in September 1867. So at the peak of his intellectual creativity he was leading one of the most important movements in the history of the organised working class. Marx complained to Engels on May Day 1865: "I really am overworked, as completing my book, on the one hand, and the 'International Association', on the other, are making very heavy demands on my time" (MECW 42: 149). This led to a cross-fertilisation of theory and practice.

Marx's theoretical research informed the political debates he undertook. His classic summary of his theory of value and surplus value, "Value, Price, and Profit", originated as a paper for the General Council in which he challenged a follower of the Utopian socialist Robert Owen who argued that trade union struggles were futile because wages couldn't rise above the level of basic subsistence. At the same time, the experience of these struggles was reflected in Capital, volume 1, above all in the chapter on the working day.37

The International played an important role in building solidarity for workers' struggles in different countries—by Parisian bronze workers, London bookbinders and tailors and Genevan building workers among others—and combating the importing of scab labour to break strikes. But its focus was more political than economic. In Britain the unions involved in the IMWA were a driving force in the Reform League, which in 1866-7 agitated for the old Chartist demand of manhood suffrage and succeeded in winning a substantial extension in the franchise in the 1867 Reform Act. Marx wrote to Engels after big Reform League rallies in Trafalgar Square in June/July 1866: "The workers' demonstrations in London are fabulous compared with anything seen in England since 1849, and they are solely the work of the "International" Mr [Benjamin] Lucraft, f.i., the captain in Trafalgar Square, is one of our Council" (MECW 42: 289-90).

But of course the horizons of the International were firmly international. So were Marx's. The object of Capital was the capitalist mode of production conceived as a global economic system. As his critique of political economy deepened, particularly in the different editions of Capital, volume 1, he demonstrated how the tendencies of capitalist accumulation—the concentration and centralisation of capital, the development of an industrial reserve army, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall—drove Western territorial expansion and colonial domination. He thus anticipated the theory of capitalist imperialism developed by Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, Nikolai Bukharin and others in the first decades of the 20th century.38 But this understanding of capitalism as a world system implied that resistance would take the form not only of the struggle between wage labour and capital within

individual countries but of different movements for political emancipation dictated by the hierarchical structure of power on an international scale and the plurality of forms of exploitation integrated into the global capitalist economy. For Marx, the most important example of these forms outside the direct wage-labour/capital relationship was American slavery. He writes in Capital:

While the cotton industry introduced child-slavery into England, in the United States it gave the impulse for the transformation of the earlier, more or less -patriarchal slavery into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact the veiled slavery of the wage-labourers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the New World as its pedestal.39

Marx wrote to Engels in January 1860: "In my view, the most momentous thing happening in the world today is the slave movement—on the one hand, in America…and in Russia, on the other" (MECW 41: 4). The emancipation of the serfs in Russia did not lead to a great upheaval from below, but the secession of the Southern slave states from the United States in response to Abraham Lincoln's election as president in November 1860 did unleash the most gigantic struggle. Marx refers in a footnote in Capital, to "the one great event of contemporary history, the American Civil War".40 Presciently, in his earlier letter to Engels, Marx had wondered: "Should the affair grow serious by and by, what will become of Manchester?" (MECW 41:5). The slave plantations of the American South were part of a transnational economic complex that bound them to the first great modern industrial capitalist cluster, the textile factories of north western England whose main raw material, cotton, they supplied, via the merchants and ship-owners of Liverpool.41

Sven Beckert writes:

By multiple measures—the sheer numbers employed, the value of output, -profitability—the cotton empire had no parallel. One author boldly estimated that in 1862, fully 20 million people worldwide—one out of every 65 people alive—were involved in the cultivation of cotton or the production of cotton cloth. In England alone, which still counted two-thirds of the world's mechanical spindles in its factories, the livelihood of between one-fifth and one-fourth of the population was based on the

industry; one-tenth of all British capital was invested in it, and close to one-half of all exports consisted of cotton yarn and cloth…in 1861, the flagship of global capitalism, Great Britain, found itself dangerously dependent on the white gold shipped out of New York, New Orleans, Charleston and other American ports. By the late 1850s, cotton grown in the United States accounted for 77 percent of the 800 million pounds of cotton consumed in Britain.42

Therefore the "cotton famine" produced by the American Civil War—first the Southern Confederacy banned exports and then the Union imposed a blockade of the rebel states—had a devastating economic effect. "By early 1863, a quarter of the inhabitants of Lancashire—more than half a million individuals—were out of work, receiving some form of public or private assistance".43 Agents of the South sought to use the cotton famine to win support for British recognition of the Confederacy—a project that had serious prospects of success given that important sections of the British ruling class were tempted to intervene in the Civil War to prevent the US from developing into a peer competitor that could challenge their hegemony. Their efforts were countered by a campaign in support of the Union led by MPs such as John Bright who were on the Radical wing of the Liberal Party, supporters of free trade but also opposed to slavery and aristocratic privilege, and based especially on the same trade unions that went on to form the International.44 As Marx put it after the most dangerous war crisis, the Trent affair in the winter of 1861-2, was over, "it ought never to be forgotten in the United States that at least the working classes of England, from the commencement to the termination of the difficulty, have never forsaken them" (MECW 19: 137).

Marx and Engels themselves strongly supported the Union cause, but placed this in a class framework, as when Marx predicted in "The Civil War in the United States" (October 1861) that a Southern victory (which seemed quite likely in the early stages of the war) would produce:

not a dissolution of the Union, but a reorganisation of it, a reorganisation on the basis of slavery, under the recognised control of the slaveholding oligarchy… The slave system would infect the whole Union. In the Northern states, where Negro slavery is in practice unworkable, the white

working class would gradually be forced down to the level of helotry. This would fully accord with the loudly proclaimed principle that only certain races are capable of freedom, and as the actual labour is the lot of the Negro in the South, so in the North it is the lot of the German and the Irishman, or their direct descendants.

The present struggle between the South and North is, therefore, nothing but a struggle between two social systems, the system of slavery and the system of free labour. The struggle has broken out because the two systems can no longer live peacefully side by side on the North American continent. It can only be ended by the victory of one system or the other (MECW 19: 50).

The International was only formed towards the end of the Civil War. For most of it, Marx and Engels were condemned to follow it as commentators, frequently frustrated by the feebleness of the Union generals. In their correspondence, however, Marx accurately predicted that Lincoln would be forced to use revolutionary methods—for example, creating black regiments—to defeat the South. When he took his most radical step, announcing on 22 September 1862 that he would issue an Emancipation Proclamation the following 1 January freeing the slaves in all rebel states, Marx commented:

Lincoln's acts all have the appearance of inflexible, clause-ridden conditions communicated by a lawyer to his opposite number. This does not impair their historical import… Like others, I am of course aware of the distasteful form assumed by the movement chez the Yankees; but, having regard to the nature of bourgeois democracy, I find this explicable. Nevertheless, events over there are such as to transform the world (Letter to Engels, 29 October 1862; MECW 41: 421).45

Marx underestimated Lincoln's abilities, but not his actions. He drafted the letter the General Council sent to the president congratulating him on his re-election in November 1864. It contains this important paragraph:

While the working men, the true political powers of the North, allowed slavery to defile their own republic, while before the Negro, mastered and sold without his concurrence, they boasted it the highest prerogative of the white-skinned labourer to sell himself and choose his own master, they were unable to attain the true freedom of labour, or to support their

European brethren in their struggle for emancipation; but this barrier to progress has been swept off by the red sea of civil war (MECW 20: 20).

Marx repeated the same point in Capital, volume 1: "Labour in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin".46 He had, therefore, a clear understanding of how the racial subjugation of one section of the toiling classes would also weaken that section not subject to this oppression. But this insight, well-developed in Marx's writings on the US, was capable of much wider application, as industrial capitalism's core in Europe and North America subordinated the rest of the world. This meant that national liberation struggles were not simply a product of the surviving old regime in Europe, as in the case of Italy, Poland and Hungary, but would persist into the emerging era of capitalist imperialism.47 Thus, in the International, Marx had to confront French socialists (including his future son-in-law) who argued that nationality was an "out-dated prejudice". Marx described to Engels on 29 June 1866 the debate in the General Council the previous day:

The English laughed heartily when I began my speech with the observation that our friend [Paul] Lafargue, and others, who had abolished nationalities, had addressed us in "French", ie in a language which 9/10 of the audience did not understand. I went on to suggest that by his denial of nationalities he seemed quite unconsciously to imply their absorption by the model French nation (MECW 42: 287).

The case that brought home the significance of national struggles was that of Ireland. Its conquest and annexation by the English state long predated the triumph of capitalism, but Ireland in the 19th century had been reduced, thanks to the famine and mass emigration to Britain and the US, as Marx put it in one of the most powerful sections of Capital, volume 1, to "merely an agricultural district of England which happens to be divided by a wide stretch of water from the country for which it provides corn, wool, cattle and industrial and military recruits".48 The condition of Ireland was a pressing political question for the IMWA because of growing struggles against rack-renting absentee Anglo-Irish landlords (which would develop into the so-called Land War of 1879-82) and the attempts by the Fenians, or Irish Republican Brotherhood, to mount armed resistance to British rule, including various terrorist

"outrages". Marx and Engels therefore studied the situation closely, constantly swapping snippets of economic and historical information about Ireland in their correspondence.

Marx wrote to Engels on 2 November 1867: "I once believed the separation of Ireland from England to be impossible. I now regard it as inevitable, although federation may follow upon separation" (MECW 42: 460). He elaborated a few weeks later:

What the Irish need is:

1. Self-government and independence from England.

2. Agrarian revolution…

3. Protective tariffs against England. From 1783-1801 every branch of industry in Ireland flourished. By suppressing the protective tariffs which the Irish parliament had established, the Union destroyed all industrial life in Ireland. The little bit of linen industry is in no way a substitute… As soon as the Irish became independent, necessity would turn them, like Canada, Australia, etc, into protectionists (MECW 42: 486-7).

The last demand is particularly interesting since previously Marx had supported free trade against bourgeois economic nationalists such as the German Friedrich List and the American Henry Carey, who advocated protectionism as a way of allowing their countries to industrialise despite the dominance of British capitalism. Marx anticipated the course that British colonies that were allowed "Dominion" status—including southern Ireland under Éamon de Valera in the 1930s and 1940s—actually pursued. But his support for Irish independence was not only for the sake of the Irish themselves. He wrote to Engels (10 December 1869):

quite apart from all "international" and "humane" phrases about justice for Ireland—which are taken for granted on the International Council—it is in the direct and absolute interests of the English working class to get rid of their present connexion with Ireland… For a long time I believed it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working

class ascendancy… Deeper study has now convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will never accomplish anything before it has got rid of Ireland. The lever must be applied in Ireland. This is why the Irish question is so important for the social movement in general (MECW 43: 398).

Marx most fully elaborated his reasoning in a justly celebrated letter to two old German comrades, Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt (9 April 1870):

Ireland is the bulwark of the English landed aristocracy. The exploitation of this country is not simply one of the main sources of their material wealth; it is their greatest moral power. They represent, in fact, the domination of England over Ireland. Ireland is, thus, the grand moyen [great means] by which the English aristocracy maintain its domination in England itself.

On the other hand, if the English army and police were to be withdrawn from Ireland tomorrow, you would immediately have an agrarian revolution in Ireland. But the overthrow of the English aristocracy in Ireland would entail, and would lead immediately to, its overthrow in England. And this would bring about the prerequisites for the proletarian revolution in England…the English bourgeoisie has also much more important interests in the present economy of Ireland. As a result of the constantly increasing concentration of lease-holding, Ireland is steadily supplying its surplus to the English labour market, and thus forcing down the wages and material and moral position of the English working class.

And most important of all! All industrial and commercial centres in England now have a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who forces down the standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker, he feels himself to be a member of the ruling nation and, therefore, makes himself a tool of his aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against him. His attitude towards him is roughly that of the "poor whites" to the niggers in the former slave states of the American Union. The Irishman

pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker both the accomplice and the stupid tool of English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is kept artificially alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short, by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret of the maintenance of power by the capitalist class. And the latter is fully aware of this…

England, as the metropolis of capital, as the power which has hitherto ruled the world market, is for the present the most important country for the workers' revolution, and, in addition, the only country where the material conditions for this revolution have developed a certain degree of maturity. Thus, to hasten the social revolution in England is the most important object of the International Working Men's Association. The sole means of doing so is to make Ireland independent… The special task of the Central Council in London is to awaken the consciousness of the English working class that, for them, the national emancipation of Ireland is not a question of abstract justice or humanitarian sentiment but the first condition of their own social emancipation (MECW 43: 473-5).

It is very sad to see Marx use racist language in a letter whose dominant thrust is to demonstrate the dangers of racialised divisions (promoted by dominant Victorian British attitudes towards the Irish). It shows how pervasive racial discourse was, even among those who rejected racism. Marx also overestimated the Anglo-Irish landlords' importance to British imperialism. Though the question of Home Rule for Ireland polarised ruling class politics in Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, splitting the Liberal Party in the 1880s and threatening civil war in the summer of 1914, the ruling class actually was ruthlessly unsentimental in the manner in which it ditched the Anglo-Irish aristocracy. Both Liberal and Unionist governments passed major Irish land reforms. According to Henry Patterson, "the British land legislation culminating in the Wyndham Act of 1903 removed the landlord class as a unifying focus of resentment. An estimated two-thirds to three-quarters of farmers had become owners of their land by the outbreak of World War One".49 This facilitated the emergence of a class of big cattle ranchers who helped to

provide the social base of the conservative Irish Free State that emerged from the War of Independence and Civil War between 1918 and 1923.

These defects don't alter the importance of Marx's argument. First, as in "The Civil War in the United States", the letter shows his understanding of the role of flows of transnational migration in forming the working class in different countries—Irish and Germans to the US, Irish to Britain. Underlying this understanding is Marx's theory of the industrial reserve army of labour constantly being created by technological change and colonial domination that provides capital internationally with new drafts of cheap workers. Secondly, the tensions caused labour market competition between "native" and migrant workers, when reinforced by the ideological apparatuses of what Gramsci would call civil society, can solidify into racialised antagonisms that divide and weaken the working class. Thirdly, it is in the interests of the "native" workers, and of the working class as a whole, that socialists should actively support the struggles of oppressed nations for their political emancipation, even if (as proved to be the case in Ireland) these struggles remain within the limits of capitalism.

In the event, Marx himself was unable to pursue these insights much further. The IMWA succumbed to the great crisis produced first by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and then by the Paris Commune of 1871. Marx won the General Council's support for The Civil War in France, which championed the Commune. But he was increasingly caught between two fires. On the one hand, he was challenged on his left by Bakunin and his supporters, which meant the International was increasingly riven by internal factional struggle. On the other hand, particularly amid the media furore over The Civil War in France, which soon homed on Marx as the author, he was abandoned by the British trade union leaders who had provided the Council with its ballast. This wasn't especially surprising. As Stedman Jones points out, for them "the fundamental aim of the IMWA…was to bring the benefits of British social legislation (limitation of working hours, restriction of juvenile employment) and the achievements of the new 'amalgamated' model of trade unionism to the other nations of Europe and the world".50

Moreover, the Liberals under the leadership of William Gladstone, who pioneered a new progressive bourgeois politics aimed at the mass electorate created by the 1867 Reform Act, offered an attractive political home to trade union leaders who had worked with Radicals such as Bright in the past. Marx spotted this development early on, telling Kugelmann on 6 April 1868 that Gladstone's championing of the disestablishment of the Irish Church "is detrimental to the workers' party, because the intriguers among the workers, such as [George] Odger, [George] Potter, etc, who want to get into the next parliament, have now found a new excuse for attaching themselves to the bourgeois liberals" (MECW 43: 3). Many of his former trade union allies ended up as Lib-Lab MPs—a form of subaltern working class politics that had to be smashed when the Labour Party emerged at the end of the 19th century.

By 1872 the First International was history. Nevertheless, the arguments Marx had developed in its heyday were of lasting importance. Lenin would rediscover his writings on the state during 1917 and develop them further in The State and Revolution. Moreover, in pre-1914 debates among Marxists in the Russian Empire, he had restated the position Marx had mapped out in his writings on Ireland: it was essential for workers in imperialist countries, in order to break free from the ideologico-political hegemony of their ruling class, to support the struggle for self-determination of oppressed nations. Under Lenin's leadership, the Communist International generalised this argument: in the era of imperialism the revolutionary workers' movement must ally itself to colonial revolts. So here too we see Marx laying the foundations of the analysis and strategy developed further by his successors, and in particular the leaders of the October Revolution, Lenin and Trotsky.

Conclusion

There are, of course, problematic aspects to Marx's political interventions. An obvious one is his relatively relaxed attitude to the question of organisation, as is evident in his participation in the relatively tight, conspiratorial Communist League and his leadership of the rumbustious, ideologically incoherent First International. Monty

Johnstone indeed distinguishes five major "models" of the party in Marx's and Engels's work:

each of which corresponds to a stage or stages in the development of the working class movement in a given period or in given countries… (a) the small international Communist cadres' organisation (the League of Communists—1847-52); (b) the "party" without an organisation (during the ebb of the labour movement—1850s and early '60s); (c) the broad international federation of workers' organisations (the First International—1864-72); (d) the Marxist national mass party (German Social Democracy—1870s, '80s and early '90s); (e) the broad national labour party (Britain and America—1880s and early '90s) based on the Chartist model.51

A consistent thread running through Marx's political writings is his hostility to sectarianism. In a letter to Friedrich Bolte of 23 November 1871 that must be seen as a reflection on the experience of the IMWA, by then on its deathbed, he writes:

The International was founded in order to replace the socialist or semi-socialist sects by a real organisation of the working class for struggle. The original Rules and the Inaugural Address show this at a glance. On the other hand the International could not have asserted itself if the course of history had not already smashed sectarianism. The development of socialist sectarianism and that of the real labour movement always stand in indirect proportion to each other. So long as the sects are justified (historically), the working class is not yet ripe for an independent historical movement. As soon as it has attained this maturity all sects are essentially reactionary. For all that, what history exhibits everywhere was repeated in the history of the International. The antiquated tries to reconstitute and assert itself within the newly acquired form (MECW 44: 252).

As John Molyneux puts it, "the strength of Marx's conception lies in its materialism, its emphasis on learning through experience and struggle; its weakness lies in its economic determinism and optimistic evolutionism". He notes "a strong element of fatalism in Marx's attitude to the formation of the party. The struggle of ideas and tendencies within the working class movement will sort itself out as the class tendencies of

the workers assert themselves".52 Hence Marx's pragmatism about the organisational form the party should take. But the challenges of Bakunin on the one hand, and the future Lib-Labs on the other, proved not to be just "antiquated" reversions to the past. The problem would re-emerge on a much larger scale in the Second International, formed in 1889 after Marx's death, and especially in the German SPD that prided itself as the citadel of his and Engels's thought.

Marxists generally embraced the model defended as that of the founders by the SPD's chief theoretician, Karl Kautsky—a progressive convergence between socialism and the labour movement within the framework of broad parties in which different tendencies co-existed. But the support the SPD, along with most other sections of the Second International, gave to the First World War threw this model into crisis and demonstrated the material weight that reformism exerted through the conservative influence of parliamentarism and the now increasingly powerful trade union bureaucracy. After October 1917 Lenin and the Bolsheviks offered a different model, in which revolutionaries would organise separately from reformists but (and here they differed from sectarian "Left" Communists) work systematically to win the support of the majority of workers through active participation in their daily struggles.53

It would be anachronistic to criticise Marx for his failure to anticipate problems that emerged fully with the development of mass trade unions and socialist parties in the last decades of the 19th century. But the historic limitations imposed by his situation—not merely those arising from the development of capitalism in his day, but also the comparatively scarce opportunities that he and Engels had to exercise political influence—merely underline what he was able to achieve as a political leader. He brought the theoretical understanding he had previously developed to both the revolutions of 1848 and the First International, but he also enriched that understanding thanks to his practical experiences.

How do these theoretical developments stand up to the test of time? The learning process Marx experienced in 1848-9 was important both because it reflected his first encounter with a real revolution and because

he anticipated what we now know as the theory of permanent revolution. But the achievements of Trotsky—and, of course, along his own parallel path, Lenin—in grasping the interrelation of bourgeois and proletarian revolutions—surpassed Marx's. They could draw on much more advanced revolutionary experiences and on a much deeper understanding of capitalism on both a global and a Russian scale, thanks above all to Capital and the studies it stimulated.

But what Marx in the 1860s learned about the connections between workers' struggles and movements against national and racial oppression retains all its actuality today. This is partly because of the depth of understanding of capitalism as a global system driven by the dynamics of uneven and combined development that he had achieved in Capital.54 But it's also that the transnational mobilisation of workers to meet the needs of capital accumulation, and the potential that this creates simultaneously for racialised divisions and internationalist class solidarity is at the heart of anti-capitalist politics today. This was true in 1968, when Enoch Powell made his "Rivers of Blood" speech (see Shirin Hirsch's article elsewhere in this issue) and students rebelled across borders. And it is even more true now, with the offensives of state racism and the radical right and the counter-mobilisations by anti-racists and anti-fascists. So, just as when we explore Marx's critique of political economy, so when we scrutinise his politics, we encounter a thought that is far from being out-dated.

5.2   THE CLASS STRUCTURE

The word 'class' originated from the Latin term 'classis' which refers to a group called to arms, a division of the people. In the rule of legendary Roman king, Servius Tullius (678-534 B.C.), the Roman society was divided into five classes or orders according to their wealth. Subsequently, the world 'class' was applied to large groups of people into which human society came to be divided. Marx recognised class as a unique feature of capitalist societies. This is one reason why he did not analyse the class structure and class relations in other forms of society. Marx's sociology is, in fact, a sociology of the class struggle. This means one has to understand the Marxian concept of class in order to appreciate

Marxian philosophy and thought. Marx has used the term social class throughout his works but explained it only in a fragmented form. The most clear passages on the concept of class structure can be found in the third volume of his famous work, Capital (1894). Under the title of 'Social Classes' Marx distinguished three classes, related to the three sources of income: (a) owners of simple labour power or labourers whose main source of income is labour; (b) owners of capital or capitalists whose main source of income is profit or surplus value; and (c) landowners whose main source of income is ground rent. In this way the class structure of modern capitalist society is composed of three major classes viz., salaried labourers or workers, capitalists and landowners. At a broader level, society could be divided into two major classes i.e. the 'haves' (owners of land and / or capital) often called as bourgeoisie and the 'have-nots' (those who own nothing but their own labour power), often called as proletariats. Marx has tried to even give a concrete definition of social class. According to him 'a social class occupies a fixed place in the process of production'.

Activity 1 Can Indian society be divided into classes in Marxian sense of the world 'class'? If yes, describe these classes. If no, give reasons why Indian society cannot be divided into classes in Marxian sense of the word 'class'.

5.2.1 Criteria for Determination of Class

In order to have a better understanding of the concept of class and class structure, one must be able to respond to the question – "What are the criteria for determination of class"? In other words, which human grouping will be called a class and which grouping would not be considered as class in Marxian terms. For this exercise, one could say that a social class has two major criteria: (i) objective criteria (ii) subjective criteria. i) Objective Criteria: People sharing the same relationship to the means of production comprise a class. Let us understand it through an example – all labourers have a similar relationship with the landowners. On the other hand all the landowners, as a class, have a similar relationship with the land and labourers. In this way, labourers on one hand and landowners on the other hand could be

seen as classes. However, for Marx, this relationship alone is not sufficient to determine the class. According to him it is not sufficient for class to be 'class in itself' but it should also be class for itself. What does this mean? By 'class in itself' he means the objective criteria of any social class. Obviously, Marx is not simply satisfied with objective criteria above. Hence he equally emphasises upon the other major criteria i.e., "Class for itself" or the subjective criteria. ii) Subjective Criteria: Any collectivity or human grouping with a similar relationship would make a category, not a class, if subjective criteria are not included. The members of any one class not only have similar consciousness but they also share a similar consciousness of the fact that they belong to the same class. This similar consciousness of a class serves as the basis for uniting its members for organising social action. Here this similar class consciousness towards acting together for their common interests is what Marx calls – "Class for itself". In this way, these two criteria together determine a class and class structure in any given society.

Check Your Progress 1

1) Define a social class in two lines.

    ....

    ....

    2) Name the two criteria for determining a class.

....

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5.2.2 Classification of Societies in History and Emergence of

Marx differentiated stages of human history on the basis of their economic regimes or modes of production. He distinguished four major modes of production which he called the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal and the bourgeois or capitalist. He predicted that all social development will culminate into a stage called communism. Let us simplify this classification of societies or various stages of human history into (i) primitive-communal, (ii) slave-owning, (iii) feudal, (iv) capitalist and (v)

communist stages. In this sub-section we will discuss the first three stages.

i) The Primitive-communal System Class and Class Conflict The primitive-communal system was the first and the lowest form of organisation of people and it existed for thousands of years. Men and women started using primitive tools like sticks and stones for hunting and food-gathering. Gradually they improved these tools, and learned to make fire, cultivation and animal husbandry. In this system of very low level of forces of production, the relations of production were based on common ownership of the means of production. Therefore, these relations were based on mutual assistance and cooperation. These relations were conditioned by the fact that people with their primitive implements could only withstand the mighty forces of nature together, collectively. In such a situation, exploitation of humans by humans did not exist because of two reasons. Firstly, the tools used (namely, means of production) were so simple that they could be reproduced by anyone. These were implements like spear, stick, bow and arrow etc. Hence no person or group of people had the monopoly of ownership over the tools. Secondly, production was at a low-scale. The people existed more or less on a subsistence level. Their production was just sufficient to meet the needs of the people provided everybody worked. Therefore, it was a situation of no master and no servant. All were equal. Gradually with time, people started perfecting their tools, their craft of producing and surplus production started taking place. This led to private property and primitive equality gave way to social inequality. Thus the first antagonistic classes, slaves and slave owners, appeared. This is how the development of the forces of production led to the replacement of primitive communal system by slavery. ii) The Slave-owning Society In the slave-owning society, primitive tools were perfected and bronze and iron tools replaced the stone and wooden implements. Large-scale agriculture, live stock raising, mining and handicrafts developed. The development of this type of forces of production also changed the relations of production. These relations were based on the slave owner's absolute ownership of both the means of production and the slave and

everything they produced. The owner left the slaves only with the bare minimum necessities to keep them from dying of starvation. In this system, the history of exploitation of humans by humans and the history of class struggle began. The development of productive forces went on and slavery became an impediment to the expansion of social production. Production demanded the constant improvement of implements, higher labour productivity, but the slaves had no interest in this as it would not improve their position. With the passage of time the class conflict between the classes of slaveowners and the slaves became acute and it was manifested in slave revolts. These revolts, together with the raids from neighbouring tribes, undermined the foundations of slavery leading to a new stage i.e. feudal system (See Box 8.1). 46 Karl Marx Box 8.1: Feudal System The term feudalism is derived from the institution of 'fief', which was a piece of landed property. During the medieval period of European history, this form of property was given to a vassal by a lord in return for military service. In this sense feudalism was a relationship between a vassal and his Lord. This relationship was expressed in terms of property holding through the fief. The relationship was exercised through jurisdiction. Lords held courts for their vassals, settled disputes and punished breaches of law and custom. The court was also an administrative body which levied taxes and raised military forces. Landowners maintained control over the peasantry. By the twelfth century, landowners' control over tenants and others had increased to a very great extent.

iii) The Feudal Society The progressive development of the productive forces continued under feudalism. People started using inanimate sources of energy, viz., water and wind, besides human labour. The crafts advanced further, new implements and machines were invented and old ones were improved. The labour of craftspersons was specialised, raising productivity considerably. The development of forces of production led to emergence of feudal relations of production. These relations were based on the feudal lords' ownership of the serfs or landless peasants. The production relations were relations of domination and subjection, exploitation of the serfs by the feudal lords. Nevertheless, these relations

were more progressive than in slavery system, because they made the labourers interested, to some extent, in their labour. The peasants and the artisans could own the implements or small parts of land. These forces of production underwent changes due to new discoveries, increasing demands for consumption caused by population increase and discovery of new markets through colonialism. All this led to the need and growth of mass scale manufacture. This became possible due to advances in technology. This brought the unorganised labourers at one place i.e. the factory. This sparked off already sharpened class conflict leading to peasant revolution against landowners. The new system of production demanded free labourer whereas the serf was tied to the land, therefore, the new forces of production also changed the relations of production culminating into a change in the mode of production from feudalism to capitalism. In the next sub-section we will talk about class conflict in capitalist societies. So, the next section will cover our discussion of the fourth stage of social development. But before going to it, let us complete Check Your Progress 2.

Check Your Progress 2

1) Give the five stages of society as given by Marx.

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2) Mark True or False against each of the following statements.

a) History of class antagonism begins with salary systems. True/False

b) There was no private ownership of property in primitive-communal system. True/False

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5.3 CLASSES

5.3.3 Intensification of Class Conflict Under Capitalism

Large-scale machine production is the specific feature of the productive forces of capitalism. Huge factories, plants and mines took the place of artisan workshops and manufacturers. Marx and Engels described the capitalist productive forces in the 'Manifesto of the Communist Party'. "Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground". In a century or two capitalism accomplished much more in developing the productive forces than had been achieved in all the preceding eras of human history. This vigorous growth of the forces of production was helped by the capitalist relations of production based on private capitalist ownership. Under capitalism, the produces, the proletariat, are legally free, being attached neither to the land nor to any particular factory. They are free in the sense that they can go to work for any capitalist, but they are not free from the bourgeois class as a whole. Possessing no means of production, they are compelled to sell their labour power and thereby come under the yoke of exploitation. Due to this exploitation the relatively free labourers become conscious of their class interest and organise themselves into a working class movement. This working class movement intensified its struggle against the bourgeois class. It begins with bargaining for better wages and working conditions and culminates into an intensified class conflict, which is aimed at overthrowing the capitalist system. Marx said that the capitalist system symbolises the most acute form of inequality, exploitation and class antagonism. This paves the way for a socialist revolution which would lead to a new stage of society i.e. communism.

Box 5.2: Communism The word 'communism' originated in the mid-1830s, when it was used by members of the secret revolutionary parties in Paris. It referred to political movement of the working class in capitalist society. It also referred to the form of society which the working class would create as a result of its struggle. During the later half of the nineteenth century, both terms, socialism and communism,

were used interchangeably to describe the workingclass movement. Marx and Engels also used these terms in a similar fashion.

With the advent of the Third (Communist) International in 1917, the term communism was applied to a form of revolutionary programme for overthrowing capitalism. We can say that the term socialism began to be applied to a more peaceful and constitutional action of long-term changes, while communism referred to a revolutionary action, involving violent forms of changes. Marx discussed communism as a form of society. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) he wrote that 'Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus the real appropriation of human nature, through and for man'.

5.3.4 Class and Class Struggle

It is clear that according to Marx the mode of production or economic structure is the base or foundation of society. Any change in this infrastructure and consequently in a society. The changes in the mode of production are essentially changes in the forces of production and relations of production. In primitive communal stage there was no surplus production and hence it had no inequality and exploitation caused by the private ownership of means of production. The means of production were common property of the community. With the development and improvements in the forces of production there was increased productivity. This caused private ownership of means of production and change in the relations of production. This marked the end of primitive-communal system and thus began the long history of inequality, exploitation and class conflict, coinciding with the emergence of slave-owning society. In the slave-owning society the class conflict between the slave owners and slaves reached a peak causing a change in the mode of production from slavery to feudalistic mode of production. Marx has said that the history of hitherto existing society is a history of class struggle. This means that the entire history of society is studded with different phases and periods of class struggle. This history of class struggle begins in the slave-owning society and continues through feudal society where this class struggle is between classes of the feudal lords

and the landless agricultural labourers or serfs. Due to change in mode of production and class struggle a new stage of society i.e., capitalism replaces the age-old feudal system. In the capitalistic mode of production the class antagonism acquires most acute dimensions. The working class movement begins to concretise and reaches its peak. Through a class conflict between the class of capitalists and the class of industrial labourers, the capitalist system is replaced by socialism. This violent change has been termed as revolution by Marx. We shall deliberate on this concept of revolution in detail in the next section. This marks, according to Marx, the fifth stage of social development. Before reading about the fifth stage in the next sub-section (5.4), please complete **Activity 2.**

Do you think that Indian history provides us with some examples of class conflict? If yes, elaborate at least one such example. If no, then give reasons for the absence of class conflict in Indian history.

5.4   CLASS STRUGGLE AND REVOLUTION

Marx said that the class antagonism and subsequently the class conflict in the capitalist system will usher in socialism in place of capitalism through a revolution. Here the question arises what is the basis of this antagonism? Marx's answer is that the contradiction between the forces and the relations of production is the basis of this antagonism. The bourgeoisie is constantly creating more powerful means of production. But the relations of production that is, apparently, both the relations of ownership and the distribution of income are not transferred at the same rate. The capitalist mode of production is capable to produce in bulk, but despite this mass production and increase in wealth, majority of the population suffers from poverty and misery. On the other hand, there are a few families who have so much wealth that one could not even count or imagine. These stark and wide disparities create some tiny islands of prosperity in a vast ocean of poverty and misery. The onus of this disparity lies on the inequal, exploitative relations of production which distribute the produce in an inequal manner. This contradiction, according to Marx, will eventually produce a revolutionary crisis. The

proletariat, which constitutes and will increasingly constitute the vast majority of the population, will become a class, that is, a social entity aspiring for the seizure of power and transformation of social relations. Marx asserted that the progress of society meant the succession of victories of one class over the other. He assigned his life to planning a victory for the proletariat. In a way, he became a commander, engaged in a campaign. With his solitary aim of defeating the enemy, Marx stressed on acquiring the knowledge of the history of society and the laws that regulate its organisation. His monumental work, Das Kapital (Capital, 1861-1879), provided an analysis in which Marx was not concerned with arguments for a class-war. He treated the necessity for such arguments as an unnecessary task. He had no love for emotionalism and humanitarianism and appeal to idealism etc. He conceived of the class conflict on every front and proposed the formation of a political party which would eventually gain victory and be the conquering class. You do not have to imagine that it was Marx who, for the first time ever, advanced the idea of conflict between classes. Saint Simon wrote about human history as the history of struggles between social classes. In the 1790s Babeuf, a French political agitator, spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Weitling and Blanqui (Babeuf's disciple) developed Babeuf's ideas in the nineteenth century. The French State Socialists worked out the future position and importance of workers in industrial states. In fact in the eighteenth century many thinkers advanced such doctrines. Marx did the admirable task of sifting all this material and constructed a new set of social analysis. His analysis of class struggle was a unique mix of simple basic principles with down-to-earth details. According to Marx, the bottom rung of the social stratification is the proletariat. Below it there is no class and therefore emancipation of the proletariat will, in fact, be the emancipation of mankind. Marx accepts the right of the bourgeoisie to fight the final war. But for the proletariat the battle is for its very survival and it has to win. The revolutions of the proletariat will differ in kind from all past revolutions. All the revolutions of the past were accomplished by minorities for the benefit of minorities. The revolution of the proletariat will be accomplished by the vast majority for the benefit of all. The proletarian revolution will,

therefore, mark the end of classes and of the antagonistic character of capitalist society. This would mean that the private ownership of property will be abolished. The proletariat will jointly own means of production and distribute the produce according to the needs of the members of the society. This stage is called the stage of dictatorship of proletariat. This stage will later on convert into a stateless society where the communist system will finally be established in the society. This will also end all kinds of social classes and of all kinds of class conflicts for future. This will also mean de-alienation of the proletariat. Since the concept of alienation is now regarded as one of the main ideas of Marxism, after completing Check Your Progress 3, you will also learn a little about this concept, and its relevance to Marxian analysis of class conflict.

Check Your Progress 3

1)   Discuss the main features of communism in three lines.

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2)   Mark True and False against each of the following sentences.

 a) The private ownership of property will not be abolished in communism. True/False

b) Communism is characterised by stateless and classless society. True/False

....

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5.5 MARX'S CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

Alienation literally means "separation from". This term is often used in literature and Marx has given it a sociological meaning. Marx has conceived of alienation as a phenomenon related to the structure of those societies in which the producer is divorced from the means of production and in which "dead labour" (capital) dominates "living labour" (the

worker). Let us take an example of a shoemaker in a factory. A shoemaker manufactures shoes but cannot use them for himself. His creation thus becomes an object which 51 is separate from him. It becomes an entity which is separate from its creator. Class and Class Conflict He makes shoes not because making shoes satisfies merely his urge to work and create. He does so to earn his living. For a worker this 'objectification' becomes more so because the process of production in a factory is decided into several parts and his job may be only a tiny part of the whole. Since he produces only one part of the whole, his work is mechanical and therefore he loses his creativity. A systematic elaboration of the concept appears in Capital under the heading "Fetishism of commodities and money". But the ethical germ of this conception can be found as early as 1844, when Marx unequivocally rejected and condemned "the state" and "money", and invested the proletariat with the "historical mission" of emancipating society as a whole. In Marx's sense alienation is an action through which (or a state in which) a person, a group, an institution, or a society becomes (or remains) alien a) to the results or products of its own activity (and to the activity itself), and/or b) to the nature in which it lives, and/or c) to other human beings, and in addition and through any or all of (a) to (c) also d) to itself (to its own historically created human possibilities). Alienation is always self-alienation, i.e., one's alienation from oneself through one's own activity. To quote Gajo Petrovic (1983: 10) we can say, "And self-alienation is not just one among the forms of alienation, but the very essence and basic structure of alienation. It is not merely a descriptive concept, it is also an appeal, or a call for a revolutionary change of the world".

De-alienation

Mere criticism of alienation was not the intention of Marx. His aim was to clear the path for a radical revolution and for accomplishing communism understood as "the re-integration of one's return to oneself, the supersession of one's self-alienation". Mere abolition of private property cannot bring about de-alienation of economic and social life. This situation of the worker, or the producer does not alter by transforming private property into state property. Some forms of

alienation in capitalist production have their roots in the nature of the means of production and the related division of social labour, so that they cannot be eliminated by a mere change in the form of managing production. Far from being an eternal fact of social life, the division of society into mutually interdependent and conflicting spheres (economy, politics, laws, arts, morals, religion, etc.), and the predominance of the economic sphere, are, according to Marx, characteristics of a self-alienated society. The dealienation of society is therefore impossible without the abolition of the alienation of different human activities from each other. Alienation in the Marxian sense of the term cannot be overcome by the reorganisation of the economy, however radical the programme of such 52 Karl Marx transformation may be. Alienation of the society and of the individual are integrally connected. Therefore, the de-alienation of neither can be carried out without the other, nor can one be reduced to the other.

The concept of alienation is a key tool of analysis in Marx's thought. According to Marx, one had always been self-alienated thus far. The bourgeoise relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production causing alienation. At the same time, the production forces developing in the womb of bourgeoise society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism and alienation. This social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the "prehistoric" stage of human society. Our discussion of the concept of alienation closes Unit 8 on Class and Class Conflict. Before moving on to a summary of the unit, let us complete Activity 3.

Activity 3

Is there a word for alienation in your mother-tongue? If yes, provide the term and explain it by giving examples from your day-to-day life.

5.6   LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have discussed the concept of class and class conflict in the history of development of society as given by Karl Marx. He defined class in terms of people's relationship to the means of production and their class consciousness. In Marxian terms, the history of society, so far,

is the history of class struggle. This means that ever since the social inequality and exploitation started in human history, that is, beginning from slavery system, society has been divided into mutually warring classes of Haves and Havenots. This successive class conflict and change in mode of production has led to change in the stages of society from slavery to feudalistic and feudalistic to capitalistic system. The final social revolution would transform the capitalistic system into communist system where there would be no more classes, social inequality and class conflict. In other words, there will be de-alienation of the proletariat.

5.7 KEY WORDS

Bourgeoisie: Also known as 'Haves' are those people who own the means of production for example – landowners, capitalists in industrial societies.

Capitalism: It is one of the historical stages of society where the means of production are mainly machinery, capital and labour.

Class: When people share the same relationship to the means of production and also share the similar consciousness regarding their common interest, they constitute a class.

Class-conflict: When two classes having basic antagonism Class and Class

Conflict: of class interests struggle or clash in order to safeguard their class interests then it is called class conflict.

Feudalism: It is also one of the historical stages of society where the means of production are mainly land and labour. Forces of Production Forces of production mean the ways in which production is done; the technological 'know-how', the types of equipments in use and types of goods being produced, e.g., tools, machinery, labour, etc.

Infrastructure: According to Marx, the materialistic structure or economic structure is the foundation or base of society. In other words, it is also called the infrastructure. The superstructure of society rests on it. Infrastructure includes mode of production and hence forces of production and relations of production.

Means of Production: It includes all the elements necessary for production, e.g., land, raw material, factory, labour and capital, etc.

Mode of Production: It refers to the general economic institution i.e., the particular manner in which people produce and distribute the means that sustain life. The forces of production and the relations of production together define the mode of production. Examples of modes of production are capitalistic mode of production, feudal mode of production, etc.

Proletariat: These people are also known as 'Have-nots' and these are the people who do not own any means of production except their own labour power. Hence all the landless peasants or agricultural labourers in feudal societies and industrial workers in capitalist societies are the proletariat.

Relations of Production: According to Marx, the forces of production shape the nature of the 'relations of production'. These are, in fact, the social relations found in production i.e., economic roles, e.g., labourer, landowner, capitalist, etc.

Revolution: It is the sudden, total and radical change in society brought in by the matured conditions of class conflict.

Superstructure: All social, political and cultural institutions of societies excepting economic institutions constitute the superstructure of a society.

5.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1) Give the five stages of society as given by Marx.

2) Discuss the main features of communism in three lines.

5.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

Coser, Lewis A, 1971. Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Inc: New York (Chapter 2, pp. 43-88).

5.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1) It comprises people sharing same relationship with the means of production and having similar consciousness regarding their class interests.

2) A social class can be determined by two major criteria, namely, a) objective and b) subjective criteria.

Check Your Progress 2

1) Five stages of society as given by Marx are

- Primitive-Communal System
- Slavery
- Feudalism
- Capitalism
- Communism.

2) a) True b) True

Check Your Progress 3

1) It will be characterised by a classless society, devoid of private ownership of means of production. There will be no stateless society.

2) a) False b) True

UNIT 6: POWER AND AUTHORITY- MAX WEBER

STRUCTURE

6.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you should be able to:

- To understand the concepts of power and authority as explained by Max Weber
- To show the connections between Weber's types of social action and types of authority

- To describe in detail the three types of authority namely, traditional, charismatic and rational-legal

- To describe bureaucracy as the instrument for the operation of rationallegal authority

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In this unit, you will find some of Weber's important contributions in understanding power and authority. In the first section (6.2), there is a brief discussion of the sociological concepts of power and authority with special reference to Weber's understanding of the terms. The second section (6.3) will mention the types of social action that Weber identifies and the types of authority that flow from them, namely, traditional, charismatic and rational-legal authority. The third section (6.4) will focus on the instrument through which rational-legal authority is exercised, namely, bureaucracy.

6.2 CONCEPTS OF POWER AND AUTHORITY

Let us now examine the key concepts of power and authority, both, in the general sociological sense as well as in the specific Weberian context.

6.2.1 Power

In ordinary usage, the term 'power' means strength or the capacity to control. Sociologists describe it as the ability of an individual or group to fulfil its desires and implement its decisions and ideas. It involves the ability to influence and/ or control the behaviour of others even against their will. For Max Weber, power is an aspect of social relationships. It refers to the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behaviour of another person. Power is present in social interaction and creates situations of inequality since the one who has power imposes it on others. The impact of power varies from situation to situation. On the one hand, it depends on the capacity of the powerful individual to exercise power. On the other hand it depends upon the extent to which it is opposed or

resisted by the others. Weber says that power can be exercised in all walks of life. It is not restricted to a battlefield or to politics. It is to be observed in the market place, on a lecture platform, at a social gathering, in sports, scientific discussions and even through charity. For example, giving alms or 'daan' to a beggar is a subtle way of exercising your superior economic power. You can bring a smile of joy to the beggar's face or a feeling of despair by giving or refusing alms. What are the sources of power? Weber discusses two contrasting sources of power. These are as follows

a) Power which is derived from a constellation of interests that develop in a formally free market. For example, a group of producers of sugar controls supply of their production in the market to maximise their profit.

b) An established system of authority that allocates the right to command and the duty to obey. For example, in the army, a jawan is obliged to obey the command of his officer.

The officer derives his power through an established system of authority. As you have seen in the last point, any discussion of power leads us to think about its legitimacy. It is legitimacy, which according to Weber constitutes the core point of authority. Let us now examine the concept of authority

6.2.2 Authority

The German word "Herrschaft", used by Weber, has been variously translated. Some sociologists term it as 'authority', others as 'domination' or 'command'. Herrschaft is a situation in which a 'Herr' or master dominates or commands others. Raymond Aron (1967: 187) defines Herrschaft as the master's ability to obtain the obedience of those who theoretically owe it to him. In this unit, Weber's concept of Herrschaft will denote the term "authority". A question may be raised, namely, what is the difference between power and authority? Power, as you have seen, refers to the ability or capacity to control another. Authority refers to legitimised power. It means that the master has the right to command and can expect to be obeyed. Let us now see the elements that constitute authority.

6.2.3 Elements of Authority

For a system of authority to exist the following elements must be present.

    i)   An individual ruler/master or a group of rulers/masters.

    ii)   An individual/group that is ruled.

    iii)   The will of the ruler to influence the conduct of the ruled which may be expressed through commands.

    iv)   Evidence of the influence of the rulers in terms of compliance or obedience shown by the ruled.

    v)   Direct or indirect evidence which shows that the ruled have internalised and accepted the fact that the ruler's commands must be obeyed.

We see that authority implies a reciprocal relationship between the rulers and the ruled. The rulers believe that they have the legitimate right to exercise their authority. On the other hand, the ruled accept this power and comply with it, reinforcing its legitimacy. It is time to complete Activity 1 and Check Your Progress 1.

Activity 1

Give example of at least five authority from your daily life. What are the elements involved in them? Prepare a note of one page on them. Exchange your note, if possible, with the co-learners at your Study Centre.

Check Your Progress 1

1) In one line define the concept of power.

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2) Describe, in about three lines, two important sources of power.

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3) Point out, in three lines three important elements of authority

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Let us now examine the types of authority identified by Weber. Before we do so, it is very important to study his typology of social action. The types of authority Weber discusses are, as you will soon see, closely linked with the types of social action.

6.3   TYPES OF SOCIAL ACTION AND TYPES OF AUTHORITY

6.3.1 Types of Social Action

Weber identifies four distinct types of social action. They are

i)   **Zweckrational** action or rational action in relation to a goal An example of this is an engineer constructing a bridge, who uses certain materials in a certain manner to achieve goal. This activity is directed towards obtaining that goal, namely, completing the construction.

ii)   **Wertrational** action, or rational action in relation to a value Here, one may give the example of a soldier laying down his life for the country. His action is not directed towards attaining specific material goal like wealth. It is for the sake of certain values like honour and patriotism.

iii)   **Affective** action This kind of action results from the emotional state of mind of the actor. If some one is teasing a girl in a bus, she may get so irritated that she may slap the offending person. She has been provoked so much that she has reacted violently.

iv)   **Traditional** action This is an action, which is guided by customs and longstanding beliefs, which become second nature or habit. In traditional Indian society, doing 'pranam' or 'namaskar' to elders is almost second nature needing no prompting. One may find that the above typology of social action is reflected in Weber's classification of types of

authority. We will discuss this in the following sub-section (6.3.3).

6.3.2 Types of Authority

As you have already read in sub-section 6.2.1, authority implies legitimacy. According to Weber, there are three systems of legitimation, each with its corresponding norms, which justify the power to command. It is these systems of legitimation which are designated as the following types of authority.

(i)   Traditional authority
(ii)   Charismatic authority
(iii) Rational-legal authority

Fig. 6.1 Types of Authority

Let us describe each of these types in some detail.

6.3.2.1 Traditional Authority

This system of legitimation flows from traditional action. In other words, it is based on customary law and the sanctity of ancient traditions. It is based on the belief that a certain authority is to be respected because it

has existed since time immemorial. In traditional authority, rulers enjoy personal authority by virtue of their inherited status. Their commands are in accordance with customs and they also possess the right to extract compliance from the ruled. Often, they abuse their power. The persons who obey them are 'subjects' in the fullest sense of the term. They obey their master out of personal loyalty or a pious regard for his time-honoured status. Let us take an example from our own society. You are familiar with the caste system in India. Why did the 'lower' castes bear the atrocities inflicted by the 'upper' castes for centuries? One way of explaining this is because the authority of the 'upper' castes had the backing of tradition and antiquity. The 'lower' castes some say had become socialised into accepting their oppression. Thus, we can see that traditional authority is based on the belief in the sacred quality of 42 Max Weber long-standing traditions. This gives legitimacy to those who exercise authority. Traditional authority does not function through written rules or laws. It is transmitted by inheritance down the generations. Traditional authority is carried out with the help of relatives and personal favourites. In modern times, the incidence of traditional authority has declined. Monarchy, the classic example of traditional authority still exists, but in a highly diluted form. The Queen of England is a traditional figure of authority but as you may be aware, she does not actually exercise her authority. The laws of the land are enacted in her name, but their content is decided by the legislators, the representatives of the people. The queen has a parliament, which governs the kingdom, but she does not appoint ministers. She is a nominal head of state. Briefly, traditional authority derives its legitimacy from longstanding traditions, which enable some to command and compel others to obey. It is hereditary authority and does not require written rules. The 'masters' exercise their authority with the help of loyal relatives and friends. Weber considers this kind of authority as irrational. It is therefore rarely found in modern developed societies.

6.3.2.2 Charismatic Authority

Charisma means an extraordinary quality possessed by some individuals (see Box 6.1). This gives such people unique powers to capture the fancy

and devotion of ordinary people. Charismatic authority is based on extraordinary devotion to an individual and to the way of life preached by this person. The legitimacy of such authority rests upon the belief in the supernatural or magical powers of the person. The charismatic leader 'proves' his/her power through miracles, military and other victories or the dramatic prosperity of the disciples. As long as charismatic leaders continue to 'prove' their miraculous powers in the eyes of their disciples, their authority stays intact. You may have realised that the type of social action that charismatic authority is related to is affective action. The disciples are in a highly charged emotional state as a result of the teachings and appeal of the charismatic leaders. They worship their hero. Box 6.1 Charisma Dictionary meaning of the term charisma is a divinely inspired gift. It is gift of divine grace. This term is used by Weber to denote "a kind of power over others which is also perceived as authority by those subject to it. the holder of charisma may be a human being, in which case his authority might be interpreted in terms of myth of the divine mission, insight or moral attributes" (see Scruton 1982: 58). Charismatic authority is not dependent on customary beliefs or written rules. It is purely the result of the special qualities of the leader who governs or rules in his personal capacity. Charismatic authority is not organised; therefore there is no paid staff or administrative set-up. The leader and his 43 assistants do not have a regular occupation and often reject their family Power and Authortiy responsibilities. These characteristics sometimes make charismatic leaders revolutionaries, as they have rejected all the conventional social obligations and norms. Based, as it is, on the personal qualities of an individual, the problem of succession arises with the death or disappearance of the leader. The person who succeeds the leader may not have charismatic powers. In order to transmit the original message of the leader, some sort of organisation develops. The original charisma gets transformed either into traditional authority or rational-legal authority. Weber calls this routinisation of charisma. If the charismatic figure is succeeded by a son/daughter or some close relative, traditional authority results. If, on the other hand, charismatic qualities are identified and written down, then it changes into rational legal authority, where anyone acquiring

these qualities can become a leader. Charismatic authority can thus be described as unstable and temporary. We can find examples of charismatic leaders throughout history. Saints, prophets and some political leaders are examples of such authority. Kabir, Nanak, Jesus, Mohammed, Lenin and Mahatma Gandhi, to name a few were charismatic leaders. They were revered by people for their personal qualities and the message they preached, not because they represented traditional or rational-legal authority. Let us now describe the third type of authority identified by Max Weber.

Box 6.2 Routinisation Weber used routinisation to mean the "transformation of charismatic leadership into institutionalised leadership where one office takes the place of a personality as the focus of authority" (Scruton 1982: 415).

Check Your Progress 2

1) Tick mark the correct answer. Which one of the following in not a type of authority according to Weber?

a) Traditional authority
b) Rational-legal authority
c) Charismatic authority
d) Personal authority

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2) Tick mark the correct answer. When the original charisma of a leader gets transformed into traditional or rational-legal authority, what does Weber call it?

   a) Routinisation of one's power to capture devotion of ordinary people
   b) Routinisation of legitimacy
   c) Routinisation of one's ability to lead
   d) Routinisation of one's capacity to control the behaviour of other's against their will

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3) Tick mark the correct answer. Traditional authority derive legitimacy from

   a) Law of the land

   b) Long standing customary law

   c) Outstanding performance of the leader

   d) All of the above.

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6.3.2.3 Rational-Legal Authority

The term refers to a system of authority, which are both, rational and legal. It is vested in a regular administrative staff who operate in accordance with certain written rules and laws. Those who exercise authority are appointed to do so on the basis of their achieved qualifications, which are prescribed and codified. Those in authority consider it a profession and are paid a salary. Thus, it is a rational system. It is legal because it is in accordance with the laws of the land which people recognise and feel obliged to obey. The people acknowledge and respect the legality of both, the ordinance and rules as well as the positions or titles of those who implement the rules. Rational-legal authority is a typical feature of modern society. It is the reflection of the process of rationalisation. Remember that Weber considers rationalisation as the key feature of western civilisation. It is, according to Weber, a specific product of human thought and deliberation. By now you have clearly grasped the connection between rational-legal authority and rational action for obtaining goals. Let us look at examples of rational-legal authority. We obey the tax collector because we believe in the legality of the ordinances he enforces. We also believe that he has the legal right to send us taxation notices. We stop our vehicles when the traffic policeman orders us to do so because we respect the authority vested in him by the law. Modern societies are governed not by

individuals, but by laws and ordinances. We obey the policeman because of his position and his uniform which represents the law, not because he is Mr. 'X' or Mr. 'Y'. Rational-legal authority exists not just in the political and administrative spheres, but also in economic organisations like banks and industries as well as in religious and cultural organisations.

6.3.3 Lack of Conformity between Typologies

From the above discussion on the types of social action and types of authority one may find that traditional authority corresponds to traditional action, rational-legal authority corresponds to rational action in relation to goal and charismatic authority corresponds to affective action or emotional 45 action. However one easily finds that Weber distinguishes four types of Power and Authortiy social action and only three types of authority. The lack of conformity between the typology of social action and the typology of authority is a subject for open discussion. In order that you might clearly grasp the manner in which rational-legal authority functions it is necessary to examine the institution of 'bureaucracy'. Bureaucracy is the medium through which rational-legal authority is carried out and it is the subject matter of the next section (6.4). Before going to the next section, complete Activity 2.

Activity 2
Give an example of rational-legal or a traditional authority from your own society with special reference to the basis of legitimacy of that authority. Prepare note of one page. Exchange your note, if possible, with the notes of your co-learners at your Study Centre.

6.4 BUREAUCRACY

Bureaucracy, as just mentioned, is the machinery, which implements rational-legal authority. Max Weber studied bureaucracy in detail and constructed an ideal type which contained the most prominent characteristics of bureaucracy. Let us examine this ideal type which reveals to us the major features of bureaucracy.

6.4.1 Major Features of Bureaucracy

i)　In order that the bureaucracy may function adequately, it relies on the following rules and regulations. a) The activities which comprise bureaucracy are distributed among the officials in the form of official duties. b) There is a stable or regular system by which officials are vested with authority. This authority is strictly delimited by the laws of the land. c) There are strict and methodical procedures which ensure that officials perform their duties adequately. The above mentioned three characteristics constitute 'bureaucratic authority', which is to be found in developed and modern societies.

ii)　The second feature of bureaucracy is that there is a hierarchy of officials in authority. By this we mean that there is a firmly built structure of subordination and superordination. Lower officials are supervised by higher ones and are answerable to them. The advantage of this system is that governed people can express their dissatisfaction with lower officials by appealing to the higher ones. For instance, if you are dissatisfied with the behaviour or performance of a clerk or a section officer in an office, you can appeal to the higher official to seek redress.

iii)　The management of the bureaucratic office is carried out through written documents or files. They are preserved and properly kept by clerks who are specially appointed for this purpose.

iv)　The work in the bureaucratic office is highly specialised and staff is trained accordingly.

v)　A fully developed bureaucratic office demands the full working capacity of the staff. In such a case, officials may be compelled to work over-time. Having looked the main features of a bureaucratic set-up, let us now learn something about the officials that you have found repeatedly mentioned above.

6.4.2 Characteristics of Officials in Bureaucracy

Weber mentions the following characteristics of officials in a bureaucratic set-up

i)   Office-work is a 'vocation' for officials.

ii)   They are specially trained for their jobs.

iii)   Their qualifications determine their position or rank in the office.

iv)   They are expected to do their work honestly. Their official positions also have a bearing on their personal lives.

Let us see how.

i)   Bureaucratic officials enjoy a high status in society.

ii)   Often, their jobs carry transfer liabilities. By this we mean that they may be transferred from one place or department to another leading to some instability in their professional and personal lives.

iii)   Officials receive salaries not in accordance with productivity but status. The higher their rank, the higher their salaries. They also receive benefits like pension, provident fund, medical and other facilities. Their jobs are considered very secure.

iv)   Officials enjoy good career prospects. They can move from the lower rungs of the bureaucratic ladder to higher ones if they work in a disciplined manner. It is time to complete Check Your Progress 3.

Check Your Progress 3

1) Bureaucracy is an example of

a) traditional authority.

b) rational-legal authority.

c) charismatic authority.

d) none of the above .

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2) Mention in three lines important features of bureaucratic authority.

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3) Mention in four lines important characteristics of the officials of bureaucracy.

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6.5 LET US SUM UP

This unit began with a discussion of the Weberian concepts of 'power' and 'authority'. It then went on to discuss the types of social action identified by Max Weber, followed by the types of authority described by him. Next you studied traditional, charismatic and rational-legal authority in some detail. Finally, the unit focused upon bureaucracy as the instrument through which rational-legal authority operates. Not only did the unit outline the features of a bureaucratic office but also the officials or staff that constitute it.

6.6 KEY WORDS

Power: One's capacity to impose his or her will on others

Authority: When power is legitimised it becomes authority

Ideal type: A methodological tool developed by Weber through which the most commonly found features of a phenomenon are abstracted. Ideal type is an analytical construct with which the social scientist compares existing reality.

Routinisation: A process of transformation of the charismatic authority either into traditional or rational legal authority

Money-economy: Any economic transaction made in terms of money.

6.7 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Mention in three lines important features of bureaucratic authority.

2. Mention in four lines important characteristics of the officials of bureaucracy.

6.8 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Bendix, Reinhard, 1960. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. Heinman: London Freund, Julien 1968. The Sociology of Max Weber. Random House: New York

6.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. Power is one's capacity to impose his or her will on others.

2. Power can be derived from a constellation of interests that develop in a formally free market situation. Power can again be derived from an established system of authority that allocates the right to command and duty to obey.

3. a) Presence of individual ruler/master or a group of rulers/masters b) Presence of an individual/group that is ruled c) Evidence of influence of the rulers in terms of compliance and obedience shown by the ruled

Check Your Progress 2

1. d)
2. a)
3. b)

Check Your Progress 3

1. b)

2. Important features of bureaucratic authority are a) it operates on the principle of jurisdictional area which relies on certain administrative regulations. b) there is a stable regular system by which officials are vested with authority. c) there are strict and

methodical procedures which ensure that officials perform their duties adequately.

3. Important characteristics of the officials of bureacracy are that a) office work is a vocation for the official b) officials are especially trained for their job c) their qualifications determine their position or rank in the office, and d) they are expected to do work honestly.

UNIT 7: CULTURAL THEORY PERSPECTIVES

STRUCTURE

7.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know about the Culture as Explanation: Cultural Concerns
- To discuss the Social-Structural and Cultural Explanations
- To discuss the Cultural Geography
- To describe the Culture as a variable in comparative politics

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Political culture is an established and seemingly inescapable concept, but it has a deeply problematic standing in political science. While it is obvious that the cultural background has an influence on political life—whether it be in a country, a region, or for that matter an institution or a firm—what exactly this background consists of and how it has its influence is inadequately understood, is contested, or is set aside as unimportant. Remedying the poor standing of political culture research requires the construction of theory: theory that explains what political culture is and how it works. Against the view that adequate theoretical

foundations already exist, the view that the concept itself resists theory by definition, and the arguments of opponents of political culture research who assume the superiority of their own theoretical frameworks, it is essential to demonstrate both the necessity and the possibility of a more adequate theory of political culture. This is done in the first four chapters of the book. The second half of the book constructs the new theory, reaching into philosophy for some foundational arguments about the nature of culture and into psychology for some parallel findings about human motivation. Culture is analysed into two dimensions, the practical and the discursive. The dualistic ontology of culture is then deployed in the last two chapters in the analysis of the causal dynamics of political culture, theoretically accounting for the inertial and fluid properties which have hitherto simply been juxtaposed.

The first section, 'Why a theory of political culture?', outlines the controversies surrounding the concept of political culture, which involve deep disagreements among its users as well as denials by others that it has any scientific validity. The centrality of political culture to debates about the methods and approaches of political science is emphasized, but so too is the unresolved nature of those debates. The second section, 'What is a theory of political culture?', presents the plan of the book's attempt to re-launch political culture research on a more secure theoretical footing, along with a defence of the particular understanding of 'theory' that the book will assume. A theory of political culture should be an account of what political culture is—its ontology—and how it works—its causal dynamics. Here examines the interpretive alternative within political culture research. It situates interpretivism in a long line of reactions to positivist social science, beginning with Herder's culturalism and reaching a high pitch of intellectual intensity in the discussion of historicism by Dilthey and Weber. The failure of attempts either to establish an alternative to causal explanation or to reconcile cultural interpretation with it is demonstrated. Interpretivism is traced through its development in cultural anthropology in the work of Benedict, Sahlins, and Geertz, the last being important for its wide influence in the social sciences and in political culture research. Geertz's migration towards 'thick description' marks a progressive withdrawal

from explanatory questions, and has provided the manifesto for a denial of theory in political culture research. Yet this denial merely represses causal questions, which inevitably recur in metaphorical language. The chapter argues that causal questions should instead be addressed directly.

7.2 OVERVIEW

In the 19th century, "culture" was used by some to refer to a wide array of human activities, and by some others as a synonym for "civilization". In the 20th century, anthropologists began theorizing about culture as an object of scientific analysis. Some used it to distinguish human adaptive strategies from the largely instinctive adaptive strategies of animals, including the adaptive strategies of other primates and non-human hominids, whereas others used it to refer to symbolic representations and expressions of human experience, with no direct adaptive value. Both groups understood culture as being definitive of human nature.

According to many theories that have gained wide acceptance among anthropologists, culture exhibits the way that humans interpret their biology and their environment. According to this point of view, culture becomes such an integral part of human existence that it is the human environment, and most cultural change can be attributed to human adaptation to historical events. Moreover, given that culture is seen as the primary adaptive mechanism of humans and takes place much faster than human biological evolution, most cultural change can be viewed as culture adapting to itself.

Although most anthropologists try to define culture in such a way that it separates human beings from other animals, many human traits are similar to those of other animals, particularly the traits of other primates. For example, chimpanzees have big brains, but human brains are bigger. Similarly, bonobos exhibit complex sexual behaviour, but human beings exhibit much more complex sexual behaviours. As such, anthropologists often debate whether human behaviour is different from animal behaviour in degree rather than in kind; they must also find ways to distinguish cultural behaviour from sociological behaviour and psychological behavior.

Acceleration and amplification of these various aspects of culture change have been explored by complexity economist, W. Brian Arthur. In his book, The Nature of Technology, Arthur attempts to articulate a theory of change that considers that existing technologies (or material culture) are combined in unique ways that lead to novel new technologies. Behind that novel combination is a purposeful effort arising in human motivation. This articulation would suggest that we are just beginning to understand what might be required for a more robust theory of culture and culture change, one that brings coherence across many disciplines and reflects an integrating elegance.

This unit is designed to give students a basic overview of the traditional approaches to the study of culture in the social sciences as a background to the introduction of an "equilibrium" approach to culture as has been developed in the past few years in political science and economics. The equilibrium approach seeks to account for the influence of culture on economic and political behavior, yet seeks as well to account for shifts in culture. It should also show the different role of culture in institutional life in preindustrial and modern societies. The course will assess the pay-off for this approach, in examining whether it can shed new light on old questions such as the sources of democracy, inter-group violence, and nationalism, distribution of benefits, public goods, and economic growth. This course is in large part based on a series of discussions between the instructor and Barry Weingast. Students who want an overview of the course contents are welcome at any time in the course (but before it begins may make for an easier choice for a research paper) can read our jointly authored manuscript "An Equilibrium Approach to Culture" on the class website. Requirements of the Course: Students will be expected to read broadly for each week's readings, and to participate in seminar discussions of the readings. For any four of the weeks, a "response paper" of about 1,500 words should be posted on the discussion section of the Coursework website. Those papers, participation in seminar discussions, and a take-home final examination on the readings and lectures will be the basis for the course grade. Students are welcome to petition to write a seminar paper that develops or critiques some aspect of the equilibrium approach to culture as a substitute for the response

papers. The exam and the seminar paper (for students taking that route) will be due on the final day of examination week.

7.3 CULTURE AS EXPLANATION: CULTURAL CONCERNS

Cultural theory is a method of studying cultural conflict. It makes a neo-Durkheimian synthesis around a dynamic concept of culture as simultaneously creating, sustaining, and produced by institutions. A focus on institutional factors avoids confusion of subjective and objective viewpoints. Conflicts of values are interpreted in terms of competition between incompatible organizational forms. This approach to policy analysis has been applied to disputes concerning risk, environmental degradation, water engineering, organizational control, crime, traffic regulation, and religion. The method is to create an abstract field of possible organizational environments in two dimensions (strength of group boundaries and strength of structuring constraints on individual behavior), giving four ideal types of organization, each with its appropriate culture. Upon the various positions in this field, specific attitudes and values are postulated as institutionalized cultural pressures. The moral climate of a bureaucratic hierarchy shows in the lines and boundaries it draws; a dissident group develops an enclave culture, likewise a competitive market exerts pressure for freedom to contract, a population of isolates behaves idiosyncratically for lack of pressures to conform. All four cultural types are assumed present in any community, each in dynamic rivalry with the others.

7.4 SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS

Our summary of the main social-structural and cultural theories that have been employed to explain historical and ecological variation in offending has necessarily been brief, and we make no attempt to provide a comparative evaluation of the explanatory worth of these different perspectives. Indeed, all of the relevant theoretical approaches find some support in the literature (Pratt & Cullen, 2005) and can probably account

for some of the variation that arises over time, and among different neighborhoods, cities, regions, and countries. We think that these approaches are salient for explaining historical and ecological variation in offending and leave it to others to evaluate their relative worth. We do think, however, that the evolutionary approach that we advocate in this book can enrich our understanding of variations in crime and can be successfully integrated with the perspectives presented in this section.

Political culture theory has passed through several periods of intensive development and high interest from both social and political science research (Seligson 2002; Eckstein 1988; Elkins and Simeon 1979). Its success has been based on the explanatory power of its arguments regarding the intermediate role culture plays in the relation between the citizens and the dynamics of the polity structure, organization and operation. It has also known long periods of critics and harsh denials of its very explanatory power, philosophical backgrounds, and methodological means (Welch 2013; Steinmetz (1999); Jackman and Miller 1996; Reisinger 1995; Pateman 1971; Lijphart 1980; Dittmer 1977). One such critical aspect is that political culture theory does not actually provide for an ontology and epistemology of its own, it just suggests dimensions of comparative analysis without having fundamentally specified what it is and how it works (Welch 2013). Moreover, it employs attitude measurements and evaluations of attitudes' impact on political behavior or action deliberation without actually having provided for attitude operationalization. Attitude research has ever since developed an impressive conceptual and methodological endeavor for achieving an operational form of the attitude structure as it has been defined by Allport (1929, 1935). The spectacular historical development in attitude fundamental and methodological research has not been closely followed by similar efforts in political culture theory and methodological research. Another critical aspect is that political culture theory has not integrated culture and state studies in a unified conceptual and operational framework (Steinmetz 1999).

Observing the methodological developments in the political culture research and connected areas, one could expect that they would have effects on the ontological and epistemological aspects which have long

been waiting for a sound approach in political culture theory. There are several possible explanations of such expectations.

One such possible explanation could regard a new view based on a new type of support—the big data—the advanced technologies of the artificial as well as social media provide for the approaches on political participation in both virtual and real environments, which potentially modify the classic view on mass attitudes formation and change, political identities or political involvement. Not only that attitude survey research and, consequently, attitude measurements would be substantially transformed by the new technologies and the research methodologies they support, but the fundamental, methodological, and operational research on mass attitudes emergence as well as research on attitude structural components—affect and emotions, values and beliefs—have already been re-considered, and this seems to be only the beginning of a long and sophisticated chain of changes.

Another possible explanation addresses the actual need that political culture research could employ the virtual generative experiments which provide for the simulations of the potential dynamic evolutions of society and polity by means of the artificial societies (Epstein and Axtell 1996) and artificial polities (Cederman 1997; Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau 2010) methodologies. Though initially inspired and developed within the areas of conflict studies and international relations, these theories as well as their associated methodologies, mainly based on artificial agents, complex adaptive systems, and artificial life technologies, have seriously questioned political methodology means and, moreover, have indeed changed the research methodologies in other social sciences, like sociology and social-psychology. The impact of these radical changes has resulted in new disciplines, (i.e., computational sociology), and have confirmed similar phenomena which happened in economic sciences (computational economy) or linguistics (computational linguistics). A phenomenon equivalent to a "earth-quake" in the advanced technologies of the artificial which started in early 1980s and has been intensively employed in social and political research, has been felt like a "tsunami" in these areas since the classic research methodologies (that is, based exclusively on public surveys) have been almost "flooded" by the

generative experiments in which data are generated and only the outcomes of simulations could be efficiently compared with those obtained by empirical means (Flache et al. 2017). This phenomenon has subtly penetrated the political methodology research (Voinea 2016), and has even confronted with the dominant classic school: experimental political science (Druckman et al. 2011). Once the methodological backgrounds were shaken up, and the door for change was slightly opened, the wave is expected in the short run to hit massively the political methodology research.

Political culture: theory and methodology

Ever since its foundations by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in their famous book The Civic Culture (1963), political culture theory has employed attitude measurements as means to define the political culture as the theory about the relationship between the individual as citizen and the state viewed as an open polity (Almond and Verba 1963: p. 7). Classic political culture theory has provided for the modelling of the relationship between the individuals and the state, and this has thoroughly revealed both the need for such a concept and the strong methodological constraints to achieve a model of this relationship. The reasons were complex enough to explain the "crisis" which they generated between theory and methodology in political culture theory.

One important reason was the sharping difference between the way in which attitudes have been conceptually defined (Allport 1929, p. 221; 1935, pp. 798–844; Rosenberg and Hovland 1960) and the way in which they have been measured and operationalized. While the conceptual definition allowed for the classic 'affect-belief-cognition' ('A–B–C') structure of description, the operational definition could hardly go beyond relating the statistical variables describing belief, affect, and level of information in such a way as to achieve a binary outcome of rejection/acceptance with regard to the attitudinal object. This difference has strongly stimulated the social-psychology as well as the political psychology methodology research to achieve the operationalization of the attitudes as complex structures of belief, affect, cognition and action deliberation components which could explain behaviours and action

choices. Moreover, the ultimate goal has always been that of explaining the relationship between citizens' political attitudes and the dynamics of state (polity), governance, and political power. However, there is a second reason which added more complexity to the first one.

The second reason is that measurements concerning the state (polity), the political power, and the emotional phenomenology which impacts political behaviour are still waiting for a measurement theory, operationalization theory and, eventually, a modelling theory. In spite of considerable developments in these areas, the development of the research methodologies have never truly, completely answered the need for complex operational descriptions of the polity, power and emotional phenomenology, nor have they been able to adequately and completely support the explanation of the dynamic relationship between individuals' attitudes and the dynamics of state and power.

These two fundamental reasons have been strong enough to shape the orientations of research methodologies concerned with issues of political culture starting from the mid'1970s until the present days. The first and most important consequence was that in the following two or three decades after the 1970s, the methodology research purposes have divided the methodology research effort to the aim of covering each and every aspect in the attitude structure which was actually waiting for an operationalization solution: emotion, belief, cognition, and later on, symbol and meaning formation. From this perspective, what actually happened afterwards was a tremendous development of disciplinary, multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary research aimed at achieving a full operationalization of attitudes.

The idea

The idea of this Special Issue was to collect methodological research approaches from various areas which address the fundamental concepts and methods in political culture and which have been included (or not) in the methodological concerns of political culture theory: values and beliefs, opinions and mass attitudes dynamics, political participation, mass belief systems and political communication, emotion and collective perceptions, symbol and meaning formation, narratives and public

policy, political leadership and ideology, state dynamics, political behavior, management of the commons and collective deliberation, conflict. The methodological approaches cover relevant areas like advanced data analysis, big data, data mining and machine learning, content analysis, text analysis, narratives, agent-based modelling.

The incredible expansion of methodological research as supported by the massive advanced technologies of communication, computational simulation and modelling has created a hard-to-cover gap between method, concept and philosophy of the domain. Political culture theory would not be the only domain which does not or could hardly keep pace with this fast and overwhelming development. One should not put the blame easily on the theory itself. The reason must be sought, of course, in the domain itself and, hopefully, identify a way to define what it is and how it works. However, the reason should be sought also in its essential connections to other domains on which it heavily depends, like the democracy and state studies.

This Special Issue is meant to emphasize this ever expanding methodological development, its dimensions and its potential impact on the epistemology of the domain. It is also meant to warn on the methodological advances and performances which should be taken into consideration for identifying the type of knowledge and how knowledge niche research areas arise, and to evaluate (even if very briefly) the contribution of each such approach.

Justification of a special issue

More than ever before, the technological innovation offered by the computational sciences as well as the sciences of the artificial has offered support and resources for research methodologies which could essentially impact the political culture theory. The methodology research developed in many connected interdisciplinary areas like social simulation, computational social networks, internet and big data, to mention but few, has extended its reach far beyond the initial border of the attitude measurement and analysis. It includes now a corpus of (old and new) measurement theories together with empirical data on issues which have not been measured before, like emotions or political identity

repertoires. The consequences of this uncommon development and subtle methodological differentiation would soon have their impact on the need for identifying sound ontological and epistemological grounds in the political culture theory. It is our purpose to underline the major lines of dynamic interdisciplinary development and thus understand where we stand in the political culture theory more than half century after it has been founded.

The subject

It is this methodological research advance and its areas of reach which makes the subject of our Special Issue.

Firstly, the Special Issue aggregates methodological approaches to some of the most common issues in political and social sciences which address either directly or indirectly the area of political culture: political behavior, political cognition, political participation, political communication, democracy (political structure and political leadership), governance (policy), nation-state, citizenship and state (political organization and state dynamics).

Secondly, the collection of the selected papers is meant to cover a considerable number of orientations in current disciplinary and interdisciplinary research focused on issues which are usually included in the definition of the political culture area: opinions, attitudes, values, beliefs, behaviors, culture, symbol, collective perceptions, and collective deliberations.

This Special Issue is trying to provide a comprehensive view over the dimensions of ongoing extension of the methodological developments and their potential consequences for the mid- and long-term research orientation in political culture research. We have compacted past and latest developments in the methodological research in political culture and connected areas into several quite wide fields of theoretical and methodological research: (1) attitudes, (2) democracy, (3) state and governance.

More often, more advanced and more convinced: a picture from within political culture methodological research

The dynamics of political phenomena proves an ever increasing complexity in approaching them. Trying to face this complexity challenge and to keep evaluating the sources of change in the society and in the state dynamics, various research communities in social and political sciences are employing more often and more convinced new types of research methodologies which are based on more advanced technologies of the artificial. One can see how sophisticated technologies, like the technologies of artificial intelligence, artificial life, and artificial societies, as well as technologies of simulation-based modelling and large-scale virtual experiments are intensively employed in research areas of political culture. Moreover, research methodologies from interdisciplinary connected areas like computational linguistics, content analysis, web semantics, semiotics, or cultural anthropology have been intensively employed in the political culture research.

Methodologies in political culture research have started to be intensively employed after the cognitive revolution and mostly starting with the 1990s. Such developments have characterized many areas outside classic original domains of political culture theory, namely political behaviour and comparative politics. Their outcomes have divided the area into, roughly, classic and external areas. While the classic area keeps its attachment to the original type of approach, the "assault" has been prepared for long time outside it. There are several areas which contribute to the domain: initially, the nation identities and nationalism and the democracy areas have divided the domain. Later, several other areas have provided for conceptual and methodological research: (1) policy and public administration, (2) democracy-building (transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy), (3) state-building (state formation, state dynamics, state failure, and state re-construction after failure).

The first main impact has been induced by the value theories which have kept the original concept and methodology, but lowered the level at which values are identified and measured as determinants of the attitudes. Value theory has produced the first main paradigmatic shift toward cultural-based social change.

From a methodological and epistemological perspective, the political culture research is a meeting place for at least three paradigms: (1) positivist and post-positivist epistemologies as inherited from the classic theory survey methodologies of collecting and analysing data based on the empirical data, (2) constructivist epistemologies based on the methodologies of complex emergent systems (agent-based systems, complex adaptive systems), and (3) culturalist and rational choice-based policy studies.

No matter if developed in its own courtyard or in some conceptual neighbourhood, research approaches on issues which are addressing political culture are emphasizing (1) a pragmatic orientation toward widening and diversifying the methodological issues, and (2) the need for methodological considerations which could potentially offer the ground for epistemological clarifications.

In the light of these developments a methodological clarification is strongly needed: getting scattered methodological research approaches together might prove unexpected changes at the theoretical level. The point we want to make is not just a methodological one, but also epistemological. Our Special Issue formulates an essential question in political culture research about whether all such developments represent a proof of an enhanced ability to tackle conceptual constructions by means of advanced technologies or they just reveal a novel framework of political methodological research that is in need of an epistemological clarification: namely what is the knowledge claim of the new methodological approaches?

It was the attitude measurements-based methodology which has initially offered support for shaping a theoretical formulation of what is meant by the notion of 'political culture' and how it works. However, later on, it was this same methodology which has actually opened the political culture theory's door for change. Now and then, this change is foreshadowed by the almost overwhelming extension of the methodological research. In this Special Issue we have considered four relevant types of development, each of them providing support for possible further epistemological clarifications: (1) modernization and human development theory, (2) cultural theory of politics, (3)

computational political culture, and (4) political anticipation and anticipatory systems for governance and society.

Since these clarifications would be offered by competing types of approaches and very much different schools of thinking in various areas of social and political sciences, they are themselves questioned with respect to their knowledge claim: Firstly, what type of knowledge do they provide for? Secondly, how do we come to acquire such knowledge?

Let us take a brief look at each of these major developments.

A theory in search for its methodology

During the mid'1960s, there were two main arguments which have been decisive in what has been called the domination of the positivist wave: one was the impact of survey methodology in sociological and comparative politics research, to mention but two most affected areas in social and political research (Berezin and Sandusky 2017). The other one regards the influence of several main schools of thinking in promoting positivist accounts on the empirical research and survey data analysis (Steinmetz 2005): Lazarsfeld's group at the Columbia University, Campbell's team at the University of Michigan, David Easton and William Riker as mentors of several generations of political scientists at Harvard (Hauptmann 2005).

Political culture theory has been conceived as a theoretical and methodological comparative analysis approach in two areas of study: national identity and the nation-state, and the democracy phenomena, including elections, political leadership, partisanship, political socialization. It was its research programmatic goal which has made meaningful its theoretical approach and has conveyed its significance to the extended research community and to the large public as well, that is, the goal of explaining the dynamics of the relationship between citizens and the state in democratic societies as a means of democratic stability. Almond and Verba's impressive cross-country research approach, The Civic Culture (1963), has explained and made this dynamics predictable on the basis of empirical data and political analysis. The influence of Parsons' theories on the normative aspects of social and political life as

well as the influence of Weber's ideas has been decisive for guiding the political culture theory's development under a positivist framework. This positivist background of conceptual architecture and research aims has never changed. It still stands.

Classic political culture theory avoids defining a proper ontology. The theory is based on a comparative analysis approach aiming at explaining the role citizens might play in the dynamics of governance, power and state by means of their attitudes, where the concept of 'attitude' is meant to cover in a most general and extensive way a wide range of "subjective orientations", from sentiments and emotions, to values, beliefs, cognitions, knowledge, and behavioural aspects. The type and structure of the empirical data counts as well since the theory is based on opinion survey data sets which provide for the comparative analysis at nation level such that causality between cultural and political issues can be modelled in variables correlational terms:

Political culture research is characterized by an enormous diversity of studies on political attitudes. However, the theoretical status of a particular attitude and its […] explanatory value often remain ambiguous […] political culture presents itself as collective term […] which is analytically imprecise and hence has limited explanatory value. These two deficits appear in all criticisms regarding the concept. Yet, The Civic Culture has abetted this in two ways. First, it provides a very broad definition of political culture: namely, subjective orientations to politics. Second, the authors chose public-opinion surveys for the generation of the data set of The Civic Culture. This data collection method allows for a relatively simple analysis of individual attitudes (Fuchs 2007)

One of the most debated aspects has thus been that of causality. Classic political culture theory combines political behavior and culture at the subjective level of the individual citizen, atomizing the level on which attitudes are measured. Afterwards, these individual measurements are aggregated so that they provide for generalizations to mass attitudes. On the other hand, culture is considered as an emergent collective phenomenon (Elkins and Simeon 1979), and thus cannot be explained by simply counting or summing up individual projections. However, patterns of features could be identified such that cultures are associated

in time and space with some typical community of individuals. Beyond this, the question remains: Political culture theory explains the governance dynamics by cultural means provided by the analysis of individual attitudes. As in this case the "cause" and the "effect" are of different natures (Elkins and Simeon 1979), the question is how could the theory explain the one by means of the other in statistical terms? Approaching this difficulty has resulted in repeated changes of paradigm: from systemism to methodological individualism to phenomenological individualism, from positivist to interpretivist or constructivist views.

Modernization and human development theory

One is concerned with theories of modernization and human development originating in Condorcet's ideas about the French Revolution, and preserving strong Parsonians and Durkheiminian roots. This development has brought to the front the concept of value (Inglehart et al. 2003; Welzel 2013). The approach combines the classic political culture theory with theories of social change and value theories from psychology (Schwartz 2012; Maslow 1954, 1993), sociology of culture (Rokeach 1973, 1979), theories of state-building and democracy-building after the fall of communism in the Eastern European countries in 1989 and democratic stability (Dalton and Klingemann 2007; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Klingemann and Zielonka 2006; Pollak et al. 2003; Mishler and Pollack 2003; Huntington 1993), and state studies (Ellis 1997; Elazar 1970; Eckstein 1988).

These works prove a strong attachment to the classic concepts of subjective orientations as well as individual and mass political attitudes in political culture theory. However, while keeping in the mainstream Parsonians tradition, it succeeds to lower the classic methodological level of the political culture theory from 'attitudes' to 'values' as the latter takes a position of precedence with respect to the formation and change of the former in terms of causality. It is the most profound adaptation of the classic theory toward a more sound philosophical background, and what the approach suggests seems closer to an epistemology of democracy (Goldman and Blanchard 2015) in projecting these concepts—values, attitudes and actions as well as the relations between

the individual citizen and the (democratic) state—onto the abstract level of their significance in democracy terms for the human development sequence (Welzel 2013). This theoretical development suggests an epistemology of democracy viewed and defined in terms of human action and, as intentional statement it is, most probably, closets to the original ideas of the founding fathers of political culture theory. It fits in the tradition of the ontology and sociological epistemology of human action which could be found in the works of Weber (1949), and Parsons (1968). Moreover, it reveals a deep inspiration in Lipset's ideas (1959):

Our purpose here is not to demonstrate the impact of changing values on democracy so much as to make a point about the epistemology of survey data with important ramifications for the way we analyze democracy. Unlike dozens of articles we've published that nail down one hypothesis about one dependent variable, this piece analyzes data from almost 400 surveys to demonstrate that modernization-linked attitudes are stable attributes of given societies and are strongly linked with many important societal-level variables, ranging from civil society to democracy to gender equality (Inglehart and Welzel 2010)

Though close to some of the political culture theory's main targets, like the knowledge about democracy and the knowledge about how to keep a democracy stable and efficient in terms of governance (public policy) and relation to the citizenry, an attempt to develop it toward suggesting an epistemology of democracy in terms of human values and actions would, however, deflect the classic political culture theory from its original purpose, which is that of identifying the mechanisms and processes which explain how the citizenry and the democratic polity could substantially and, sometimes, decisively influence each other's dynamics.

Cultural theory of politics

The other one is a cultural theory of politics (Swedlow 2011a, b; Wildavsky 1987) which builds upon the structuralist backgrounds of Douglas' Cultural Theory (CT) an approach which combines culture, institutions, and political science in a theory which starts from the rationality of individual agents, their deliberative and action capacities,

and the relations between individuals and institutions. The methodological approach takes into consideration the individual level (political culture) as well as the macro level (institutions) in cross-cultural contexts, and succeeds to achieve a significant explanatory power in areas which include public policy and international relations. It is of a special relevance the connection between the cultural relativist theory (Thompson et al. 2006) and the policy theory which explains the impact of the former in explaining the political conflict as well as the political coalition formation and dynamics (Swedlow 2011a, b). This connection is important as it reveals a fundamental orientation toward meaning formation in the relationship between the individual and the institutions in policy terms and dynamics. This might help in identifying a conceptual congruence with the narrative policy theories (NPF) and also with the interpretivist theories of state and the network-based governance models (Marsh 2011). The methodologic approaches in these fields as well in their interdisciplinary areas share a fundamental interest in the dynamics of collective perceptions and meaning extraction from social and political structure suggesting as appropriate an epistemology of structural communication, meaning formation and transfer.

Aiming at explaining the subtle mechanisms of governance by cultural mechanisms, a theory of culture seems to complement the classic political culture theory with respect to the theoretical and methodological issues associated to the applications of the later to the area of governance and public administration, connecting it to both political power and public policy. In spite of its structuralist backgrounds, it suggests an epistemology of meaning. This suggestion might be reinforced by the close ties between cultural theory and narrative theories concerned with public policy.

Computational political culture

In between these two first developments, there is a long-claimed, strongly advocated theoretical development which reveals in political science—as well as in sociology and international relations research—a fundamental orientation toward emphasizing the dynamics of political phenomena and their complexity (Tilly 1995, 2001; McAdam et al. 2001;

Goodin and Tilly 2006). The roots of this orientation should be sought in the middle-range mechanism theory (Merton 1949, 1957), and in the theories of mechanism-based explanation (Boudon 1998; Bunge 1997, 2004) which have marked the post-positivist wave. This conceptual and methodological development took political analysis and modelling from the universal law theories (Hempel 1942) to the dynamic processes and recurrence mechanisms in history-sensitive political phenomena (Tilly 1995). The developments on this dimension have revealed different philosophical backgrounds from methodological individualism to systemism. The consideration of culture in state modelling has been the result of the influence of a "culturalist turn" in both social and political sciences during the 1990s (Steinmetz 1999). It revealed the weaknesses of the modelling paradigms which employed culture in explaining state operation and state dynamics, and required a different view:

Methodological individualism, phenomenological individualism, and system realism all have difficulty dealing with culture because they have no secure location for it. The two forms of individualism can pack bits of culture into particular human brains as preferences, cognitive filters, memories, or something of the sort, but they then lack any plausible account of culture's collective character, much less of its interdependence and systematic change. System realism faces the opposite problem: while locating culture in the aggregate as an organ of system-wide communication, control, or adaptation, it offers no credible account of cultural variability, multiplicity, conflict, and change, much less of how culture affects individual performance. (Tilly 1999: p. 410)

The paradigmatic changes in what regards state modelling dimension of political culture research has been, on the one hand, the result of the "lack of ontologies and methodologies that are both philosophically profound and scientifically defensible" (Pickel 2007). On the other hand, this repeated paradigmatic shift has also revealed the difficulty of such paradigms in answering one of the most challenging research question which concerns the capacity of political culture theory to explain how order emerges, how macro-level processes and structure (institutions) could influence the micro-level behaviors and interactions?

Notes

As Tilly suggested, the appropriate developments of state theories which directly point to essential issues of political culture theory should take into consideration a relational approach (Tilly 1999: p. 419) at four levels of conceptual and methodological elaboration: citizenship, democracy, nationalism, and contentious repertoires (Tilly 1999: p. 414). Though elaborated in several fundamental works (McAdam et al. 2001; Goodin and Tilly 2006), this idea remained in theoretical qualitative terms. Notwithstanding its strong influence, the idea has not found a proper methodology, nor has it been going far beyond epistemological assumptions of critical realism. It, nevertheless, found a methodological accomplishment in what has been viewed as the computational and simulation wave in both sociology and international relations research inspired from state studies and from the generative forms theories based on Simmel' sociology (Cederman 1997). The orientation toward simulation-based research has been initially emphasized in Axelrod's Tribute Model (1997) and has been soon followed by an avalanche of agent-based methodological approaches to most variated issues in social and political sciences.

This orientation is strongly connected with a trend toward achieving a computational political science in much the same way as sociology, economics, or linguistics have experienced this dramatic transformation induced in the late 1990s and fostered during the past two or three decades by the technological innovation. Classic analysis of survey empirical data has been gradually confronted and sometimes complemented or even replaced by a generative approach which revealed that the constructivist theories took the lead during the late 1990s in social-psychology research on attitudes (Wilson et al. 2000), and simulation-based modelling research on Epstein and Axtell (1996, 2002), Axelrod (1997). Causality-based approaches made room to complexity based ones. It was the time when progress in social simulation and computational sociology has strongly influenced the political science research in the state study area (Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau 2010), conflict studies and international relations (Axelrod 1997; Cederman 1997) such that the generative experiments of simulation-based modelling have been approached in different paradigms, like KISS

(Axelrod 1997), and TASS (Ito and Yamakage 2015). All this struggling for paradigm has revealed a clear appetite for the bottom-up approaches in both social and political sciences, that is, a type of constructivism which has successfully addressed the emergence of structure in social and political organizations. Though not as successful in explaining the emergence of new political order, the methodological individualism and its methodological achievements in social simulation research systems has proved the capacity to explain structure emergence, which has been studied in connection with system complexity and self-organization.

This kind of methodological development suggests an epistemology of interaction. Concepts of "agency" and "interaction" could allow for the elaboration of an epistemology of society and polity as complex interaction entities able to adapt, grow or degenerate in consequence of their interactions in their spatio-temporal contexts. However, interaction alone without reflexivity and self-organization cannot provide for essential views of both society and polity. This might explain why a forth orientation has been identified and what does it offer in comparison with the others.

Anticipatory systems

The anticipatory systems for governance and society represent an initiative which is currently carried on by LEAP,Footnote1 with a main focus on policymaking as a political anticipation of risk. The project develops qualitative research in anticipatory systems (Caillol 2017), a concept defined earlier by Robert Rosen (2012) and further adapted by Mihai Nadin to policy making systems (2015). An anticipatory system can be defined as a system in which "present change of state depends upon future circumstances, rather than merely on the present or past" (Rosen 2012: p. 5). Such systems contain models of themselves, and their behavior is characterized as anticipatory. Anticipation is a concept which originates in the interdisciplinary research in natural science and mathematics, and concerns the capacity of biological systems (living organisms) to generate and maintain internal predictive models of themselves and their environments, and utilize the predictions of these models about the future for purpose of control in the present. Many of

the unique properties of organisms can really be understood only if these internal models are taken into account. Thus, the concept of a system with an internal predictive model seemed to offer a way to study anticipatory systems in a scientifically rigorous way. (Rosen, Foreword2012: p. 5)

This concept has been further studied and formalized by Dubois (1998) who defines the anticipatory system as a system which contains a model of itself. Rosen's theory is based on an "epistemology which defines properties of logic and mathematical structures" (Kercel 2002, 2007) where such property, like "impredicativity" is described as "every functional aspect of the model is contained within another functional component" (Nadin 2012: p. 26)

Luhmann's theory on social systems (2012) has been inspired by the Maturana's theory on autopoietic systems (2002). Luhmann's view is based on the idea of communication. His works on social and political systems are fundamentally concerned with the transmission of meaning in structures of communication (social systems) or structures of governance (political systems). His theories suggest an epistemology of meaning as the fundamental working principle in both social and political systems.

The epistemologies of meaning are more often suggested or elaborated with concern to reflexive systems. Reflexivity is a concept which is intensively used in research on social media systems and on social and political systems. In socializing networks and in self-organized criticality research, reflexivity concerns the capacity of virtual systems to become (re)active to repeated contacts with other virtual active systems, that is, systems which receive messages, understand their content, and further transmit the messages in a neighbourhood of contacts. In social and political systems, reflexivity concerns systems with model-based behaviour, that is, anticipatory systems: such systems could self-organize such that a new internal order might replace an old one. It is one of the possible scenarios which political culture cannot explain so far in terms of mass attitudes and their impact on the dynamics of an open polity. Meaning formation, meaning dynamics and meaning transmission appear as basic aspects in the definition of anticipatory systems. Meaning

research methodologies transcend psychological and social boundaries, and have been approached with concern to the definition and operation of macro-systems, like the polities.

From this perspective, meaning epistemologies might be the ones to win the competition as we have described it in the previous sections and sub-sections: the main argument might be that they incur philosophical soundness in political culture theory.

There are other approaches on the ontological and epistemological choices in political culture theory. Some authors have tried to re-elaborate political culture theory on different ontological and epistemological backgrounds by introducing concepts of discourse and practice in a dual model inspired by the philosophical works of Foucault (1981) and congruent with the constructivist works on attitudes (Wilson and Hodges 1992; Wilson et al. 2000):

The great virtue of Foucault is to have stated as strongly as it could be stated that discourse – representation, codification, categorization, prescription, and so on – has a necessarily political character. […] power is discursive in the sense that it operates through analysis and then prescription of the worker's actions. (Welch 2013, p. 173)

Other authors have elaborated more on the weaknesses and limits of political culture theory (Bove 2002).

Tendencies of methodological research developments in political culture

The aim of this Special Issue is to understand and describe the main tendencies in the area of research methodologies associated with political culture theory research. The most relevant and effective tendencies which have been selected for this Special issue are summarized in what follows. Their selection was meant to illustrate some of the ongoing relevant dimensions of the current development. It was also aimed at warning with respect to the wideness, complexity and multi-, and inter-disciplinary characteristics of the domain of theories and methodologies employed.

Attitude and attitude change dynamics and the relationship between attitudes and value systems and values dynamics, beliefs systems and belief (ideology) dynamics, affect dynamics, dynamics of knowledge

acquisition and structuring (learning) and dynamics of cognitive processes and cultural cognitions

This tendency could be characterized as enlarging and advancing the methodologies for dynamic attitude operationalization and dynamic attitude change research. There are two main dimensions of research which dominate the picture: (1) studies of attitude change dynamics in agent-based systems, and (2) studies of attitude change dynamics in relation to the dynamics of belief systems, ideologies, values, symbols. In this volume, while the former proved fruitful in understanding scenarios of preference falsification in deliberation processes (Tena-Sanchez et al., this volume) or in war contexts (Mitsutsuji and Yamakage 2019), the latter type of approach prove useful in understanding the cognitive basis of attitude change dynamics. However, cognitive modelling, while appropriate to model a dynamic scenario like Brexit attitudes, could also reveal at the methodological level the lack of conceptual complexity in the political culture methodology in relating attitude change dynamics with belief dynamics, thus leaving the burden of the modelling task on the opinion dynamics modelling and social simulation agent-based methodology (Edmonds, this volume). This tendency addresses also the relationship between emotional phenomenology and sentiment analysis (Takikawa and Sakamoto 2019), political violence, contentious politics, social and political unrest and ethnical conflict (Lemos et al. 2019), political discourse and ideology analysis (Maerz and Schneider 2019). This tendency also covers the need to address a complex evaluative perspective over the value system transformation in the context of major political regime change, like revolutions, in particular, the revolutions in the Eastern Europe which determined the fall of communist regimes in 1989. Cultural maps of the world prove their complexity when constructed with different statistical means and criteria (Pavlović and Todosijević 2019).

Emotions and ideology, meaning formation and meaning dynamics in political communication and social media, emergence of symbols

This tendency addresses the communication issues which influence and could appropriately explain the attitude formation and change processes. Such issues address the meaning formation and symbols' dynamics in

sensitive social and political context, emotional phenomenology which influences the formation of meaning and its dynamics in political discourses and dynamic social and cultural contexts (Maerz and Schneider 2019).

Governance and policy public perceptions, collective perceptions, and the narratives

This tendency is mainly addressing the issues of both policy and polity dynamics by means of analysing and evaluating public perceptions and narratives which provide for attitude formation and change. This tendency also covers the need to employ modelling methodologies which provide for explanatory capabilities of both policy and polity dynamics. One major class of methodologies is that of Narratives Policy Framework (NPF) which have been intensively employed in the analysis of the relationship between policy and cultural cognition (Walter-Smith et al. 2019). Another one is that of agent-based models of institutional structures dynamics: political regimes as well as political systems achieve catastrophic behaviour generated by public perceptions revealing preference falsification in contexts of affective cognitions (Miodownik and Lustick 2019).

Common resources management and community action deliberation

The need to address the complexity of management and deliberation with regard to common resources in deliberative communities induces this tendency of covering the community deliberative action choice in terms of political culture, that is, attitude formation, belief change, value consolidation/de-consolidation, etc. (Barsony et al. 2019).

Comparative analysis, testing, and evaluation of research methodologies and their supporting technologies

This tendency proves the need of the methodological research to achieve an integrated, advanced body of methodologies which could improve not only the performances in processing huge amounts of data, connections, and resources now available in both the physical and virtual spaces, but mainly a justification of their effectiveness in relating political culture theory with its milieu of rather independently developed methodologies which are now waiting to prove how and why they can contribute to political culture theory improvement (Ettensberger 2019). This tendency

has been induced and sustained in agent-based modelling and social simulation research by some of the most relevant attempts to elaborate comparative analysis of research methodologies (Axtell et al. 1996; Lorenz 2014). This tendency is now revealed in political culture methodology research development as a way of selecting research methodologies based on criteria of performance and effectiveness in achieving research goals defined at the political culture theory level.

A landscape of methodological research in political culture and connected areas This Special Issue aims at identifying the extension and the impact of the new research methodologies and technologies on the political culture research outcomes and performances to answer the inquiries on the potential emergence of a computational dimension of political culture research in much the same way the computational sociology, to give but one example, has fundamentally transformed the classic domain of sociology by methodological and technological means.

A number of contributions employ agent-based models as a virtual laboratory to investigate political culture. The range of phenomena covered by these contributions range from changing identities to sudden collapse of political institutions and emergence of new order. It is striking, however, that many of the agent-based models apply various forms of opinion dynamics modelling and only very few approach the political attitudes modelling.

Other contributions apply big data technologies along with data mining, machine learning and text mining technologies to search for natural language patterns in political discourses. These contributions attempt at classifying political culture.

Other contribution uses cluster analysis of statistical patterns on the macro level of the world value surveys as provided by the most relevant database in this area.Footnote2

Some other contributions employ mixed methods approaches up to qualitative micro sociological analysis of ways of public life. These various approaches demonstrate the fruitfulness of recent methodological developments in political culture research in the crossing of traditional disciplinary boundaries.

Agent-based models

Two papers, one by Ian S. Lustick and Dan Miodownik and one by Francisco José León-Medina, Jordi Tena-Sánchez, and Francisco José Miguel describe agent-based models of the theory of preference falsification. The theory has been developed by the political scientist Kuran (1995). The basic idea is the well-known tendency from survey research that individuals orient their public expression of beliefs and attitudes on what is socially acceptable. This can have the consequence that their true preferences differ from their publicly expressed attitudes. Kuran uses this basic assumption for explaining political phenomena.

In their paper on "Fakers Becoming Believers How opinion dynamics are shaped by preference falsification, impression management and coherence heuristics", Francisco José León-Medina, Jordi Tena-Sánchez, and Francisco José Miguel provide a theoretical investigation of the theory of preference falsification by means of an agent-based model of opinion dynamics. Opinion dynamics is a long-lasting and highly active research field in the domain of agent-based modelling (Lorenz and Neumann 2018). So the authors could rely on an already developed framework for their research. The theoretical objective of this investigation is twofold: on the one hand the authors utilize agent-based modelling for overcoming limitations of Kuran's mathematical theory such as the assumption of homogeneity of actors, or ignorance of status differentials. On the other hand, they introduce the concept of preference falsification to the research program of opinion dynamics by developing a model that is carefully grounded in psychological theory. This implies that agents might change also their private opinion. The main objective of the simulation experiments is again theoretical: studying how unanimity of public opinion emerges and the micro dynamics of the related opinion change. This is a purely theoretical objective. Indeed the authors end with remarking the possibility of a sudden collapse of pluralistic ignorance such as the Arab Spring as potential further research. This is exactly the objective of the article by Lustick and Miodownik. They utilize the theory of preference falsification for explaining the stability and a possible sudden collapse of institutions. So the end of this theoretical investigation is the beginning of the next one.

In their paper on: "When do Institutions Suddenly Collapse? Zones of Knowledge and the Likelihood of Political Cascades", Lustick and Miodownik utilize simulation experiments for studying the rare events of revolutionary political cascades. A huge amount of simulation experiments enables to investigate conditions for the likelihood of revolutionary cascades, by studying conditions in the parameter range in which tipping it will never occur, and others with a certain likelihood within predictable limits. The formal model enables to enhance Kuran's theory of preference falsification by specifying hidden assumptions of the theory. Lustick and Miodownik first extend Kuran's theory by introducing different agents according to their propensity to act on their genuine beliefs on a scale from activists of a "Che Guevara" kind to merely passive citizens. This is somewhat similar to Epstein's model of civil violence (Epstein 2002). Next they introduce the term "zones of knowledge" that specify the range of the neighbourhood that can be monitored by the agents. When a monitoring agent observes sufficient mobilization by others to pass its own threshold for mobilization, it mobilizes. The findings of a statistical analysis of the simulation experiments tend to support the lines of argument by small worlds theorists that middle range combinations of connectedness are more conducive to tipping points.

Also the paper of Katsuma Mitsutsuji and Susumu Yamakage on "Dual attitudinal dynamics of public opinion: agent-based reformulation of L.F. Richardson's war-moods model" describes an approach on public opinion dynamics, focused specifically on the attitudes towards war. Related to the theory of preference falsification also the agents in this model have public and private opinions even though the model is not specifically built on Kuran's theory. Rather, they refer to the theory of duality of public and private attitude developed by the early pioneer in complexity research, Lewis Richardson in the 1940s. The model investigates the dynamics of one specific public opinion, namely attitudes towards war. The objective is an explanation of cycles of war fever and weariness that could have been observed in Europe during the World War I, but also in the US public opinion during the wars after World War II. Whereas Richardson formulated a systems level model of

differential equations analogous to models of the spreading of epidemics, Mitsutsuji and Yamakage refine Richardon's approach by an agent-based model to capture the micro-dynamics of opinion change. While no status differentials are implemented in this model, also here agents update their publicly expressed opinion based on observing their neighbourhood. War is represented as an external shock with an additional influence on the agents' attitudes. This relatively simple model is able to produce patterns of meta-stability of public opinion which might quickly flip to a diverse majority after long times of stability which is comparable to the war mood cycles in empirical data.

The paper on "Co-developing beliefs and social influence networks—towards understanding socio-cognitive processes like Brexit" by Bruce Edmonds describes a model of opinion dynamics as well. However, the author deliberately abstains from relying on the classical framework of opinion dynamics models which is critically reviewed in this article. The central innovation of the model is a representation of the mutual influence of individual's beliefs and social structure by integrating a theory of mental coherence with processes of social network change within an agent-based model. This model structure results in very different processes than classical models of opinion dynamics (e.g. Deffuant et al. 2000; Hegselmann and Krause 2002) that typically evolve towards a stable state of either conformity or diversity of different opinion clusters like it is also the case e.g. in the model presented by León-Medina who study exactly the processes leading to unanimity in public opinions. A comparison with data opinion polls prior to the Brexit shows that these are highly volatile rather than emerging towards a stable state. This is the puzzle that Edmonds attempt to explain by integrating cognitive and social processes in a model of social intelligence. In the model the agents have links to other agents and a set of beliefs that might be more or less coherent. Agents can suggest their beliefs to other agents in their network and agents can individually drop a belief in order to increase the coherence of their belief set. Moreover, agents can change their network, i.e. drop or add link to other agents based on the principle of homophily. For capturing processes of undecided voters such as in the Brexit case, agents might also be strong minded or weak minded

regarding the need for cognitive coherence. Simulations experiments show that the combination of cognitive and social processes produces different results than runs with only social or cognitive processes activated. The combined processes show oscillating patterns in the opinion dynamics similar to those in the opinion polls before the Brexit.

In terms of citations two success stories exist in agent-based simulation research: On the one hand, opinion dynamics models (see e.g. a special issue in Advances in Complex Systems on Opinion dynamics and collective decisions for a state of the art of this research field), a research field to which also the contributions discussed so far can be subsumed, even though they are highly innovative further developments of this approach. The other "success story" consists in the models of ethnic segregation in the line of Schelling's model of ethnic segregation (Schelling 1971) and Axeldrod's model of dissemination of culture (Axelrod 1997).

The research presented by Carlos Lemos, Ross Gore, Laurence Lessard-Phillips, and F. LeRon Shults on a "Network Agent-Based Model of Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Cooperation" can be broadly considered as a contribution to this research field. Even though they do not deal with segregation, their model investigates effects of ethnic in-group and out-group differentiation. In line with the game theoretic approach of Hammond's and Axelrod's model of the evolution of culture (2006) they apply a Prisoner's dilemma game to study ethnocentrism. Agents are marked with tags to differentiate different ethnic majority and minority groups. Based on these tags the agents have a different likeliness of other agents of the same or a different tag that represents group barriers. Like Edmond's, this model also investigates the mutual interplay between individual cognition and social structure. The cognitive element is represented by the agents' updating their strategies in the Prisoner's dilemma game, and social structure represented as in Edmond's model by embedding the agents in a network structure of partners with whom the agents play the Prisoner's dilemma game. Due to experiences, the network might change over time. Lemos et al. investigate the parameter space of the model for investigating how group barriers influence the emergence of co-operative or non-cooperative behaviour, how structural

adaption shapes the emergence of cooperation between groups, and the influence of the relative size of the majority and minority groups on the formation of mixed network structures. A central finding is that all different kind of combinations of strategies can emerge, however, with different likelihoods. Whereas the group barriers, marked by tags, are of central importance, relative size of the populations is only of minor influence on the results.

Big data, text mining, data mining and machine learning technologies

Agent-based models are particularly useful for investigating the interplay of cognitive and social structure. The approach enables to study at the same time the cognition of individual agents and the structural properties of their interaction and how they are mutually interwoven. The computational agents enable to grow society "from the bottom up" as it has been famously coined by Epstein and Axtell (1996). In consequence, the "top down" role of elites is less considered in this research approach. Elites come in the focus of investigation of political culture research when turning to approaches that use computational technologies for "big"- data mining, i.e. examining patterns in "real-live" data such as speeches, newspaper articles etc. This is data that is neither simulated nor generated by surveys, but "naturally" occurring in the social world. Subject of this data however, are often political elites—may these be speeches by political leaders themselves that are publicly available or newspaper articles covering political events.

A methodological contribution to applying machine learning technologies to political science is the paper on "Comparing Supervised Learning Algorithms and Artificial Neural Networks for Conflict Prediction: Performance and Applicability of Deep Learning in the field" by Felix Ettensperger. Such methodological investigations provide an important step for assessing new technologies in political science research that deserves further attention and research. The motivation for applying machine learning technologies is that quantitative conflict analysis is still based mostly on conventional regression methods. However, conventional linear regression methods are often problematic in predicting the complex non-linear interactions. A hope can be that machine learning algorithms might overcome this problem of a linear

analysis. However, so far an analysis of their reliability is missing. For overcoming this gap, Ettensperger compares the accuracy of various different learning algorithms. Nine different machine learning techniques are evaluated, including k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN), Random Forest (RF), Feed-Forward Neural Networks (FFNN) and Recursive Neural Networks with Long-Short-Term-Memory (LSTM) Layers. As input data for the conflict prediction is used socio-economic, demographic, and political data. The resultant classification can be 'Peaceful', 'Almost Peaceful', 'Minor Conflict', 'Major Conflict', and 'War'. Given the five categories one would expect an accuracy of prediction by chance to be 20%. Thus algorithms should be of higher accuracy to be useful. For the comparison different tests are used such as excluding whole countries for investigating how the algorithm works with completely new, unfamiliar data. The test result is that simple linear regression models achieve a median accuracy of slightly above 50%, whereas supervised learning algorithms, which are probabilistic approaches to pattern recognition and classification, predict 70% and 80% of the cases correctly. However, they perform poorly when excluding whole countries (i.e. in prediction structurally new cases). In this respect the so-called random forest algorithm, shows the best result. Accuracy remains at about 50%. Overall neural networks with single or multiple hidden layers networks perform less accurate than probabilistic pattern recognition. This holds also for a new variant of network architectures so-called Long-Short-Term-Memory Networks, a technique used for instance for image recognition or playing Go. Moreover they provide less information on how predictions are achieved, i.e. about the relative explanatory power the different variables used as input information. Thus the problem of conflict prediction poses different challenges than traditional fields of applications of artificial intelligence. Here probabilistic learning algorithms remain reliably technologies.

By using a large scale text-mining approach based on natural language processing technologies the paper on "The Moral-Emotional Foundations of Political Discourse: A Comparative Analysis of the Speech Records of the U.S. Congress and the Japanese Legislatures" by Hiroki Takikawa and Takuto Sakamoto provides a contribution to political psychology,

more specifically a critical re-examination of Haidt's moral foundation theory (Haidt 2012) and the relationship between emotions and political ideology as suggested by Wojcik et al. (2015). These accounts have the far reaching implication that political polarization may be mainly driven by innate factors. However, the assumption of a close association between an individual's moral-emotional behavior and his/her political ideology lacks comparative perspective as it is mostly based on US data. This is the motivation for comparing US and Japanese congress speeches over a longitudinal time frame. The results provide only limited support for the assumptions of political psychology that psychological factors such as emotions or moral foundations drive ideological preferences. Sentiment analysis for studying emotions and moral dictionary for investigating moral foundation theory enables the authors to undertake a multivariate regression analysis. However, the authors could not find systematic differences between democrats and republicans in US, but more emotions by minority party. Surprisingly, in Japan emotional language is more polarized and the polarization intensified over time, presumably due to long time just one ruling party. Likewise moral foundation theory is not well supported in US. However, the authors find better conformance of the data and the theory in Japan. The main finding is that positional factors of the political parties, i.e. being majority or minority party is of more explanatory value whereas there is no consistent relationships between moral-emotional phenomena and political ideology in the data. This challenges traditional assumptions of political psychology research.

In the paper "Comparing Public Communication in Democracies and Autocracies—Automated Text Analyses of Speeches by Heads of Government" Seraphine F. Maerz, and Carsten Q. Schneider develop a scale of liberalness of political leaders based on a computational analysis of speeches. By using a self-developed dictionary the authors apply a machine-based classification of keywords on a scale ranging from clearly liberal to clearly illiberal keywords. They analyze 4740 speeches delivered between 1999 and 2019 by 40 political leaders of 27 countries for developing the scale. The scale is validated using multiple criteria. This includes criterion validity, which checks if the speeches are

delivered by leaders from known liberal democracies or authoritarian regimes. Furthermore qualitative coding of a random sample of selected speeches confirms the validity of the scale. Validation includes also discovering latent topics of the talks with unsupervised topic models, a machine learning technology for statistically detecting topics in a natural language text corpus and a network analysis of topic clusters. These tests show that the authors developed a valid measure to identify meaningful differences among political leaders from democratic to autocratic regimes.

Statistical macro analysis

A methodologically relatively traditional but nevertheless highly important quantitative contribution to this special issue is the article by by Zoran Pavlović and Bojan Todosijević on "Global cultural zones the empirical way: Value structure of cultural zones and their relationship with democracy and the communist past". The article provides insight into the state of the art in the statistical macro analysis of political culture following Inglehart's global cultural map (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Thus the investigation contributes to the research on cross-cultural differences in values in the succession of classical modernization theory. The authors use cluster analysis. This is basically a classification technology like machine learning technologies as well. However, in contrast to natural language processing technologies, this analysis relies on statistical survey data, namely the World Value Survey. Whereas Inglehart relied on theoretical considerations based on a factor analysis of the dimensions of cross-cultural variation, the authors apply clustering techniques. While the cluster analysis is based on Inglehart's claim of two dimensions of cross-cultural variation, a distinction between traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression values, their analysis does not support Inglehart's model of nine cultural zones, as groups of countries with distinctive value profile. A statistical test of differences between the cultural zones suggested by Inglehart showed no significant differences between the groups. In contrast, a solution of the cluster analysis with three clusters appeared as empirically most appropriate and theoretically meaningful. The authors differentiate

between theoretically three distinct zones: a zone of traditional authority, comprising 50 countries, a zone of secularized authority, including 20 countries, and a zone of emancipation, consisting of 14 countries. Next to religion and socio-economic development in particular the presence or absence of a communist legacy appears to be highly relevant for the prospects of political culture. The authors suggest that the differentiation of the value zones seems to be theoretically correlated with the quality of democracy: Democratic political culture seems to be a matter of a specific combination of both value dimensions—the zone of emancipation. This theoretical discussion sheds light also on Maerz and Schneider's article of the empirical development of scale of liberalness as it allows to locate the liberalness of political leaders to cultural zones.

Mixed (methods) approaches for cultural analysis

The mapping of global cultural zones leads to cultural theory, developed by the anthropologist Douglas (1986), as an analytical frame for detailed analysis of political culture. Going back to Emil Durkheim's claim that social relations can be classified by two dimensions of integration and regulation (Perri 6, 2008), Cultural Theory posits a kind of Parsonian four-fold table of culturally possible ways of life spread out by the two variables. For instance both strong integration and regulation characterizes a hierarchical stance towards ways of life, whereas individualism is characterized by weak integration and regulation. Dependent on the different manifestations of the two variables the cultural patterns of individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchy or fatalism appear. Two contributions to this special issue make use of this theoretical account for studying political culture.

The paper "Political Disagreement in the Classroom: Testing Cultural Theory through Structured Observation" by Aenne Schoop, Marco Verweij, Ulrich Kühnen, and Shenghua Luan provides the first example for applying Mary Douglas' cultural theory to political culture research. Methodologically, the research advances qualitative methods in political culture research by exploring the methodology of structured observation: Groups of high school students were asked to discuss their opinions concerning three to five highly complex problems and how to resolve

them. Complemented by a survey of basic questions concerning demographic indicators and affinity with a political party and interest in politics, four classes with a total of 64 participants have been asked to discuss issues at least three out of five complex dilemmas of climate change, gun control, support for extreme right-wing parties, reaction to terrorist attacks, and child poverty. These are issues of high relevance for political culture research. The theoretical objective of the study was resolving the puzzle of cultural theory why the distinct ways of organizing, behaving and perceiving appear as a "way of life" as postulated by cultural theory. For this purpose each utterance was coded by a deductive coding scheme derived from cultural theory, i.e. as individualistic, egalitarian, hierarchic or fatalistic. Results reveal an inter-coder reliability of 98% and thus only 2% of incidents were excluded. Thus the students' attitude can uniquely be classified by the theoretical framework of cultural theory. However, the results show also a great diversity in the classroom, even though structured by the skeleton of cultural theory: While a slight majority of the students' preferred hierarchic solutions for the problems, a diversity of the individual attitudes remained within a certainly rather homogeneous environment of one and the same the high school in a small town in a rural area of Northern Germany. Methodologically, the study demonstrates that the methodology of structured observation, derived from psychology and management studies is a valuable tool for political culture research.

The second example of using cultural theory for political culture research is the paper by Aaron Smith-Walter, Michael D. Jones, Elizabeth A. Shanahan, and Holly L. Peterson on "The Stories Groups Tell: Campaign Finance Reform and the Narrative Networks of Cultural Cognition". At the example of attitudes towards campaign finance of political parties the authors show that homogeneous cultural groups tell distinct stories about political processes that reflect their diverging core values. These narratives enable sense-making and structuring perception. Thereby narratives are central for valuation as certain aspects are put in the foreground of the narratives while others are put in the background. The selective framing of these stories follows patterns as prescribed by cultural theory, e.g. by individualistic or hierarchical attitudes. Relying

on the methodological insight of the narrative policy framework that these narratives provide a fundamental driver for political processes, the authors elaborated a mixed-methods approach for analyzing the valuation of political processes by different cultural groups. Data had been gathered by a number of culturally homogeneous (but distinct from each other) focus groups for discussing political campaign finance. For differentiating different focus the approach of cultural cognition had been applied, based on the differentiation provided by cultural theory. In fact, the groups generated distinct narratives. The differences of the narratives have been analyzed by quantitative measures of classical statistics and network measures. Statistical test theory had been utilized to measure differences in narrative components (i.e. existence or absence) between groups. Network measures have been deployed for mapping the characteristics of the narratives. For instance, density provides an indicator for a more cohesive story. For comparing differences between the networks of the different groups measures of statistical significance have been applied, supported by selected in vivo codes, whereas a qualitative analysis enabled identification of characters (e.g. heroes and victims) and causal mechanisms (e.g. that policy is made intentional by humans) in the narrative story. As narratives provide framework for integrating new information, a fundamental finding of the research is that even when provided with the similar information, the stories that the groups produced varied along theoretically consistent cultural dimensions. This is of practical relevance for policy: it cannot be assumed that "naked" information can simply objectively communicated to the public.

Finally, the contribution by Éva Perpék, Fanni Barsony, György Lengyel on "Enclave Deliberation and Common-Pool Resources. An Attempt to Apply Civic Preference Forum on Community Gardening in Hungary" represents the most distinctive qualitative angle of this special issue. The authors apply the method of a deliberative civic preference forum. This is a group discussion which differs from survey research as participants can reflect on their thoughts and those of other participants aiming at disseminating information and expressing diverse opinions. Based on the philosophy of deliberative democracy the attempt of the research is to

investigate whether community gardens can be understood as common pool resources in which the institutional design principles developed by Elinor Ostrom can be found. Ostrom (1990) typically investigated close-knit typically rural communities and thus the research question of the investigation is whether this organizational management style can also be found in community gardening. More broadly the authors have a threefold goal: provide gardeners a forum, testing if a civic preference forum is an adequate method for deliberative participation, and finally learn the institutional design of gardening communities. Relying on the discursive quality index (Steenbergen et al. 2003) to evaluate quality of deliberation the authors find that these criteria had indeed been fulfilled. Theoretically they could also find elements of Ostrom's institutional design principles. It has to be mentioned however, that restricting the philosophical foundation of deliberative democracy to gardening is also telling about the degree of development of civil society and status of liberal democracy. This confirms the big data driven findings of Maerz and Schneider (analyzing the speeches of political leaders) from a level of a qualitative micro-sociological perspective.

In spite of the impressive methodology developments, it is still too early for conclusions Ever since Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have founded it in the early 1960s, political culture theory has undergone a process of research domain fragmentation: its very domain has been divided into more and more tinny "niche" areas which, once developed, have brought back to it certain kinds of conceptual and methodological enrichment.

Bringing back such fragments or, even better said, bringing altogether parts which have been approached separately and further developed has not, however, resulted in achieving a specific methodology of research. Freed from the nomothetic constraint (Hempel 1942), and almost overwhelmed by the methodological "boom" strongly supported by the advanced technologies of the artificial, political culture has not found as yet a way to synthetize all these methodological contributions into theory improvement.

Attitude research is still looking for the means to formalize the relationship between beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours, and to

explain how the macro-level phenomena influence the attitude formation and change in the individuals. Rokeach (1979) has conceptually described the relationship between beliefs and values and the role they play in attitude formation. However, this description could not be formalized so far as it needs to define the mechanisms which achieve the relationships between beliefs and values, the emergence of attitudes, and the behaviour dynamics.

Polity research still needs a way of measuring and evaluating the state dynamics, state performance, and state failure. State dynamics as well as state performance have been modelled for conflict scenarios by means of agent-based systems and complex adaptive systems, though these models are based on economic conceptual backgrounds and conflict theory (Mueller 1991; Cioffi-Revilla 2009; Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau 2010; Cederman et al. 2018). While index-based measurement has been able to provide a comparative basis for state failure (Graf 2012), state failure measurement and the dynamic evaluation of the after-failure reconstruction capacities have been more appropriately approached by means of agent-based systems methodologies since they could cover the relationship between micro and macro levels of a political systems (Sakamoto and Endo 2016; Sakamoto 2013).

Socializing networks have provided for huge amounts of data in which complex information about emotional phenomenology is hidden. Facebook, Twitter or any other—all of them abound of data: these socializing platforms are going to essentially change the political culture theory. It is a matter of technology to extract the meanings from this data. Notwithstanding the impressive methodological developments and achievements, as long as political culture theory is still lacking substantial and integrative methodological contributions from polity, political regime, political power and emotional phenomenology research, it keeps waiting for the innovation to become effective.

Our Special Issue aims to warn on the huge, multidimensional conceptual and methodological space of political culture research, and its continuous enlargement based on the technological advances. Despite the methodological diversity, it can be stated nevertheless that many highly different contributions, ranging from agent-based modelling (ABM) to

narrative policy theories, search for mechanisms: mechanisms of institutional collapse (Miodownik and Lustick, this volume), mechanisms of attitude change towards phenomena such as war (Mitsutsuji and Susumu Yamakage 2019) or Brexit (Edmonds 2019), mechanisms of the collapse of a political monopoly or mechanisms of sense making (Walter-Smith et al. 2019) to mention a few examples. Identifying mechanisms attempts at answering the question: how does it work? This is an epistemological question. It attempts at providing an explanation, rather than asking for instance, the ontological question of what is existent. Mechanism based explanations are a specific type of an epistemological orientation (Hedström 2006). Thus, the search for mechanisms suggests a common epistemological orientation even among methodologically highly diverse approaches in recent directions of political culture research. This is a first hint that can be gained from the collection of research in this Special Issue. Nevertheless, one might ask: Where are we heading to?—A tentative answer is provided in the Prologue to theSpecial Issue (Voinea 2019).

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

ii) Compare your answers with those given at the end of this unit.

1. How do you know about the Culture as Explanation: Cultural Concerns?

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2. Discuss the Social-Structural and Cultural Explanations.

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7.5 CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY

In the 1990s a new generation of cultural geographers began to engage with a diverse range of philosophical traditions, and social and cultural

theories from cultural studies, anthropology, and sociology such that the subdisciplinary – indeed disciplinary – boundaries of cultural geography became blurred. The so-called 'linguistic' turn was felt throughout the social sciences and humanities; in cultural geography it focused attention on the landscape as text and the politics of the representations that geographers produce with the publication of Peter Jackson's (1989) influential text Maps of Meaning and the subsequent establishment of new academic journals such as Ecumene which would later evolve into Cultural Geographies (Crang and Mitchell, 2002). As Crang and Mitchell (2000: 2) argued, this journal would illustrate research aimed at "the wider deployment and development of cultural geographic imaginations: as part of returns to the 'traditional' humanities – history, literature studies, art criticism and philosophy – and through the emergence of newer interdisciplinary fields of cultural, media, queer, postcolonial, gender, environmental, urban and science studies. It is these transdisciplinary shifts that are placing cultural geographies at the centre of a more extensive intellectual landscape." They then went on to argue that Cultural Geographies sought to map out "the intellectual field of cultural geography not in terms of opposing camps – such as 'new' cultural geography and 'old' cultural geography – but by bringing together concerns over the cultural geographies of knowledge, landscape, nature and environment, and space and place" (Crang and Mitchell, 2002: 1). This has been acknowledged as helping to theoretically invigorate cultural geography in the US (Olwig, 2010). It also heralded an emphasis in innovative qualitative methods in cultural geography (Shurmer-Smith, 2003, DeLyser and Rogers, 2010). Nevertheless, a continuing theme has been in terms of mapping and reading cultural landscapes in variously nuanced ways (Mathewson, 1998, 1999; Mitchell, 2002; Crang, 2003; Della Dora, 2009).

There has been a long tradition of 'reading' the landscape in cultural geography. Peirce Lewis (1979: 12), for example, described the landscape as 'our unwitting autobiography.' Since the 1980s, however, the metaphor of landscape as text has been pursued more rigorously through a fuller engagement with literary and cultural theory; for example, in Duncan's (1990) now-classic study of the Kandyan Kingdom

in early nineteenth-century Sri Lanka, he describes how the king of Kandy concretized two intertwined discourses on kingship through a massive city-building program, in an attempt to secure his political power; this landscape transformation was then interpreted differently by the king, nobles, and peasants, through the lens of the two key texts. The story, then, is of intertextuality, of the interplay of discourses enacted in landscape and texts.

This textualization of landscape has itself been criticized, less in relation to Duncan's specific empirical application than as a general theory of landscape interpretation. It has been criticized for erasing process (Gregory, 1994), for overemphasizing the coherence of texts and landscapes, and for suppressing traces of nonhuman others: "it treats the landscape as a blank page that only human actors can read and write upon" (Demeritt, 1994: 170). Nevertheless, the metaphor has been reworked, for example, around the notion of theater and the script, to draw out the open, performative possibilities of text – partly structured and partly improvised. Gregory (1999), for example, analyzed the scripting of Egypt in the nineteenth century by a growing tourism industry. European tourists not only read voluminously when traveling down the Nile, the guidebooks also provided stage directions for transforming dahabeeah (floating barges) into 'secure viewing platforms' and the remains of ancient Egypt were literally and materially staged as an 'extended exhibition.' It is this attention to the materiality and spatiality of writing, in this case travel writing, that distinguishes the work of cultural geographers (Duncan and Gregory, 1999).

The humanistic geographers of the early 1980s were drawn to the textual metaphor; Cosgrove (1985) entreated them to pay closer attention to the visual, as a way of understanding one of their key, though untheorized, concepts, that of landscape. In Gregory's (1994: 98) assessment, this recognition of the 'conceptuality' of landscape was one of the 'cardinal achievements' of the revival of cultural geography in the 1980s. Cosgrove traced the emergence of landscape as a visual ideology, as a way of seeing, in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe. The discovery of linear perspective enabled a realist illusion of space: "Landscape is thus a way of seeing, a composition and structuring of the world so that it

may be appropriated by a detached individual spectator to whom an illusion of order and control is offered through the composition of space according to the certainties of geometry" (Cosgrove, 1985: 55). This way of seeing coincided with and supported a transition from feudalism to capitalism, and new social relations with nature, and land as property. What landscape paintings achieve aesthetically "maps, surveys, and ordnance charts achieve practically" (Cosgrove, 1985: 55); this recognition led to a critical reassessment of another of geographers' representational forms: the map. The assumed link between reality and representation has been broken, and maps are now read as "mechanisms for defining social relationships, sustaining social rules, and strengthening social values" (Harley, 1992: 237), as 'technologies of power' and as 'performances' (Pinder, 2007: 459). Kitchin and Dodge (2007: 331) take this a stage further and urge us to "rethink cartography as ontogenetic in nature; that is maps emerge through practices" such that "mapping is a process of constant reterritorialization."

Issues of power, politics, and performances have thus become central concerns for contemporary cultural geographers (Jackson, 1989; Shurmer-Smith and Hannam, 1994). Landscapes not only express social relations, they are also an important means of enacting them. And landscapes, like maps, are such effective technologies of power because they tend to naturalize these relations (Cresswell, 1996; Mitchell, 1996). Critical attention has also been given to the various cultural geographies that constitute colonial relations, in the past and in the 'colonial present' as well as with issues of racism, nationalism, identity, location, belonging, diaspora, and memory (Sidaway, 2000; Nash, 2002, 2003; Price, 2010; Tolia-Kelly, 2010).

Developing from this, cultural geographers have drawn from Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway to interrogate the assumed duality between nature and culture (Demeritt, 1994; Mitchell, 1995; Matless, 1996, 1997). There are two issues at stake. First, the division between nature and culture enforces the view that humans are the sole social agents. An artifactual understanding of nature pluralizes agency; cultural geographers are now willing to consider that we live in a livelier world in which nonhuman actors also have agency. The notion of agency has been

reworked, away from that of a conscious and controlling self, to one of having effects. Second, conceptualizing the boundary between nature and culture as a social construction has opened up a rich set of investigations around both the production of the boundary and slippages across it. In particular, Sarah Whatmore (2006) has been at the forefront of developing materialist concerns, which engage with science and technology studies and issues of performance (see below) to theorize a 'more-than-human world' in which nature and culture are articulated as 'lived.' She further argues that both 'old' and 'new' cultural geographies have sought to "cast the making of landscapes (whether worked or represented) as an exclusively human achievement in which the stuff of the world is so much putty in our hands" (Whatmore, 2006: 603). Instead, she argues drawing upon the philosopher Gilles Deleuze for conceptualizing nature and culture in terms of 'livingness.' Moreover, the lines between economy and culture are no less blurry particularly when we examine issues of consumption, urbanization, and the mobility of capital (Jackson, 2002; Castree, 2004; Gibson and Kong, 2005; Amin and Thrift, 2007; Thrift, 2012). Economic development is increasingly about culture, whether it be in the form of tourism or the redevelopment of urban areas for the purposes of spectacle and consumption. Access to jobs and job performances are increasingly interpreted as cultural phenomena and cultural geographers have begun to examine this in the context of hospitality work (Bell, 2007).

7.6 CULTURE AS A VARIABLE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Bringing culture into the analysis remains a problem for comparative political science. The notion is too vague and elusive — we are reluctant to evoke that amorphous mass of beliefs, institutions and actions which comprise the political culture of any nation when trying to compare policy processes. Only when the interplay of familiar political variables fails to correlate is culture introduced as an explanation of last resort

Recent work seeks more rigour for a cultural variable. Drawing on the anthropology of Mary Douglas and the public policy of Aaron Wildavsky, 'cultural theory' argues that groups fashion their world in limited

and predictable ways. Regime, belief and economy are subsumed by more fundamental choices about the organisation of collective life. Culture is people sharing values which justify social relations.

This paper sketches the premises and findings of cultural theory. It suggests some possibilities for comparative research — and the problems of testing this ambitious reformulation of political culture.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

ii) Compare your answers with those given at the end of this unit.

1. Discuss the Cultural Geography.

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2. Describe the Culture as a variable in comparative politics.

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7.7   LET US SUM UP

Many political scientists first learned of anthropologist Mary Douglas's cultural theory (CT) through Aaron Wildavsky's APSA presidential address (Wildavsky 1987), in which he sought to explain the value of this theoretical approach for political science. Since then, much additional work has been done to develop CT as an ambitious general theory of politics.

7.8   KEY WORDS

Interpretivism: Interpretivism is a school of thought in contemporary jurisprudence and the philosophy of law.

Culturalism: In philosophy and sociology, culturalism is the central importance of culture as an organizing force in human affairs. It was originally coined by the Polish-American philosopher and sociologist

Florian Znaniecki in his book Cultural Reality in English and later translated into Polish as kulturalizm.

Historicism: Historicism is the idea of attributing meaningful significance to space and time, such as historical period, geographical place, and local culture.

7.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

3. How do you know about the Culture as Explanation: Cultural Concerns

4. Discuss the Social-Structural and Cultural Explanations.

5. Discuss the Cultural Geography.

6. Describe the Culture as a variable in comparative politics.

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7.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 7.3
2. See Section 7.4

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 7.5
2. See Section 7.6